Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

Post-Graduate and Research Department Series, No. 22

MAHĀBHĀṢYADĪPIKĀ

OF

BHARTṚHARI

Fascicule II : Āhnika III

critically edited by

G. B. Palsule

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
POONA, INDIA
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FOREWORD

Understandably enough, the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (*MBD*) of Bhartṛhari is not so well and widely known as his other work, namely, the *Vākypadīya* which latter is aptly regarded as a veritable touchstone of Sanskrit grammatical scholarship. But it is certainly strange that the *MBD* should now be available — and that too in a fragmentary form — only through a single manuscript, which is preserved in the Berlin library. The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute procured a photostat copy of that manuscript, which, even on a cursory examination, was found to be woefully corrupt. But Professor K. V. Abhyankar and Acharya V. P. Limaye bravely undertook to decipher the manuscript and, with commendable perseverence, prepared an edition of the *MBD* according to their own reading of the text. This edition was published by the BORI in 1970. Even at that time it was felt that it would have been desirable if that edition had contained the photostat of the original manuscript so that critical students of Sanskrit grammar could have had the opportunity of evaluating the text, as reconstructed by the learned editors, by comparing it with the manuscript. The Institute made right this deficiency by issuing in 1980 an exact photostat of the Berlin manuscript of the *MBD*. This may be said to represent the second phase in the Institute's research project relating to the *MBD*.

It had all along been realised that the edition of the *MBD* published by the Institute in 1970 was but a tentative one. Actually, in another context, Abhyankar and Limaye had already mentioned a critical edition of the *MBD* with English translation and exposition as an urgent desideratum in the field of Bhartṛhari-studies (*Vākyapadīya of Śrī Bhartṛhari*, University of Poona, 1965; Introduction, p. XIV). Such work naturally called for a deeper, more strenuous, more systematic, and more collaborative study of the text. The Institute, therefore, formulated a detailed scheme for a critical edition of the *MBD* with English translation and exposition and got several scholars involved in it. The scheme was duly submitted to the University Grants Commission which readily agreed to sponsor it financially. And thus commenced the third (final ?) phase of the project.

While publishing the first fascicule of the critical edition of the *MBD* (Āhnika III), the Institute would like to express its grateful thanks to the University Grants Commission. And when I say that the editor, Professor G. B. Palsule, has done his job with admirable expertise, I hope that I shall not be accused of partiality towards a colleague and friend.

Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute
Poona
March 25, 1985

R. N. Dandekar

PREFATORY NOTE

This is the first fascicule, comprising the Āhnika III, of the Critical Edition of Bhartṛhari's commentary *Dīpikā* (sometimes called simply *ṭīkā*) on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. When the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute undertook to bring out this edition of the *Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā* and assigned different Āhnikas to different Editors, my choice at once fell on the Āhnika III. This was for two reasons. The first one was quite simple and practical: this is the shortest Āhnika, the shortness being augmented by a huge gap in the text. Secondly, many years back I had taught this third Āhnika of the *Mahābhāṣya* to the M.A. classes in the University of Poona and so I thought that I was fairly acquainted with this section of the *Mahābhāṣya*. After fourteen years I now realise how little I had really understood the *Mahābhāṣya* then. I cannot resist the temptation of referring to a stanza of (the other ?) Bhartṛhari which I think is very apt in the present context also, viz. *yadā kiṁcijño'ham ... ... mado me vyapagataḥ.*

In conformity with the plan finalised for this Critical Edition, this fascicule contains the critically edited text, its translation, and explanatory and critical notes. The translation is, in accordance with the now established pratice, literal. The notes are copious— 'too copious', some will perhaps say. But it was felt that many points remain obscure even with a literal translation and that detailed notes were necessary to bring out clearly the subtle, intricate and long drawn-out arguments with which ancient grammatical texts like the *Dīpikā* bristle, if the edition was to be of real help to the readers. (It may be mentioned incidentally that this Editor himself had no end of trouble in understanding the text and that he has to confess his inability to understand the text in a couple of places.) It was no easy job to fix the text, what with the uniqueness of the manuscript (and the previously unsuspected gaps in it), the idiosyncracies and the carelessness of the scribe and a somewhat peculiar style in which Bhartṛhari writes. This involved a far more number of text-reconstructions than would be normally expected. (No asterisk marks, however, have been used to indicate a reconstructed text, firstly because they would have disfigured whole pages, and secondly, because one can easily compare the constituted text with that of the MS by a mere glance at the companion volume, a facsimile reproduction of the MS published by the Institute in 1980.) Suffice it to say that all the decisions of text-reconstructions were taken after lengthy discussions with the collaborators, with one eye on intrinsic probability and the other on the corresponding passages of Kaiyaṭa who is often seen to have followed closely Bhartṛhari's *Dīpikā* —

a debt which he too has acknowledged.— Questions of a general nature like the transmission of the *Dīpikā*, the principles of the text constitution followed here, the relation between our author and that of *Vṛtti* on the *Vākyapadīya* etc. have not been discussed here as they will be dealt with in a General Introduction which will eventually follow.

Lastly, I have to record my deep debt of gratitude to the collaborators who have helped me immensely in this task. Acharya V. P. Limaye and Pandit V. B. Bhagavat Shastri were so kind as to take the trouble of a patient *pāṅkta* reading of the whole Āhnika with me. Acharya Limaye has a gift of divining unsuspected original readings and tracing citations, while Pt. Bhagavat Shastri's mastery in the ancient traditional texts of Sanskrit grammar solved a number of knotty problems which would otherwise have remained insoluble to me. Indeed, if I did not have the good fortune to have this *budhajana*, always ungrudging and obliging, constantly available for discussion, I would not have understood even half of what I now do. Dr. S. D. Joshi, equally at home in both the old and the modern Sanskrit scholarship, made some brilliant suggestions. Nor should I forget Dr. Saroja Bhate who took great interest in this work and with whom I have discussed some parts of this text. Finally, I express my deep sense of gratefulness for the opportunity given to me to participate in this great project.

Pune
25th March 1985

G. B. Palsule

ABBREVIATIONS

AL	=	Abhyankar and Limaye, ***Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā***, Poona, 1970
Bhar	=	Bhartṛhari
Dīp	=	*Dīpikā*
Kaiy	=	Kaiyaṭa
Kāt	=	Kātyāyana
Kāś	=	*Kāśikā*
Mbh	=	*Mahābhāṣya*
MS	=	Manuscript
Nāg	=	Nāgeśa, Nāgojibhaṭṭa
P	=	Pāṇini
Pari	=	Paribhāṣā
Pat	=	Patañjali
Sid-kau	=	*Siddhānta-Kaumudī*
Sw	=	Swaminathan, ***Mahābhāsya-Ṭikā***, Banaras, 1965
Vār	=	*Vārttika*
कै	=	कैयट
ना	=	नागेश, नागोजिभट्ट
सि. कौ.	=	सिद्धान्तकौमुदी

भर्तृहरिविरचितायां

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां तृतीयमाह्निकम्

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां तृतीयमाह्निकम्

[१] एतद्व्याख्यानेनैव व्याख्यातप्रायत्वात् त्यक्तानि नव सूत्राणि वेदितव्यानि ।

[२] कचित्... स्वरूपं तु सर्वत्र संनिहितमिति नाश्रीयते । तथा हि । इदमपि संज्ञया विधानं 'दिव औत्' (पा. ७. १. ८४) इति । अयमौकारः स्वरूपेण विधीयते इति ।

[३] **प्रकृतं गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमनुवर्तते** । इक इत्येतावता सिद्धम्, इकः प्रकृते गुणवृद्धी भवत इति । एवं सिद्धे सूत्रे गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमाश्रितशब्दव्यापारार्थम् । अयं तु द्वाभ्यां गुणवृद्धिग्रहणाभ्यामेतमर्थं प्रतिपादयति । एकेनापि सिध्यति । प्रकृतं गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमनुवर्तते । सर्वत्रैव व्याकरणे ग्रहणकवाक्यमुच्चरति । तत्तु न कार्यस्य प्रतिपादकम् । तन्निर्वर्तकं तु वाक्यान्तरं लक्ष्यसमवाय्युपप्लवते, यथा 'कर्तरि' (पा. ३.४.६७), "पशौ" (पा. ३.२.२५), कर्त्रोर् 'हस्तिसूचकयोः' (पा. ३.२.१३ वा.) इति । एवमनुमीयमानात् गुणवृद्धिग्रहणात् श्रूयमाणाच्च वाक्यान्तरमेव प्रतिपद्यामहे – इको गुणवृद्धी गुणवृद्धी इति । गुणवृद्धिसहचरिते ये गुणवृद्धी ते [इ]कः स्थाने भवत इति ।

[४] **यदि तदनुवर्तते... अदेङां वृद्धिसंज्ञा[पि] प्राप्नोति,** प्रतियोगमधिकारस्योपस्थानात् । ननु च वृद्धिशब्दः स्वरितः, इहादैच्पदार्थक उपतिष्ठते च, अत आदैचामेव गुणसंज्ञा प्रसक्ता स्यात् । अयमभिप्रायः । प्रदेशानां संज्ञा प्रवर्तमाना संज्ञान्तरेण कृतसंबन्धात् शब्दपरैव, इत्यनुमीयमानोऽपि [वृद्धिशब्दः] तथाभूतोऽनुमीयते इति इदमुक्तम् अदेङामिति (? °मपि) वृद्धिसंज्ञा स्यादिति ।

[५] **संबन्धमनुवर्तिष्य[ते]** । कथं संबन्धानुवृत्तिः ? उच्यते । यथैव अनुदेशाः प्रतिलब्धयथासंख्या[ः] प्रयोगकाले अभावान्निवर्तन्ते, यथा 'इग्यणः' (पा. १. १. ४५) इति, एवं स्वरितासङ्गादनुवृत्तिरनुमिता, उत्तरकालमादैचोऽप्यत्र संनिहिता इति प्रतिपद्यमान एवमर्थैव आदैजनुवृत्तिरिति संबन्धाभावं प्रतिपद्यते, लिङ्गासङ्गाच्चोत्तरत्र संबन्धमिति ।

[६] **अथ वा मण्डूकगतयोऽधिकारा** इति । संप्रति मुक्त्वादैचो वृद्धिशब्द एव केवलोऽनुवर्तते । प्रपार्थिनो मण्डूका अक्षीणवृत्तयस्तथाभूतां क्रियामारभन्ते, यथान्तराले

प्रतिबद्धगुरुत्वाः, अथ चैकमिष्टदेशं संनिपतन्ति, एवं शब्देऽप्यर्थकृता; यस्मिन्नर्थित्वं समीहते तत्रैवानुमिमीते इत्येतन्मण्डूकगत्या साम्यम् ।

[७] **अथ वैकयोगः करिष्यत** इति । पृथक्क्रियायोगादेकयोगत्वम् । भवतिरेक उच्चारणेऽध्याह्रियते । ' वृद्धिरादैजदेङ् गुण ' इति । यद्यपि प्रतिपत्तिकाले भवतिर्भिद्यते, एक एव प्रतिपत्तिकाल इति नास्ति स कालो यस्मिन् वृद्धिसंज्ञाशून्या आदैचः स्युः, अदेङो वा गुणसंज्ञाशून्या इति ।

[८] **अथ वान्यवचनाच्चकाराकरणादि[ति]** । किमत्रोत्सर्गापवादाभ्यां साम्यं को वा विशेषः ? विशेषस्तावद् – यथा सामान्यविशेषभाव उत्सर्गापवादयोः ' कर्मणि. . . . ' (पा. ३.२.१), ' आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः ' (पा. ३.२.३) इति । 'धातोर्' (पा. ३. १. ९१) इति चोदनायामस्त्यन्तर्भावात्र आकारान्तस्येति सामान्यमाकारान्तेषु । धात्वन्तरेषु [त्व]स्यानन्तर्भाव आकाराद् विशेषः । एवमिह [न] ' वृद्धिरादैज् ' इत्यत्र अदेङामन्तर्भावः, नापि 'अदेङ् गुण ' इत्यादैचां भवति । अथ किं सामान्यम् ? संदिग्धासंदिग्धत्वे । यथैवोत्सर्गचोदनायां [संदिह्यमानायाम]संदिह्यमानो विशेषः, एवं वृद्धिरादैजित्यनुवृत्तिः संदिह्यमाना किमुत्तरार्था नान्तरीयकत्वादिहाप्यर्थिता, उतैतदर्थापीति । अदेङ् गुण इति तु [अ]कृतार्थमसंदेग्धव्यं चेत्येतत् सामान्यम् ।

अत्र चोद्यते – यथैव प्रत्ययसंज्ञा संदिह्यमानान्यासामप्यनुवृत्तौ संभवन्त्यां सन्नादिषु कृतार्था असंदिह्यमाना[भिः] कृत्कृत्यतद्धिततद्राजसंज्ञाभिरकृतार्थाभिः समुच्चीयते, एवमिह कस्मात् समुच्चयो न भवति ? इति । अत्रोच्यते । प्रत्ययसंज्ञायाः संज्ञिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थत्वे प्रतिपत्तिर्न तु प्रदेशे केनचिद् व्यापारेणोपकरिष्यत इति । भिन्नकालत्वादविरोधाच्च विशेषसंज्ञाभिः समुच्चीयते । इह तु ' वृद्धिरादैज् ' इति निर्देशादिदं समधिगम्यते सोऽयमभिसंबन्धेनान्तरीकृत्य संज्ञिनः संज्ञाव्यपदेशोऽयमिति । स्वरितलिङ्गासङ्गाच्चेदं व्यक्तं, ' इको गुणवृद्धी ' इत्यत्रोपस्थितवृद्धिशब्देन साहचर्यात् प्रदेशे कश्चिदुपकारः करिष्यत इति । तत्र 'अदेङ् गुणः ' इत्यत्रोपस्थितं न कं[चिद्] व्यापारमनुविधीयते । किं संज्ञाव्यापारमुत संज्ञिव्यापारमिति संज्ञात्वमेवास्य संदिह्यमानमसंदिग्धो लिङ्गासङ्गः । ' अदेङ् गुणः ' इति गुणशब्दस्य संज्ञात्वमसंदिह्यमानम् । तत्र संदिह्यमानसंज्ञाव्यापारेणासंदिह्यमानसंज्ञाव्यापारस्य समकक्षता न युक्तेति सुष्ठूच्यते प्रकृतस्यापवाद इति ।

[९] **अथ वा वक्ष्यत्येतद्** इति । अनेनैतत् प्रतिपादयति – न्यायप्राप्ता मण्डूकगतिर्व्याकरणेनापि प्रतिपादितेति । तत्रानुवृत्तस्यापि निरर्थित्वे [असंबन्धं]

विभाषाश्रुतिरुपसूचयति इत्यनेन [यत्रार्थित्वं तत्रैव] संनिपतितव्यम्। अन्तराळे तु ग्रामान्तरं गच्छत इव मूळोपसर्पणमिति ।

[१०] **अथ वोभयं निवृत्तं तदपेक्षिष्यामहे।** ननु चात्रानेन भवितव्यम्, अनं[त]रस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वेति। यत्र ह्युभौ स्वर्येते तत्रोभावनुमीयेते, यत्रान्यतरस्तत्रान्यतमस्यानुमानमिति । सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। अपेक्ष्ये तु द्विधा मतिर्भवति अपेक्षितुः, भेदेनाभेदेन च। अभेदेन तावत् – देवदत्तश्च यज्ञदत्तश्च विष्णुमित्रश्चेत्यभेदेनैतदिति। यदा भेदेनापेक्षते तदानन्तरेण भवितव्यम्। यदा तु समुदायमपेक्षते तदा समुदाय एवानन्तर इति लक्ष्यवशाद् अयं कदाचित् किंचिद् अपेक्षत इति ।

[११अ] **किं पुनरयम् अलोन्त्यशेष आहोस्विद् अलोन्त्यापवादः?** शेषोऽवयव एकदेश इति पर्यायाः। अपवादो निवर्तकः। स्वयं चोभयमुपपादयति, एकवाक्यत्वा[त्त]च्छेषत्वं नानावाक्यत्वात् तदपवादत्वम्। (१) तत् त्वेकवाक्यत्वं नानावाक्यत्वं च कथमिति नैवैतदुक्तम्। कथं चैतयोरेकवाक्यत्वं स्यात्, काळभेदेन श्रुतयोरनेकयोगव्यवहितयोः? (२) सति चैकवाक्यभावनिमित्ते नानावाक्यस्याभावात् सति च नानावाक्यभावनिमित्ते एकवाक्यस्याभावात् संदेहानुपपत्तिः । न चैकस्मिन्नेव द्वयोर्नानावाक्यैकवाक्यभावयोः समवस्थानमस्ति। (३) किमर्थवेतावेवोपन्यस्तौ बाधाङ्गाङ्गिभावौ, न पुनर्विकल्पसमुच्चयावपि? (४) तथा नानावाक्यत्वमिह बाधानिमित्तमुक्तम्, अन्यत्र तु समावेशनिमित्तम्, "तत्र क्त्वुनादिप्रतिषेधो नानावाक्यत्वात्" (पा. ३.४.६७ वा. २) इति। एतत् सर्वं वक्तव्यम्।

[११आ] (१) यत् तावद् उच्यते, व्यवहितयोः कथं संबन्ध इति। नानन्तर्यं संबन्धहेतुः। एवं ह्युच्यते — "अर्थतो ह्यसम[र्था]नामानन्तर्यमकारणम्"। यथा, "अनड्वाहम् उदहारि या त्वं वहसि शिरसा भगिनि कुम्भं साचीनम् अभिधावन्तम् अद्राक्षीः" इति। एषाम् आनन्तर्येणापि संनिविष्टानाम् उपकारो नास्ति तस्याः क्रियायाः। कुतः? असंभवात्। नास्ति अनडुहः शिरसा वहनं कुम्भस्य च सरणम् इति। एतन्निबन्धनम् उपलब्धुर् अन्ययानुपूर्व्या बुद्धिविषयं वाक्यान्तरम् उपप्लवते। यथैवोपांशु गुणयंस् तन्निबन्धनम् अर्थं प्रतिपद्यते। केचिन् मन्यन्ते — एतदुपायम् अशाब्दकमेवार्थं प्रतिपद्यते इति। एवं व्याकरणेऽप्यर्थलक्षणः संबन्धो ना[नन्त]र्यकृतो, यथा 'बहुषु बहुवचनम्' (पा. १.४.२१), 'ङ्याप्प्रातिपदिकाद्' (पा. ४.१.१) इति। एतत् तु तिङर्थं भिन्नदेशम् उपदिष्टम्। एवम् इहापि 'राज्ञः क च' (पा. ४.२.१४०) इत्येवमाद्यर्थः पृथगुपदेशः स्यात्।

(२) अथ चार्थलक्षणः कस्मिंश्चिद् विषये संबन्धः स्यादिति, यस्मिंश्च विषये स्वनिमित्तप्रयुक्तयोर् एतयोः संनिपातस् तस्मिन्नुभयमपि संभवति, अङ्गाङ्गिभावो बाधा चेत्यतः संदेहः। यत्र त्वेक एव संभवति तत्रैकस्यैव प्रवृत्तिर्यथा कर्तृपशुचोदनायाम् 'कर्तरि....' (पा. ३. ४. ६७) इति साधनम् आश्रयम् अपेक्षते शक्तिमत्त्वात्। द्रव्यनिमित्तानुविधायित्वात् परतन्त्रं स[द्] द्वितीयापेक्षमेव, 'पशौ' (पा. ३. २. २५) इति द्रव्यभूतस्य शब्देनोपादानात्। धातोश् च प्रत्ययः क्रियावचनाद् उत्पद्यमानः साधने भवितुम् अर्हतीति न शक्यते कल्पयितुं, पशौ शुद्धे प्रत्ययः कर्मादिगुणयुक्ते वेति। कुतः ? कर्मादीनाम् अचोदितत्वात्। तस्माद् एतयोर् अत्यन्तम् उपकारित्वेनापेक्षायामेतद्विषयमेकवाक्यत्वमनुमीयते, पशौ कर्तरि भवतीति। एवमणिञोरेकस्मिन्नर्थे संनिपतितयोरेकैकस्मिन्नेतस्यार्थस्याभिधानात् विशेषविहितः सामान्यविषयं बाधत इति बाधकत्वेनैवापेक्षा। इह त्वङ्गस्य गुणवृद्धी भवत इति षष्ठी गुणवृद्धी च। षष्ठीम् अपेक्ष्य 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' संनिपतति। गुणवृद्धी अपेक्ष्य 'इकः' इति संनिपतति। एवम् एतदेकविषयसंनिपाते (?), यद्यङ्गस्येतीयं श्रुतिरन्त्येऽलि प्रवर्तते, अवयवसमुदायान् न हि किंचित् [अ]न्यदस्य रूपम् अस्ति। इदम् एव हि तस्य रूपम् अङ्गस्य। यथा 'रुह[:] पः' (पा. ७. ३. ४३), 'राज्ञः क च' (पा. ४. २. १४०) इति। एतदुक्तं भवति — रुहो हकारस्य, राज्ञो नकारस्येति। तत्राङ्गस्येति यदा समुदायशब्दोऽन्त्येऽल्युपसंह्रियते, इदमवयवस्य विशेषणम् 'इकः' इति। एवमयं तच्छेषो भवति विशेषणत्वेनान्त्यस्यालः। अङ्गस्येति समुदायशब्दोऽन्त्येऽल्युपसंह्रियमाण इका प्राप्ततदन्तविधिरुपसंहारेण युज्यते, इगन्तस्याङ्गस्यालोऽन्त्यस्येति। एवमपि इगन्तस्याङ्गस्य गुण इति विशेष्यत्वेनालोन्त्यशेषतामापद्यते। अथ त्वङ्गस्येतीयं गुणवृद्धिविधौ नैव स्थानषष्ठी, किं तर्हि, 'इकः' इत्येषा स्थानषष्ठी, एतद्विशेषणम् 'अङ्गस्य' इति, यथा 'ऊदुपधाया गोहः' (पा. ६. ४. ८९) इति, एवं सति 'अलोन्त्यस्य' इत्येतस्य गुणवृद्धिविषये अत्यन्तमप्रवृत्तिरिति बाधकत्वमस्योद्यते। इयमेव च बाधा या अप्राप्तिरिति। तत्र तच्छेषकल्पनायामिकः प्रधानविप्रकर्षः, अङ्गस्यैव गुणो विधिनोक्तमिति(? °क्त इति) शब्दप्रतिपत्तिरर्थप्रवृत्तिश्च बाध्यते। अपवादपक्षे त्विको गुणोऽङ्गस्य तु प्रधानविप्र[क]र्ष इति।

(३) समुच्चयः कस्मान्नोपन्यस्त इति। असंभवात्। इहाभिन्नार्थानामेकक्रियाविषयः समुच्चयो दृश्यते, यथा 'देवदत्तं सूपेन लवणेन घृतेन भोजय' इति। सूपादयोऽभिन्नार्था उपसेचनेन रसोत्पादनेन स्नेहनेन भुजौ समुच्चीयन्ते। एवमिहाङ्गमिक् च गुणे

समुच्चेतुमशक्ये । अङ्गं हि प्राप्नुवन्तं या यदा च प्रतिपद्यते गुणम्, [तदा] तदितरया विशेषणषष्ठया भवितव्यम् । इत्येवमपि समुच्चयो न कार्यरूपः । विकल्पः एकार्थानां विरो[ध]वतामन्यतमेन कृतत्वात् प्रवर्तते, यथा ‘ देवदत्तं भोजय प्रासादे गृहे कांस्यपात्र्यां राजत्याम् ’ इति गृहे प्रासादे वा भोज्यः । एवमिहाङ्गस्य वा भवति, इको वेति न युगपद्वर्तते । एकस्याः षष्ठयाः कार्ययोगित्वादिति ।

(४अ) अथ नानावाक्यत्वे को विरोधे परिहारः ? उच्यते । इह ‘ दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय ’ इति केचिदेकमेव वाक्यमिति प्रतिपन्ना एकस्याख्यातस्य श्रुतत्वात् । एको हि ददातिर्भिन्नकर्मको भिन्नसंप्रदानकश्चेति । यथैव भुजिर[ने]ककरण इति सत्यपि भुजेर्बहुकृत्वः प्रयोगे एकवाक्यतैव भवतीति, ‘ देवदत्तं मांसेन भोजय दध्ना भोजय शाकेन भोजय ’ इति । इहभवन्तस्त्वाहुः द्वे एते वाक्ये इति । एकं वाक्यं ‘ दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम् ’, द्वितीयं ‘ तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय ’ इति । क्रियापदं तु गतार्थत्वान्न प्रयुज्यते । तत्रैको ददातिर्दधिकर्मकोऽपरस्तक्रकर्मक इति द्वे एव ददातिक्रिये । किमर्थं तु लोके समुदायो न भवति ? एतदशक्यं वक्तुम् । कुतः ? अदृष्टत्वात् । यैरपि शास्त्राणि न समधिगतानि, तैरप्युक्तं ‘ दधि अस्मै न देयम् ’ इति । अथावश्यमुपपत्तिर्वक्तव्या, इयमुपपत्तिः । येषां तावत् द्वे एते वाक्ये तेषां क्रियां क्रियान्तरं बाधते । दधिकर्मिका तक्रकर्मिकया बाध्यते । ब्राह्मणश्रुतौ कौण्डिन्योऽपि यद्यप्यन्तर्भूतः, तथापि कौण्डिन्यरूपेण नोच्यते । किं तर्हि ? सामान्यरूपेण । फलमपि दातुर्ब्राह्मणाय दत्तमिति भवति । यत्तु कौण्डिन्यायेति तक्रदानं [तत्] तु विशेषतया श्रूयते । दधिदानं च विनापि कौण्डिन्येन संभवति, न तु तक्रदानम् । तस्मात् यत्र च तेन रूपेण चोदितः संदिग्धो, यत्र च विशेषरूपेण चोदितोऽसंदिग्धः, ते क्रिये तत्र समुच्चयं [न] प्रतिपद्येते । कथं ह्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षतक्रदानेन स[मक]क्षीकर्तुं शक्यम् ? तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्न समुच्चयो नापि विकल्पः ।

अपरेषां दर्शनम् । वाक्यशेषस्यात्रानुमानम् । तस्य चेदं लिङ्गं तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति । एतदत्रादावेव प्रक्रम्यते कौण्डिन्यं त्यक्तुं ‘ दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम् ’ इति ।

अपरे मन्यन्ते । भूयांसो हि ब्राह्मणशब्दाः । तत्र केचिदुद्धृतकौण्डिन्याः, केचिदुद्धृतमाठराः, केचिदन्तर्भूतमाठराः, केचिदन्तर्भूतकौण्डिन्याः । तत्रायं ब्राह्मणशब्दोऽन्तरेण वाक्यशेषानुमानमुत्कालितकौण्डिन्येष्वन्येषु प्रवृत्तश्चे[त्येत]दयं प्रतिपत्ता तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेत्यस्मात् प्रतिपद्यते । कुत एतदिति चेत्, अयमन्यान् प्रतिपादयन्नेवं

प्र[ति]पादयति, अतोऽस्य भवति, यथैवाहमन्यान् प्रतिपादया[म्ये]वमहमनेन प्र[ति]-पाद्य इति । अस्मिन् दर्शने ब्राह्मणरूपेणाप्रतिपादितो दधिदाने कौण्डिन्यः । येषां तत् त्वेकं वाक्यं तेषां साधनान्तरस्य निवर्तकं तक्रं दधि निवर्तयति । कुतः ? दधि संदिह्यमानं, तक्रं साक्षान्निर्दिष्टं 'तक्रम्' इति ।

(४ आ) ल्युन्नादिषु च समावेशं प्रकरणभेदात् प्रतिपन्नः । यथा प्रकरणभेदात् अपत्ये बाधका न तेऽधिकारविहि[ता]नामपवादाः, एवमेव च क्तो वर्तमानकालविहि[त]स्य लटो, [न] भूतकालविहितलक्षणस्य । तथाधिकरणिकापत्यलक्षणस्य पाछ्वेयामति (?)। एवं भिन्नप्रकरणत्वात् कर्तरि कृदिति प्रतिपादितः प्रकरणान्तरे ल्युन् करणे भवतीति कृत्त्वात् कर्तरि स्यात्, [ल्युन्]रूपात् करण इति समावेशनं प्रतिपन्नः । तत्र परिहार उच्यते । यथैवैकस्मिन्नर्थे संनिपतितयोरणिञोर्विशेषवता सामान्य[व]तो बाधनम्, एवमिहापि ल्युन्नित्येकस्मिन् शब्दे द्वावर्थौ संनिपतितौ करणं कर्ता च । तत्र ल्युन्रूपमाश्रित्य करणार्थं प्रतिपद्यते, कृत्त्वमाश्रित्य कर्त्रर्थमिति विशिष्टश्रुतिरर्थः सामान्यश्रुतिमर्थं बाधते । एवं लडित्येतस्मिन् शब्दे विशिष्टोपपदाश्रितः कालः कालान्तरं बाधते । एवं क्तेऽपि विशिष्टं धातुरूपमाश्रितमि[ति] निष्ठेति या भू[त]ता तां वर्तमानकालो बाधते । एवं यञि भावगर्हा या अधिकारसमभिहारता[म]स्य । तथा ढकि वृषरूपविशेषवती वडवाश्रुतिरपत्यार्थं बाधते । किं चाप्रयुज्यमानाः 'च'शब्दास्तमे[व] विषयमपहरन्तीति । रूढेरपि वापरमभ्युपगम्यते । तथाऽसत्यपि अनिमिषत्वे अनिमिषशब्दो मत्स्यवृत्तिरस्तीति । ये त्वेक-[वाक्य]वादिनस्त एवं प्रतिपन्नाः — यथैवेदमेकं वाक्यं 'दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यस्तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय दीयताम्' इति, एवमिदमप्येकं वाक्यं 'कर्तरि कृत् करणे ल्युन्' इति । तत्रैतदुक्तं भवति — ल्युनोऽन्यः कर्तरि भवतीति । इह कथं 'सुपो ... लुक्' (पा. २.४. ७१), 'अलुगुत्तरपदे' (पा. ६. ३. १) इति । अत्रापीदं वाक्यम् उत्तरपदादन्यत्र सुपो लुगिति । अथ वा, नानाकालं वाक्यमिति यथादेशश्चोदितो तथा [प्रत्ययो भवति यथा] नानाकाले दधितक्रे [प्र]तिपद्यते कौण्डिन्यः । अर्थादेककालमिति परिहार उक्तः ।

सर्वत्र चाप्राप्त्यनुमानं बाधा, श्रुतौ स्मृतौ च । इयमेव तु बाधा 'अभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुटः' इति । न ह्यत्र शब्दवद् भक्षणम् । किं तर्हि ? अर्थित्वप्रयुक्तम् । तत् प्रसक्तं निवर्त्यते । व्याकरणं च स्मृतिः शब्दनि[बं]धनेति सर्वत्राप्राप्तिरेव विशेषशब्दसांनिध्येऽनुमीयते ।

[१२] मिदादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् इति । अनिगन्तत्वा[त् मि]दादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् तेषामुपसंहारात् (?) [अं]गमि[ग्]ग्रहणं न संनिपतति । तस्मात् प्रदेशेषु

इग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति। **सर्वादेशप्रसङ्गश्चानिगन्तस्य**। मिदादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमित्ययमेको दोषः। अयं चापरो – **याता वातेति सर्वादेशो गुणः प्राप्नोति**। एवं मन्यते – अङ्गस्येक इति निमित्तभावादुपसंहारः। स सति निमित्ते प्रवर्तते। तत्र यथैव स्थानषष्ठ्यां निर्ज्ञातायामुपसंहारः, एवमिगन्तत्वे सत्युपसंहारेण भवितव्यम्। यत्र तूपसं[हा]रनिमित्तं नास्ति, तत्रानुपसंहृता विद्यते षष्ठी। इदमप्यस्य दर्शनम् — 'अङ्गस्य' इत्येतद्भेदेन सर्वेष्वङ्गेषु षष्ठीं प्रतिपादयति। प्रतिपादितया षष्ठ्या इकोऽलोन्त्यस्येति इगन्तेषूपसंह्रियते, नेग्वत्सु, नाप्यनिगन्तेषु। यातादिषु पुनरस्ति षष्ठी। अतो भवितव्यं गुणेन सर्वादेशेनेतीदमाह — **अलोन्त्यषष्ठी चैव ह्यन्त्यमिकमुपसंक्रान्ता। अङ्गस्येति च स्थानषष्ठी। तद्यदिदानीमनिगन्तमङ्गमिति**। इतरोऽङ्गस्येति इदमेव रूपमलोऽन्त्यषष्ठ्याः, सा चान्त्ये इकीति येयं षष्ठी अङ्गस्येतीयमन्त्य इक्येवात्रस्थितेत्यत आह — **नैष दोषः। यथैवालोन्त्यषष्ठी अन्त्यमिकं संक्रान्ता**। यदुक्तं भवता, भिन्नानि अङ्गानि संस्करोति इति, तन्न। एवं च सति कुतोऽनिगन्तेषु यातादिषु षष्ठी, तदभावाच्च **कुतः सर्वादेश** इति। **ह्यर्थे चायं चः पठितः**। हिशब्दश्च हेतावित्ययमपि हेत्वर्थो द्रष्टव्यः। यस्मात् सर्वादेशः प्राप्नोति, तस्मान् मिदादिषु इग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। **मिदेर्गुण 'इक' इति वचनान्नान्त्यस्य**, उपसंहारनिमित्तस्याभावात्। **अन्त्यस्येति वचनादिको न**। अलोऽन्त्यस्य ह्युपसंहारेऽसति मिदेरिगन्त्यो नास्ति। **उच्यते च गुणः**। स वचनात् भविष्यति। किम्, 'अङ्गस्य' इत्यनेन? नेत्याह – **मिदे**रिति। तत्र यद्यपि षष्ठी अङ्गस्ये[ति] वातादिषु नास्ति, इह त्वस्ति मिदेरिति या चानुपसंगृहीतेति **सर्वादेशः प्राप्नोति**।

[१३] इङ्मात्रस्येति चेत्। मात्रशब्दः कृत्स्नवचनः। सर्वस्येकः, अन्त्यानन्त्यविषयस्य, गुणवृद्धिभ्यां भवितव्यम्। अङ्गस्य विशेषणत्वात्, इकश्च विशेष्यत्वात्, स्थानषष्ठी न भवति अङ्गस्येति। स्थाने विज्ञाता चोपसंह्रियत इति निमित्ताभावादप्रातिरुपसंहारस्य गुणवृद्धिविषय इति सर्वावस्थस्य इको गुणवृद्धी प्राप्नुत इत्यनन्त्यस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। [हे] **अग्निचिदिति**। नैतान्युदाहरणानि संभवन्ति। कथम्? एताभिर्ह्रस्वादिचोदनाभिरङ्गं विशेष्यमिति ह्रस्वान्तस्याङ्गस्य गुण इति इदं न्याय्यं हे बुद्धे। बुधाः। शेषाण्यपि दुहितरि शुद्धये शु(? पि)चव्य इत्येतानि उदाहरणानि उपादेयानि, नाग्निचिदादीनि। नैष दोषः। अङ्गस्येति षष्ठी तदपवादकल्पनापक्षे न कार्ययोगिनीत्येतदवस्थितम्। तत्र गुणविधानमप्रधानं कथं ह्रस्वादिचोदनाभिर्विशेष्येतेति इगेव कार्ययोगित्वात् विशेष्यते। स च ह[स्व]स्यार्थतो न संभवतीति एवमभिसंबन्धो भवति -- अङ्गस्य य इग्घ्रस्वस्तस्य

गुणो भवतीति। अथ वा, विधीयमानत्वात् गुणः प्रधानम्। तादर्थ्यादिक् चाङ्गं [च] गुणौ। तत्र ह्रस्वादिश्रुतिः प्रधाने न संभवतीति तदङ्गे विज्ञायमाना य[दा]सन्नमङ्गमि-[गि]तिं तस्य विशेषणं युक्तम्, न पुनर्विप्रकृष्टस्य गुणस्याङ्गस्येत्यलो [? °तो]-पि न्यायात् एतान्येव संभवन्ति। उदाहरणमात्रं चेदम्। इहापि अनन्त्यस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः, 'अचो ञ्णिति' (पा. ७. २. ११५) इति। अत्राप्यङ्गस्याचो यत्रतत्रस्थ-स्येति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। दरिद्रायकादिष्वनन्त्यस्याचो वृद्धिः प्राप्नोति। ननु च ओर्गुणादिषु निर्दिष्टस्था[नि]कत्वात् अव्यापारोऽस्याः परिभाषायाः। सत्यम्; एवमेतत्। इदं त्वेवं कृत्वा उच्यते। भवता अनन्त्यप्राप्तिरेव न व्यवसिता। 'अङ्गस्य' इतीदं सामान्यं विशेषस्येको विशेषणमिति एवं चेत् इहापि ह्रस्वादीनां विशेषाणाम् 'अङ्गस्य' इति सामान्यं विशेषणं भवितुमर्हति। ततश्चानन्त्यस्य प्रसङ्गो नास्ति (? अस्ति)। एवं च सति इगन्तलक्षणो न भवत्ययमिति वक्ष्यमाणमप्युपपद्यते, 'तद्धितकाम्योरिग्लक्षणात्' (पा. १. १. ५ वा.४) इति। अपरे वर्णयन्ति। अत्र इको व्यापार [आ]श्रीयते। अङ्गस्येको गुणो भवति। किं सर्वस्य ? न हि। किं तर्हि ? ओरिति। किमर्थं पुनरि-दमुपादानम् ? सर्वावस्थस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। अस्मिंस्तु वक्ष्यमाणं नोपपद्यते, इग्लक्षणत्वादस्य। अतस्तच्छेषपक्षे तदुक्तं द्रष्टव्यम्।

[१४] **पुगन्तलघूपधग्रहणमनन्त्यनियमार्थम्**। सिद्धो हि गुणोऽनन्त्यस्य। तत्र पुनःश्रुतिर्नियमार्था भविष्यति। एतदनेन प्रदर्श्यते — सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः (पा. ७. ३. ८४) इत्यत्र 'अङ्गस्य' इतीदं कार्ययोगि। तदिका विशेष्यते (? इतीदं कार्ययोगित्वादिकं विशेषयति) इति। ननु च विधेयस्य भावान्नियमानुपपत्तिः। किं च विधेयम् ? ह्रेपयतीति। अनन्त्यस्य सिद्धो गुणः। अन्त्यस्य च पका[र]स्य विधेयः स्यात्, भेत्तेति दकारस्य। उच्यते। पुकि अन्तः, लघ्वी उपधेत्येव सूत्रार्थमाश्रित्यायं नियम इति वर्ण्यते। ननु चैत्रमपि दापयत्यर्थमेतत् स्यात्। अस्त्वाकारस्य गुणो, वृद्धिं करिष्यामः। चक्रकेषु चेष्टतो व्यवस्था। अयं परो(? °रः) सूत्रैकदेशो नियमाय भविष्यति, लघ्वी उपधेति। **प्रकृतस्यैव नियमः**। ... **सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः** पुगन्तस्यैव नान्यस्येति। सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरङ्गस्येति लघ्वी [उपधा] कार्ययोगिनीति न स्यादिह ईहितेति। **ह्रस्वादिगुणस्त्वनियत** इति। अत्राङ्गस्येति विशेषणषष्ठ्यौ चेति। **अथाप्येवं नियमः स्यात् — सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरेव पुगन्तलघूपधस्येति**। निमित्ती नियतो ऽथात्र ह्रस्वादिषु गुणं न प्रतिपद्येत, निमित्तस्य तन्नियमात्। ईहितेत्येवमादिषु गुणः प्राप्नोत्येव। **अथाप्युभयतो नियमः स्यात्**। कथं पुनरुभयतो नियमो लभ्यो यावता

पुनःश्रुतिर्नियमः । तत्रैकस्मिन् नियमिते पुनःश्रुतिरपरा नास्ति, यया द्वितीयोऽर्थो नियम्यते । उच्यते । सत्यम् । एवमर्थमेवेदमुच्यते **अथापीति** । यद्यप्येवं व्याख्यायेतोभयतो नियमार्थमेतत् सूत्रमिति, **एवमपि जुसि गुणोऽनियतः** । उभयत्र परिग्रहात् । लघूपधं चैतत्, जुसश्च सार्वधातुक[त्व]मिति ।

[१५] एवं तर्हि नैवायं तच्छेषो नापि तदपवादः । यन्मन्यसे – एकविषयसंनिपातादेते परिभाषे अपेक्षेते, विरोधेन वा अङ्गाङ्गिभावेन वेति, तन्न । परस्परानपेक्षया कार्यं प्रति प्रवृत्ता एका 'राज्ञः क च' (पा. ४.२.१४०) इत्यादिषु, अपरा हि गुणवृद्ध्योरिकः स्थानित्वप्रतिपादनेन । यदि कथंचित् इकः (?) एकत्र संनिपातो भवति, नैतावतैव तयोरपेक्षा शक्या कल्पयितुम् । यथा दीर्घत्वैत्वयोः परस्परमनपेक्षमाणयोः दृष्ट एकविषये संनिपातो वृक्षेभ्य इति, तथानयोः परिभाषयोः । तत्रालोन्त्यपरिभाषा समुदायषष्ठ्या एकदेशस्थापने व्यापृता, इयमपि [गुणवृद्धिविधौ इकः स्थानित्वप्रतिपादने । **नियमादिको] गुणवृद्धी भवतो विप्रतिषेधेनेति** । शेषत्वे ह्येकवाक्यत्वादात्मना सह कीदृशो विप्रतिषेधः ? विरोधे च सत्युत्स**र्गापवादयोरप्ययुक्तो विप्रतिषेध** इति । **नियमस्यावकाशो 'राज्ञः क च'** (पा. ४.२.१४०) इति । यत्र 'इको गुणवृद्धी' [इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारो नास्ति । **'इको गुणवृद्धी' इत्यस्यावकाशः चयनं चायको लवनं लावक इति** । 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य'] इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारनिमित्तो न कश्चिद्विशेष उपलभ्यते यत्र, तत्र तस्याः प्रवृत्तिरनर्थिका । यदि चेक इत्येतयैवान्त्यस्य गुणे प्रतिपादिते नियमोऽपि तस्यैव विदध्यात्, [न] किंचित् कृतं स्यात् इत्यत [औ]दासीन्यं नियमस्य प्रतिपद्यामहे इति । **इहोभयं प्राप्नोति, [मे]द्यति, मार्ष्टीति** । नियमात् व्यञ्जनस्य स्या[त्, अ]नया च इकोऽनन्त्यस्य स्यादिति । **नैष युक्तो विप्रतिषेध** इति । आदौ तावत् सूत्रसंनिवेश एव तैर्न ज्ञायते इत्येतदाचष्टे **पूर्वोऽयं योगः परो नियम** इति । एवमपीष्टवाचिना परशब्देन व्यवहारोऽस्ति, न व्यवस्थि[त]त्ववाचिना, पूर्वप्राप्त[प्र]तिषेधादनारभमाण इत्यत (? इत्येतद्) आह— **इष्टवाची परशब्द** इति । **एवम[प्य]युक्तो [विप्रतिषेधः ।] द्विकार्ययोगो हि विप्रतिषेधः** । द्वाभ्यां कार्याभ्यां योगो यत्रैकस्य स्थानिनः स द्विकार्ययोगः, योऽत्र तत्स्थो विप्रतिषेधा[त्] = द्विकार्ययोगविषयत्वात् ताद्रूप्यं (? ताच्छब्द्यं) लभते । अथ वा योगः संबन्धः । द्विकार्येण योगो यः स विप्रतिषेध इति संबन्धविशेष एव विप्रतिषेधः । यथा विरोधशब्दस्य संबन्धविशेषो[ऽर्थः], एवं विप्रतिषेधशब्दस्यापि । **नावश्यं द्विकार्ययोग एव विप्रतिषेधः । किं तर्हि ? असंभवोऽपि** । योऽयं विप्रति[षे]धो भवता परिगृह्यते द्विकार्ययोगित्वेन,

[तत्र] योऽसंभवः स विप्रतिषेधः। यस्मिन् असंभवे न च कार्यं द्विकार्ययोगोऽस्ति। द्विकार्ययोगोऽपि यस्मिन्न संभवति, तस्मिन्नपि विप्रतिषेध इति तत्राप्यसंभव एव। असंभवं च द्विकार्ययोग एव दर्शयति — **इह तावत् वृक्षेभ्य इत्येकः स्थानी द्वावादेशौ, न चास्ति संभव** इति। ननु चैकस्य स्थाने द्वावादेशौ भवतो यथा एकपक्ष एकस्य पच्शब्दस्य द्वौ पच्शब्दौ, एवं वृक्षेभ्य इत्य[त्रा]कार एकारश्च कस्मान्न भवतः ? उच्यते। न ब्रूमः सर्वत्र न संभवतीति। किं तर्हि ? एवंभूतो न संभवतीति, योऽयं प्रस्तुतः। तत्र हि दीर्घत्वं यञ्यनन्तरं साधुत्वेनाख्यातमेत्वमपि झलि। न च संभवोऽस्ति यदुभयोः स्वेन स्वेन निमित्तेनानन्तर्यं स्यादिति। एवं कृत्वेदमुच्यते **न चा[स्ति] संभवो यदेकस्य स्थानिनो द्वावादेशौ स्याताम्** इति। **इहेदानीं मेद्यतीति द्वौ स्थानिनौ एक आदेशः; न चास्ति संभवः** इति। अत्रापि दृष्टः संभवः। 'एकः पूर्वपरयोः' (पा. ६. १. ८४), 'ऋत्जो रोपधयो रमन्यतरस्याम्' (पा. ६. ४. ४७) इति च। उच्यते। इह संभवो नास्ति। कथम् ? मिदेरिति स्थानषष्ठ्यां सत्यामुपसंहारेण भवितव्यम्। उपसंहारे चेकोऽप्रतिपत्तिरनिक् प्रतिपद्यते। अङ्गस्येति विशेषणषष्ठ्यामुपसंहारासंभवः। **अत्रापि नियमः प्राप्नोती[ति]**। अयमभिप्रायः। गुणो भवतीत्येतत् प्रवर्तते चयनादिषु, नियमस्त्वौदासीन्यं करोति इति किं कारणम् ? स्यादेतत् – न कश्चिदस्ति विशेष इति। अयमेव विशेषः, अलोन्त्यविधिर्बाधितव्य इति। यावच्चेदं नारभ्यते 'इक' इति, तावत् किं मन्यसे किमिह स्यादिति ? नियमः। एवं स[र्व]त्र प्राप्ते नियम इदमारभ्यते इत्यपवादत्व[म]स्य। तस्मादस्यैतयोर्विरोधित्वेनापेक्षेति क्रोष्ट्रीयाणां न सम्यगिदं दर्शनम्, असंबद्धमनया परिभाषयेति। **अथापि कथंचित्।** अध्यारुह्येदं वचनम्। यद्यपि कथंचित् नियम औदासीन्यं कुर्यात् चयनादिषु, एवमपि दोष एव वि[प्र]तिषेधे सतीति।

[१६] एवं तर्हि वृद्धिर्भवति गुणो भ[व]ति इति। एतत् कथं निप[त]ति ? नेदं सर्वं प्रवर्तते, गुणवृद्धिसंशब्दनेषु इकः स्थाने गुणवृद्धी भवत इति। किं तर्हि ? गुणवृद्धी यत्र गुणवृद्धिशब्दाभ्यां विधीयेते तत्र इक इत्येष षष्ठ्यर्थोऽपि संनिहितो भवति। अथ वा इक [इ]त्येषा श्रुतिः संनिहिता भवतीति। क्रियाप्रतिलम्भस्तु प्रदेशादेव भविष्यतीति यावन्ति सूत्राणि गुणवृद्धिश्रुत्युपसंगृहीतानि तावन्त्यनेनोपायेन इक इति षष्ठीमन्ति क्रियन्ते। अयमेव न्यायो यत् पारार्थ्यात् परिभाषा प्रधानदेशा सती ततः क्रियां प्रतिपद्यते इति। अनारभ्य किंचित् कार्यम् 'इक' [इ]त्येतत् प्रधानभेदात् भिन्नमुत्सृज्यते [इ]त्यनारभ्यवादो यं परिगृ[ह्णी]मः। स[र्व]त्र प्रदेशेषु रूपमात्रे जनिते 'इकः' इति, प्रधान-

वाक्यम् एवंभूतं संपन्नं ‘ मिदेरिको गुणो भवती’ति । असमाश्रितव्यापारविशेषो नाङ्गत्वे-नालोन्त्यपरिभाषामपेक्षते नापि विरोधित्वेनेति पौरुषेयो व्यापार आश्रीयते । पुरुषः स्वेच्छया प्रवर्तमानो मिदादिषु इकोऽन्त्यस्यासंभवात् मिदादीन् विशेषणत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते, इक विशेष्यत्वेन, यथेह ‘ ऊदुपधाया गोहः ’ (पा. ६. ४. ८९) इति गोहिमुपधा-विशेषणत्वेन । जुसादिषु तु [इकोऽन्त्यस्य संभवाद् अङ्गं विशेष्यत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते, इकश्च विशेषणत्वेन ।] भूयसामनुग्रहाद् एवं कस्मान्न कल्पितं जुसादिष्वङ्गस्य य इगिति ? उच्यते । कामचारः स इति । एवं चेत् कामचारः पुरुषस्यैकाङ्गं विशिष्यते इति नास्त्येव (? चास्त्येव) भूयसामनुग्रहः । उपपत्तिरप्यत्रैवं वर्ण्यते । इह यद्यनिवारित-रूपेष्वङ्गग्रहणेषु इक [इति] विशेष्यं स्यात्, अङ्गस्य इति च विशेषणम्, एवं सति शब्देनाङ्गस्य गुणं प्रति यत् सा[क्षा]दर्थित्वं तत् हीयेत, विशेष[ण]वता उपयुक्तत्वात् । अर्थेन च नास्ति योगः, इकः स्थाने गुणस्य निर्वृत्तेः । अथ त्वङ्गस्य इत्येतत् इका विशेष्यते, शब्दोपादानः प्रधानसंयोगो न हापितो भवति । इकस्तु यद्यपि शब्देन प्रधानविप्रयोगो भवेत् विशेषणत्वात्, एवमपि इको गुणेन निर्वर्तितव्यमित्यर्थेन प्रधान-संनिकर्षः । तस्माद्यस्यां कल्पनायां इगं[ग]यो[ः] प्रधानेन संस्पर्शः, सा कल्पना आश्र-यितव्या । इयं तु क्वचित् व्यभिचारिणी शास्त्रे दृश्यत इति, तस्माच्छास्त्र[प्र]वृत्तिरेव ग्रहीतव्या ।

[१७] अथ वा सर्वत्रैवात्र स्थानी निर्दिश्यते । तच्छेषमाश्रित्य स्थानिनो निर्दिष्टत्वादि[ग्]ग्रहणं प्रदेशेषु न कर्तव्यमित्येतदाचष्टे । **क्षिप्रक्षुद्रयोरपि** । पूर्वग्रहणा-दिको भविष्यतीति सूत्रार्थमाश्रित्य यदुच्यते, [तत्र] यदि तावत् यण आदि[ः] यणादिः, यणादेः परं लुप्यते, पूर्वस्य गुणो भवति = यणादेः पूर्वस्येति, सिद्धं क्षेपिष्ठः, क्षोदिष्ठः । अत्र हि यणादिः पकारो दकारश्चेति तयोर्गुणः [सिध्यति । यविष्ठ इत्यत्र तु यकारस्य गुणः] प्राप्नोति । अथ यण् आदिरस्य सोऽयं यणादिः, यणादिपरं शब्दरूपं लुप्यते पूर्वस्य च गुणः; एतस्मिन् [पक्षे] युवशब्दे [व]न् लुप्यते इति सिद्धं यविष्ठ इति । क्षेपिष्ठे तु पकारस्य गुणः प्राप्नोति । एवं तर्हि स्थूलादिषु [ओ]र्गुण एव करिष्यते । प्राग् भादसिद्धत्व-मिति [चानित्यम्] । इदं तु गुणविधानं क्षिप्रक्षुद्रार्थमेव । तत्र यणादेः पूर्वस्य गुणो भविष्यति । ननु चो[का]रान्तानां स्थूलादीनामोर्गुणे कृते अनेन चानिष्टं क्रियेत । तस्माद्योगविभागः कर्तव्यः । ‘ स्थूलदूरयुवह्रस्वक्षिप्रक्षुद्राणां यणादिपरं ’ लुप्यते । ततः ‘ पूर्वस्य गुणः ’ इति । क्षिप्रक्षुद्रावेव स्वरितत्वादनुवर्तेते । स्थूलादयो निवृत्ताः । तेषां [ओ]र्गुण एव भवतीति ।

यद्येवमनिग्लक्षणोऽयं भवति, निर्दिष्टस्थानिकत्वात् । तत्र भिन्नः भिन्नवान् इत्यत्र प्राप्नोति । उच्यते । यथैवात्रेग्लक्षणत्वे सति व्यवधानादप्राप्ताविदमुच्यते, "यदेतस्मिन् योगे क्ङिद्ग्रहणं तदनवकाशमि"ति प्रतिषेधो भवति इति, एवमिहाप्यसति इक्स्थानिकत्वे इति । [ओ]र्गुणे तर्हि, 'अत उपधाया' (पा. ७. २. ११६) इत्यत्र च यदनवकाशं क्ङिद्ग्रहणमिति प्रतिषेधः स्यात्, तस्मात् लघ्वी उपधा इग् इति इग्लक्षणत्वं कार्यम् । ननु चात्र निवर्त्याभावादिक्परिभाषाया [उ]पस्थानानर्थक्यम् । अकारश्चेन्नास्ति विशेषः । आनुमानिकी न पुगन्तलघूपधवत् पूर्वं भविष्यतीति ।

[१८] **किं विशेषेण वृद्धिग्रहणं चोद्यत** इति । वाक्यकारस्य '**वृद्धिग्रहणमुत्तरार्थम्**' इति वच[ना]दिदमनुमीयते, वृद्धिग्रहणं चोदितमिति । अतोऽसौ पृच्छ्यते '**किं विशेषेण**' इति । **गुणविधौ न क्वचित् स्थानी निर्दिश्यत** इति । व्यवहितो नञत्र प्रयुक्तः । गुणविधौ स्थानी कश्चिन्न निर्दिश्यते । तदर्थमि[ग्]ग्रहणं पूर्वं कर्तव्यमलोन्त्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । वृद्धिविधौ तु सर्वत्र स्थानिनो निर्देशात् वृद्ध्यर्थेनैतेन नार्थः 'संज्ञया विधाने नियम' इति ।

वृद्धिग्रहणमुत्तरार्थम् । पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसूत्रं प्रत्याख्यातम्, परमप्यसर्वविषयमिति इदमेवोपन्यस्यति, **क्ङि[ती]ति प्रतिषेधं वक्ष्यति स वृद्धेरपि यथा स्यात्** इति । **यद्यचो वृद्धिरुच्यते, न्यमार्ट्, अटोऽपि वृद्धिः प्राप्नोति** । आदि[ष्टि]दित्यटो मृजिग्रहणेन ग्रहणात् । जतमंग भवति(?)। कथं पुनरत्राटो वृद्धि[ः] ? यावता परत्वात् वृद्ध्या भवितव्यं, कार्यकृतत्वात् पुनर्न भविष्यति । स्यान्मतम्, शब्दान्तरस्य कृतेतीदं नोपपद्यते... । **अ[न]न्त्यविकारेऽन्त्यसदेशस्य** इति । न ह्यत्र वृद्धौ कृतायामुभयोरस्ति प्राप्तिः । किं तर्हि ? अनन्त्यस्यैवाचः । अथापि कल्प्यते, लावस्थायामट् इति । वृद्धिरपि लावस्थायां केन प्रतिषिद्धा ? तस्मादभ्युपेत्याटः पूर्वत्वमिदमुच्यते ।

इहान्ये वैयाकरणाः । अत्र चोद्यते, किमवश्यमन्यस्मिन् व्याकरणे येऽन्वाख्यातास्त इहापि अन्वाख्येयाः ? नेत्याह । किं तर्हि ? इयमपि स्मृतिर्, यत्रैव स्मृत्योर्विरोधस्तत्रैव विकल्पो, न चेदन्यतरा दृष्टार्था भवति । इह तु नास्ति विरोधः । एकत्राविशेषेण वृद्धिः स्मर्यते, अन्यत्र विशिष्टविषये विभाषेत्यस्याः स्मृतेः कृतवृद्धिः प्रयोज्य(? °क्ष्य)ते, तस्या अपि अकृतवृद्धिरिति । न्य[ङ्कोर्नेति] स्मृत्यन्तरे प्रतिषेधः आरभ्यते, न्याङ्कवमिति । इहाप्यव्युत्पत्तिपक्षे न्याङ्कवामिति शिष्टपर्षदा उक्तत्वात् अयं व्याख्यानं (? °ता) संसाध्नोति । [नि]यतकाला हि स्मृतय इष्टास्तथा श्रुतयश्च । यथा गवामालम्भो मद्यपानं च ।

शुक्रेणासेवितमिति क्रियमाणं प्रत्यवायायेति। [गवालम्भे] दृष्टा च स्मृतिर्नियतकाला। अद्यत्व एतत्पापाय। शब्दाः स्मर्यन्ते अभ्युदयाय। अन्ये तु दोषाय। इदं च शब्दरूपमद्यत्वेऽपि प्रयोक्तव्यमत एतत् साध्यमिति। तत्र [मृजेर्] वृद्धिरच इत्येतावदेवास्तु। [ततः] 'अचि क्ङिति वा भवती'ति। अस्य च स्मर्ता भाष्यकारः। अयं चादिशिष्ट इति।

अचिकीर्षीत्...। लोपोऽस्य बाधको भविष्यतीति। अकृतायाम् 'अतो लोपः' (पा. ६.४.४८) पूर्वविप्रतिषेधात्, कृतायामपि आतो लोपेन भवितव्यमिति। **उद[वो]ढामित्यत्र ढलोपस्यासिद्धत्वात्।** पूर्वं वृद्धौ कृतायां ढलोपादिषु कृतेषु त्वस्यौत्वे कृते कार्यकृतत्वान्न भविष्यति। **सिचि वृद्धेरप्येष प्रतिषेधः। कथम्? लक्षणं हि नाम ध्वनति भ्रमति मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते।** तत्र ध्वनतीत्यव्यक्तसामान्यं परिगृह्य प्रयुज्यते। यथा लोके अव्यक्तं यो ब्रवीति, स उच्यते 'किं ध्वनसि, कटकटायसि?' इति। एवमिह 'नेटि' (पा. ७. २. ४) इत्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते। किमस्य प्रतिषेधो यः (? °धोऽन्यस्य) प्रतिषेध इति एषा व्यक्तिर्नास्ति। अथ वा यथा ध्वनिः सर्वशब्दविषयस्तन्मात्रोपलब्धौ त्वेतावद् भवति– ध्वनत्ययं शब्दोऽनेन कश्चिदुच्चारित इति। एवमिहापि सर्वविषयः प्रतिषेधः, 'हलन्तस्य', 'सिचि' इति वृद्धिर्न भवतीति सर्वविषयसामान्यात् **ध्वनतीत्युच्यते।** स्यादेतत् –- ध्वनदपि तत् [ए.]कस्मिन् कृतार्थं प्रतिषेध्ये न प्रवर्तेतान्यत्रेत्यत आह — **भ्रमतीति।** सामान्यचोदना विशेषार्थैव। यथैकस्मिन् विषये प्रवर्तेत, तथा[न्य]स्मिन्नपि विशेषान्तरे। अथ मतमेतत् – यावत् तद्विशेषान्तरे प्रतिषेध्ये प्रवर्तते, तावदन्यत्र विधिः प्रवृत्तः, प्रवृत्तश्चाशक्यो भ्राम्यतापि लक्षणेन प्रतिषेद्धुमित्यत आह — **मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठत** इति। वाग् बहीरूपसामान्या। तदेवेदमाशुसंचारित्वात् मुहूर्तमप्यनवस्थितमित्युच्यते। न त्वेतदस्ति शब्दे। किं तर्हि? प्रतिषेधान्तराणि तानि भिन्नान्येव प्रतिषेध्यलक्षणानि। तस्मान्नास्ति लक्षणशून्यः कश्चित् प्रतिषेध्य इतीदमुच्यते — **मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठत** इति। अन्ये वर्णयन्ति। **ध्वनती**ति पुनःप्रवृत्तिसामान्यादुच्यते। यथा घण्टायाः पुनः पुनः शब्द उत्पाद्यमाने ध्वनति घण्टेति व्यपदिश्यते। एवमेतानि लक्षणानि 'सिचि वृद्धिः', 'हलन्तस्याचः' 'नेटि' इति [प्र]वर्तमानानि ध्वनन्तीत्युच्यन्ते। स्यादेतत् – 'सकृत् प्रवृत्तिर्' इति, एतन्नास्ति। **भ्रमति** = घटीयन्त्रवदावर्तते। आवर्तमानमपि ह्येत्र(? वं) **मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते।** तत्रैवं सति न विधिरेतस्मिन् विषये न प्रतिषेध इत्यप्रवृत्त्यैव लक्षणस्य ेतव्यम् इति। अथाप्यवस्था चक्रकेषु, तथापि इष्टतो व्यवस्थेति प्रतिषेधेन व्यवस्था

भविष्यति, इति । **अस्ति पुनः क्वचिदन्यत्रापि ।** सामान्यमुपादीयत इत्येतत् पृच्छ्यते अप्रवृत्ति(? त्त)त्वात् लक्षणस्येति । **अस्तीत्याह । सुजाते अश्वसूनृते ।** ‘नान्तःपादम्’ इत्येवं पाठमाश्रित्येदमुपन्यस्यति, न ‘प्रकृत्यान्तःपादम्’ (पा. ६. १. ११५) इति । अत्रापि अव्यक्तं सामान्यविषयं वा लक्षणमुपादाय एङः अतीति ध्वनति इदं ‘नान्तःपादम्’ (पा. ६. १. ११५) इति । अथ वा लक्षणानाम् अयादीनामनवस्थानादप्रवृत्तिरेवेति । अथ वृक्षावित्यत्र कथम् ? अत्र ‘नादिचि’ (पा. ६. १. १०४) इति प्रतिषेधेन वृद्धिरपि प्रतिषेध्या ‘वृद्धिरेचि’ (पा. ६. १. ८८) इति । अथ मन्यसे भिन्नप्रकरणावेताविति, [इ]हापि युज्यते अश्वसूनृते इति भिन्नं प्रकरणमुत्सर्गापवादयोः । अथार्थद्वारेणैकप्रकरणत्वम्, इहापि तथैव । तस्मादत्र व्यक्तस्य विशेषस्याश्रयणम् । प्रथमयोः पूर्वसवर्णदीर्घत्वस्यैव प्रतिषेधः, न ‘वृद्धिरेचि’ इति ।

अन्तरङ्गत्वादुवङादेशः ।....सिच्परस्मैपदे आश्रित्य वृद्धिरिति । **लुप्तनिर्दिष्टो वकार इति ।** केचिदत्र वर्णयन्ति– निर्दिष्टश्चासौ लुप्तश्चेति । एतत् तु नोपपद्यते, निर्दिष्टस्य लोपेनासंबद्धत्वात् । निर्दिष्टो हि कथमिव लुप्येत ? तस्मात् यथैव ‘यस्य...’(पा.६.४.१४८) इत्यस्माद्रूपात् प्रतिपत्तिमिकारस्य आश्रयाम एवं लुप्तं प्रतिपत्तिकाले वकारं प्रतिपत्स्यामह इति । **अविमव्योर्नेति वक्ष्यामि ।** स्यादेतत्, गुरु भवति, [इ]त्यत आह – **णिश्विभ्यां तौ निमातव्यौ** इति । **आचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयति** इति । किं वृद्धिग्रहणं करिष्यामीति नेष्यते सिच्यन्तरङ्गत्वम् ? नेत्याह । अनेनायीत् अचेचायीत् अचिरायीत् अजिरायीत् इत्येवमादिषु प्रवृत्त्यर्थमिदं नेष्यते । चिरिजिर्योर्हि, यङ्लुगन्तानां च, गुणायादेशयोः कृतयोर्यान्तत्वात् प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

[१९] **षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगत्वादिग्निवृत्तिः ।** इक इति स्थानषष्ठी । तत्र गुणवृद्धिभ्यां सर्व इग् निवर्तितव्य इति । अथ वैतदुपगन्तव्यम्, नेयं स्थानषष्ठीति । **अन्यतरार्थं पुनर्वचनम् ।** ननु चानिगन्तार्थं स्यात् । अने[न] इको निर्वर्ति[ते]षु गुणेषु अङ्गाधिकारे वचनमनिगर्थं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? विधि[नि]यमयोर्विधिर्बलवानित्यतोऽनिगर्थं स्यात् । तत्रायमभिप्रायः । ‘इको गुणवृद्धी’ इत्यत्र गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमनुवर्तते । तत्र लक्ष[ण]त्वेन प्रवृत्तमेतत् पुनः पराङ्गत्व[मनु]भवति । गुणवृद्धी इति च यत्र **ब्रूयात्**, [इकः] इत्येतत् तत्रोपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यमिति । **संप्रसारणे च ।** यण इति **षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगत्वात् सर्वयणां निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति ।** .... **याता वातेति ।** प्रसारणं **पूर्वम् ।** कथम् ? (? [सं]प्रसारणसंज्ञा कथम् ?) योगविभागः क्रियते । ‘इग्यणः’ । यणः स्थाने

इक् भवति। ततः ‘संप्रसारणम्’। संप्रसारणसंज्ञश्च भवति इग्, यणः स्थानेऽत्र निर्वृत्त इति। **विषयार्थं (पुन)र्वचनम्।** ननु च एतदप्ययणर्थं विज्ञायमानमेवं परिकल्प्येत – संप्रसारणशब्द आदेशो वच्यादीनामिति। तत्रायमभिप्रायः – इग्यण इत्यत्राप्युपतिष्ठत इति। **उरण्रपरे च। कर्तृ हर्तृ।** अत्रान्तर[त]मस्या[भावाद]णः पर्यायेण प्राप्नुवन्ति। एतदर्थमेव च प्रातिपदिकमुपन्यस्तम्। धातुनियमोऽन्यत्र स्यात् – “ऋत इद्धातोः” (पा. ७. १. १००), ‘उदोष्ठ्यपूर्वस्य’ (पा. ७. १. १०२) इति। **सिद्धं तु (ष)ष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात्।** षष्ठ्यधिकारे सति स्वनिमित्तप्रयुक्ताः स्थानषष्ठीमपेक्षमाणा ‘अङ्गस्य’, ‘वच्यादीनाम्’, ‘ऋत इद्धातोः’ इति, स्वकार्यं निष्पादयन्ति, न षष्ठीमन्तरेणेति। **इमावपि योगौ षष्ठ्याधिकारमनुवर्तिष्येते।** स्वर्यैते एतौ योगौ। तत्र पारतन्त्र्यात् नास्त्येताभ्यां कार्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति। **अथ वा षष्ठ्याधिकारे इमौ योगौ अपेक्षिष्यामहे।** ‘षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा’ (पा. १. १. ४९) इति योगविभागः क्रियते। ‘षष्ठी’ इति। यदेतदनुक्रान्तमेतद् यत्र षष्ठी तत्र संनिहितमिति। सामर्थ्यात् एतावेव संबध्येते। **अथ वेदं तावदयं प्र[ष्टव्यः। अव]श्यं त्वयान्यतरार्थं** पुनर्वचनमिति समर्थयमानेन कर्तव्यः संबन्धः — यत्र च गुण इति वा वृद्धिरिति वा ब्रूयात्, तत्र ‘इक’ इत्येतदुपतिष्ठत इति। एवं यातादयः शक्या निवर्तयितुम्। तत्रापेक्षायां सत्यां किमर्थं योगभेदेनापेक्षा क्रियते, न पुनरेकमेवाभिसंबद्धं वाक्यम्? तत्रैवमपेक्षिष्यामहे — गुणवृद्धी इति ये गुणवृद्धी, ते इको भवत इति एतदनेन भाष्येण कथयति — **इदं तत्रापेक्ष्यते।... यथैव तर्हि इदं तत्रापेक्ष्यते, एवमिहापि तदपे[क्षि]ष्यामह इति।**

॥ इति श्रीमहाभाष्यटीकायां भर्तृहरिविरचितायां तृतीयमाह्निकम् ॥

TRANSLATION

[1]

The nine (remaining) Sūtras should be understood to have been dropped for the reason that they are as good as explained by this explanation itself.

[2]

... rarely ... the own form, however, is present everywhere and so is not intended (here as a name). Thus, even *diva aut* (P. 7. 1. 84) is an injunction through a name; this phoneme *au* is taught by means of its own form.

[3]

" The words Guṇa and Vṛddhi, which are already read, continue ". The purpose is achieved (even) by reading (the Sūtra as) *ikaḥ* (merely), (meaning) that Guṇa and Vṛddhi which are already read replace *ik* (phonemes). The reading of the words Guṇa and Vṛddhi in this Sūtra, even when the object is thus achieved (without them), is meant for (restricting the application of this Sūtra to those cases where) an utterance of the words (Guṇa and Vṛddhi) is (expressly) resorted to. Others, however, convey the same idea by the two occurrences of the words Guṇa and Vṛddhi (in this Sūtra). (The idea is) that the object would have been achieved by a single mention (of Guṇa and Vṛddhi). And the words Guṇa and Vṛddhi which are already mentioned, continue (in this rule also). In fact, everywhere in grammar, a statement is made in a general way. But it does not bring about the result. What really achieves it is another sentence which is a particularised form (of the general rule) integrated (every time) into a concrete instance; e.g. *kartari* (P. 3.4.67, teaching the affixion of a Kṛt suffix) to denote an agent (is particularised into P. 3. 2. 25 with the addition of the qualification) *paśau* ' provided the agent is a beast ', (or into P. 3. 2. 13 along with the Vā) to denote the two agents, *hastin* ' an elephant ' and *sūcaka* ' a backbiter '. Thus we understand a different sentence altogether, viz. *iko guṇavṛddhī guṇavṛddhī* from one *guṇavṛddhi* which is inferred (to have come down by *anuvṛtti*) and the other which is actually read (in this Sūtra). (This new sentence) means : Those Guṇa and Vṛddhi (phonemes, taught as substitutes), which are accompanied by (the actual utterance of the terms *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ*) take the place of the *ik* (phonemes).

[4]

"If it (i. e. the words Guṇa and Vṛddhi) continues ... then Vṛddhi (also) becomes a name of *a*, *e* and *o*", because a section-heading is present in every rule. (Objection :) But the word *vṛddhiḥ* is read with a circumflex accent and it presents itself into this rule as denoting *ā ai* and *au*. So *ā ai* and *au* will now get the name Guṇa. (Reply :) This is the underlying idea : A technical name, when it is still proceding to a place of its use, still denotes its form only, because of its connection with another name. Therefore [the word *vṛddhiḥ*] when it is inferred (to have come down by *anuvṛtti*) is inferred only in that capacity (viz. as denoting its form). So it is said that *a e* and *o* will have the name Vṛddhi also.

[5]

"(The word *vṛddhiḥ*)[1] will continue its connection (with *ādaic*)". What is this continuation of connection ? We say[2] : Just as (other) pairs of preceding and succeeding elements retire, having secured their numerical counterparts (when one pair materialises itself in a particular instance) as for example in the rule *ig yaṇaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 45), similarly (in the present case) the coming down (of *vṛddhiḥ* into P. 1. 1. 2) is inferred on the basis of the affixion of the Svarita accent; subsequently, noticing that *ādaic* also have come down, (the reader or the student) will come to know that there is no connection (between *vṛddhiḥ* and *aden̄*). He will guess that the coming down of *ādaic* is for this very purpose and also the further continuation (of *vṛddhiḥ* into P. 1. 1. 3) on the basis of the affixion of the technical mark (viz. the Svarita).

[6]

"Or, the section headings have the movement of a frog". Now (i. e. on this alternative) only the word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down, leaving *ādaic* (sounds). Frogs seeking a watery place, when their activities are unimpaired, commence such a movement, in that, controlling their downward gravitation in the mid-air, they alight on the desired spot. There is a (similar movement) in the word also caused by the meaning. Where one thinks a semantic need (exists), there one infers (the presence of that word by *anuvṛtti*). This is the resemblance (of a word) with a frog's movement.

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[1] S. D. Joshi, *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya : Vibhaktyāhnika*, (under P. 2. 3. 32, where the expression is repeated), supplies 'Pāṇini' as the subject. He translates : '... Pāṇini must have continued a connected statement ').

[2] Literally : 'It is being said or replied.'

[7]

" Or, a single rule will be made (out of P. 1. 1. 1 and 2). " It will be a single rule because of absence of different verbs. A single verbal form *bhavati* will be supplied when reading (the Sūtra, which will now be) : *vṛddhir ādaij aden guṇaḥ*. Although *bhavati* will have to be repeated when understanding (the two definitions in the Sūtra), the time of understanding (of both definitions) will be a single one. So there will not be any time when *ādaic* sounds would be devoid of the name Vṛddhi or *aden* sounds devoid of the name Guṇa.

[8]

" Or, because of the statement of another (name, viz. Guṇa), and because of the absence of reading a *ca* ' and ' ". What is the resemblance (of P. 1. 1. 1 and 2) with *utsarga* and *apavāda* rules, and what difference ? As for the difference : there is a relationship of the general and the special between an *utsarga* and an *apavāda* rule : (e. g.) between *karmaṇi*...(P. 3. 2. 1.) and *āto'nupasarge kaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 3.). (To explain further :) when an operation is taught (for the verbal root in general) by saying *dhātoḥ* ' after a verbal root ', a root ending in *ā* is included; thus there is the generality (present) in roots in *ā*. But its non-inclusion in the other roots on account of its *ā* (is its) speciality. (But) in the present context neither *aden* sounds are included in the rule *vṛddhir ādaic*, nor *ādaic* sounds in *aden guṇaḥ*. Now, what is the resemblance ? Doubtfulness and doubtlessness. Just as, while (the operation of) a general rule is doubtful (in the field of the special rule), (that of) the special rule is undoubtful, similarly, the (purpose of) continuance of (*vṛddhiḥ*) in *vṛddhir ādaic* (into P. 1. 1. 2) is doubtful, viz. whether it is meant for the next rule (P. 1. 1. 3) and is meant to be here (in P. 1. 1. 2) only because it cannot be helped, or whether it is there for the purpose of this rule also. The rule *aden guṇaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 2), on the other hand, has yet to play its role and is free from doubt also. This is the resemblance.

Here a question is to be asked : Just as the name *pratyaya*, which has found its scope in *san* etc., and is doubtful (as regards its further application) when a continuation of other names is possible, is combined with names like *kṛt*, *kṛtya*, *taddhita*, *tadrāja* (to name a common element), which are free from doubt and have yet to find their scope, why should not there be a similar combination in the present case ?

The reply to this (question) is : The teaching of the name *pratyaya* is only to name (the element) named and not with any further idea that it will help by some activity (by occurring) in derivative rules. It is combined

with special names (like *kṛt*), because (the two kinds of rules) belong to different times and also because there is no conflict. In the present case, however, from the statement *vṛddhir ādaic* it is known that this is the teaching of a name where the (elements) named are included by the relationship (of identity expressed by the formula) : ' that is this '. It is also certain from the affixion of the mark of the *svarita* accent, that the word *vṛddhiḥ*, when present in the rule *iko guṇavṛddhī* will, on account of its presence, be of some use in the derivative rules. Now, when it is present in the rule *aden guṇaḥ*, it does not perform any activity. Its very character as a name is doubtful there, because (it is doubtful) whether it functions as a name or functions as a named; (only) the affixion of the (*svarita*) mark is free from doubt. (On the other hand) the character as a name belonging to the word Guṇa in the rule *aden guṇaḥ* is beyond doubt. Such being the case it is not proper to give the same weight to that whose naming activity is doubtful as to that whose naming activity is beyond doubt. So it is well said, ' (Guṇa is) a bar to (Vṛddhi) mentioned previously '.

[9]

" Or, he will tell... " etc. By this (the author) teaches that the frog-movement, which is available from the practice of the world, is utilised by grammar also. There the reading of the word *vibhāṣā* (in P. 5. 2. 4) indicates [the absence of the contact] of (an expression which has) come down (by *anuvṛtti*), if (the rule into which it has come down has) no need (for it); so it has to be connected [only there where thhre is need for it]. In the intervening (rules), however, it is like one approaching the roots of a tree while going to another village.

[10]

" Or, both cease to continue. We shall supply them ". (Objection :) But should not the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya vidhir vā bhavati pratiṣedho veti* apply here ? When both are furnished with the Svarita accent, well, then of course both are inferred (as continuing to be present); when only one of the two (is so furnished), then only that one. (Reply :) True. It is so. But a person, supplying something as being needed, looks at the supplied thing in two ways : (as characterised) by plurality or by oneness. By oneness, as e.g. *Devadattaś ca Yajñadattaś ca Viṣṇumitraś ca* ' Devadatta and Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra '; this is (characterised) by oneness. When he looks (at the thing as characterised) by plurality, then (only) the adjacent one can be supplied. But when he looks at (it as one) whole, then the whole itself is adjacent; thus he looks (at the things) in one or the other way so as to suit his objective.

[11]

[11 A] "Now, is this (rule : P. 1. 1. 3) subordinate to *alo'ntyasya* (P. 1.1.52) or an exception to it ?" *Śeṣa, avayava* and *ekadeśa* are synonyms. *Apavāda* (is) what sets aside. (The author of the *Mbh*) himself explains that the state of subordinateness to it (results) from the state of being one sentence and that of exception to it from being different sentences.

(Objections :) (1) But it has never been explained how this state of being one sentence or different sentences (is there). Moreover, how can the state of being one sentence be possible in the case of these two (rules) which are heard (i. e. laid down) at different times and are separated (from each other) by many rules ? (2) Further, if there is a cause for the state of being a single sentence there cannot be different sentences, and if there is a cause for the state of being many sentences there cannot be one sentence; and so there is no reasonable explanation for the doubt. And surely the states of being different sentences and of one sentence cannot exist in one and the same (entity). (3) Why are only these two introduced, supersession and supplementariness, and not option and combination also ? (4) similarly, the state of being many sentences is here stated to be the cause of supersession, but elsewhere (it is said to be) the cause of combination, viz. under *tatra khyunnādipratiṣedho nānāvākyatvāt* (P. 3. 4. 67 Vā. 2).

All this has to be explained.

[11 Ā] (Answers :) (1) As to the question : 'How can there be a relationship between the two that are separated from each other ?' (the reply is : mere) contiguity is no cause of relationship. Thus, verily, is said : "contiguity is no cause of relationship between (words) which are not semantically connected'. For example, in 'the bull,[1] O-female-carrier-of-water, who[2], you, (you) carry, on-the-head, O sister, a jar, sideways, running, you-saw' even the words, placed near immediately, do not help that verb. Why ? Because of impossibility. There is no carrying of the bull on the head and the running of a jar. As a result of this a different sentence with another word-sequence is formed in the mind of the listener. It is the same as when a person muttering (a text) repeatedly in low voice understands the meaning from it. Some believe : meaning is understood in this way without the words themselves. Similarly in Grammar also relationship is marked by meaning, (and) not made by contiguity, as in the case of (the rules) *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (P. 1. 4. 21) and *ṅyāp-prātipadikāt* (P. 4. 1. 1.). This one (viz. P.

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1 Gram. object.

2 Fem. Nom. sing.

1. 4. 21) is read at a different place for the sake of *tiṅ* (suffixes). Similarly in the present case also (P. 1. 1. 52) may have been read at a different place for the sake of such (rules) as *rājñaḥ ka ca* (P. 4. 2. 140).

(2) If there is a semantic connection in some domain, then, in the domain where the two (rules), directed by their respective causes, come together, (there) both are possible, Principal-Subordinate relationship and supersession. Hence the doubt. Where, however, only one (alternative) is possible, there (that) one alone proceeds, as e. g. in the injunction about the beast, the agent. Here the action-producer taught in *kartari* .... (P. 3. 4. 67), needs a substratum because of its power-possessive character. Being secondary to the substance, it (action-producer) is dependent on others and (besides) it certainly needs another, because (the agent) who is in the form of a substance is mentioned specifically by the expression *paśau*. Further, a verbal root denotes an action and a suffix coming after it must, in the fitness of things, denote an action-producer. So it cannot be assumed that the suffix denotes the simple beast (i. e. without agenthood); nor the one with the properties such as the being the object etc.; why ? (because the properties such as the object etc.) have not been taught (as the denotation of this suffix). Therefore, the two (i. e. the agenthood and the beast) being absolutly looked upon as extenders of help (to each other,) a single-sentence-construction (of rules) referring to them is inferred (as intended by Pāṇini) viz. as *paśau kartari bhavati* '(the suffix) comes in in the sense of the beast, the agent.' Similarly, when (the two patronymic suffixes) *aṇ* and *iñ* come together in one and the same instance, this (patronymic) meaning is expressed even when either of the suffixes is there. Therefore (the suffix) laid down in the special domain superseds (the suffix) having a general domain. So (the special rule) is looked upon as the superseder only (and the general as the superseded). Here (in the present case), however, in the injunction 'Guṇa and Vṛddhi replace the Aṅga' there is a Genitive (viz *aṅgasya*) and (the word) *guṇavṛddhī*. In view of the Genitive, (the rule) *alo'ntyasya* presents itself. In view of *guṇavṛddhī*, (the word) *ikaḥ* presents itself. When there is thus an encounter (of the two) in one and the same domain, if the expression *aṅgasya* proceeds to the *antya al* (final phoneme), — this (Aṅga) has no form other than the group of parts; this itself is the form of the Aṅga. When, for instance, it is said '*p* is the substitute of *ruh*' (P. 7. 3. 43), or 'and (in addition) *k* is the substitute of *rājan*' (P. 4. 2. 140), what is conveyed (by 'of *ruh*') is : 'of *h* of *ruh*' and (by 'of *rājan*') is 'of *n* of *rājan*'. — Such being the case, when the collective noun (*aṅgasya*) is connected with *antya al* 'final phoneme', *ikaḥ* becomes a qualifying expression of the part. Thus this (rule : P. 1. 1. 3) becomes subordinate to that (rule : P. 1. 1. 52) because (*ikaḥ*) is a qualifier of *antyasyālaḥ*. (But) when the collective noun

aṅgasya, being connected with the *antya al* 'final phoneme' is so connected only after it is first qualified by *ik,* which by *tadantavidhi* means *iganta* 'ending in ik', so that the whole thing means : '(Guṇa is a substitute) of the final phoneme of the Aṅga ending in *ik,*' — even then *alo'ntyasya* becomes subordinate (to P. 1. 1. 3), because it qualifies (the main statement :) 'Guṇa is the substitute of the Aṅga ending in *ik*' which is qualified. If, on the other hand, the Genitive *aṅgasya* is not at all (taken as) Genitive of substituendum in the rules prescribing Guṇa and Vṛddhi — then what ? — but that *ikaḥ* (is taken as) Genitive of substituendum with *Aṅgasya* as its qualifier — as e. g. is *ūd upadhāyā gohaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 89) '*ū* is the substitute of the penultimate of (the Aṅga) *goh,*' — in that case *alo'ntyasya* does not proceed at all in the matter of Guṇa and Vṛddhi, so the superseding role of this (rule : P. 1. 1. 3) is inferred. Supersession is just this absence of becoming due (of the superseded rule). Now, on the Principal-subordinate view, *ik* is separated from the main thing (Guṇa), the Guṇa for the Aṅga alone is taught by the rule — that is the meaning understood from words.

On the Supersession view, on the other hand, Guṇa is taught for *ik* while Aṅga is separated from the main thing.

(3) (As to the question) why the Combination (- view) has not been mentioned, (the reply is :) because of impossibility. Here (in the world) a combination of (things) serving a common purpose is seen in the matter of a common activity, as e. g. in 'Feed Devadatta with soup, salt, ghee.' Soup etc., serving a common purpose, are combined into feeding by (their) sprinkling, flavouring, anointing (respectively). (But) Aṅga and *ik* cannot thus be combined in (the matter of) Guṇa. (To explain :) when one (Genitive) undergoes the Guṇa which has become due for the Aṅga, at that time the (Genitive) other than it must become the qualifying Genitive. For this reason also the combination is not practicable. (Now) the option presents itself when out of many mutually exclusive (items) serving a common purpose, only one does the thing (at a time), as e. g. in 'Feed Devadatta in the palace, in (the ordinary) house; in a bell-metal plate, in a silver (plate)', (D°) can be fed either in the palace or in the (ordinary) house. (But) a simultaneous option is not there in the present case : it is not that Guṇa (is a substitute) either of the (final phoneme of) Aṅga or of *ik* (simultaneously). For (only) one Genitive (at a time) can undergo the operation (by being a substituendum).

(4a) Now, what is the solution of the contradiction (involved in the two views) about the Two-Sentence Construction ? We say : as regards (the expression :) 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas, buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya', some hold the view that this is a single sentence, because one verb is

heard, since there is a single verb *dā*, with different grammatical objects and different recipients. This is as in the case of the sentence 'Feed Devadatta with meat, feed with curds, feed with vegetables,' where, in spite of the frequent use of the verb 'to feed' because of the plurality of the means of feeding, there is the state of being a single sentence. This revered scholar here however regards that there are two sentences here, one (sentence) 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas' and the other 'buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya.' No verb, however, is used (in the second sentence) because its purpose is already served. There the one verb *dā* has curds as its object, while the other has buttermilk as its object and so there are definitely two *dā* verbs. But then why is there no combination in the worldly practice? It is not possible to say. Why? Because it is not seen. (That's all.) Even those who have not read the Śāstras say 'Curds is not given to him'. But if it is insisted that a logical explanation must be given, here is an explanation : In the view of those who believe that there are two sentences here, a different (i.e. later) act supersedes (the previous) act. The (activity) with curds as its objects is superseded by that with buttermilk as its object. (Moreover,) even though Kauṇḍinya is included in (the denotation of) the word Brāhmaṇa, still he is not mentioned *qua* Kauṇḍinya. What then? As a Brāhmaṇa. The reward also accrues to a donor, provided (the curds is) given to a Brāhmaṇa. But as far as the giving of buttermilk 'to Kauṇḍinya' is concerned, it is instructed specifically. Moreover, the giving of curds is possible even in the absence of Kauṇḍinya, but not the giving of buttermilk. Therefore, the two activities do not lend themselves to a combination, where in one (a person like Kauṇḍinya) is mentioned in that (i.e. general) form and is (therefore) doubtful, and in the other he is mentioned specifically and is not doubtful. How indeed could the inference (of giving curds to K°) be treated as being on the same level with the giving of buttermilk which is directly perceived? Therefore neither combination nor option is possible between direct perception and inference.

(Here is) the view of some : Here (an unsaid) remainder of the sentence (is to be regarded) as inferred. And (the words) 'buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya' (supply) the clue to this (inference). That is why 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas' is introduced at the outset, in order to exclude Kauṇḍinya.

Some others think : There are many *brāhmaṇa*- words. Among them some exclude Kauṇḍinya, some exclude Māṭhara, some include Māṭhara, some include Kauṇḍinya. Such being the case, this word *brāhmaṇa* (in the present context) denotes the Brāhmaṇas from whom Kauṇḍinya is excluded,– that is what this listener understands from the words 'buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya' without inferring any (unsaid) part of the sentence. If you ask,

'how'? (The reply is :) this (listener) when instructing others, instructs in the same way. So he thinks : I am being instructed by him in the same way as I instruct others. On this view Kauṇḍinya is not mentioned, (even) as a Brāhmaṇa, in the giving of curds. However, in the view of those who regard this as one sentence, buttermilk, which supersedes the other means, sets aside curds. Why? Curds is doubtful, but buttermilk is directly mentioned with the word '*takram*'.

(4ā) (The author of the Vārttikas) admitted combination in the case of *khyun* etc. on account of the separateness of the topic. Just as (the suffixes) which supersede (general suffixes) in the meaning of '(his) child' do not supersede those laid down in section-heading rules; similarly *kta* (is the superseder) of *laṭ* laid down in the sense of present time and not of one laid down in the sense of the past time; ...... Similarly he admitted combination with the idea that *khyun* taught in one context (as denoting the agent) by (the rule) *kartari kṛt* will, in another context, denote an instrument, that is to say, as a *kṛt* suffix it will denote the agent, and (as materialized) in the form of *khyun* it will denote an instrument. We (now) refute it (thus): just as in the case of *aṇ* and *iñ*,, which come together to denote one and the same meaning, there is a supersession of the general (suffix) by the special, similarly here also two meanings come together in the case of the word *khyun* viz. the instrument and the agent; there (the suffix *khyun*) possesses the meaning of instrument because of its having (the specific) form *khyun* and the meaning of agent because of its state of being a *kṛt* (suffix); so the meaning which is laid down specifically supersedes the meaning laid down in a general way. Similarly the time which depends (for its denotation) upon a particular *upapada* in the case of the word *laṭ* supersedes another time. Similarly the present time supersedes the pastness taught by *niṣṭhā* (P. 3. 2. 102) when the suffix *kta* is restricted to particular verbal roots. Similarly (the meaning viz.) badness of action in *yaṅ* supersedes its intensiveness taught in the section-heading rule. In the same way, in the case of *ḍhak*, the mention of *vaḍavā* with the spceial (meaning viz.) 'a stallion, stud-horse' supersedes the meaning '(his) child'. ...

But those who regard this as one sentence hold thus : Just as this viz. 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas, buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya' is one sentence, similarly this also, viz. '*kṛt* denotes an agent, *khyun* denotes an instrument' is one sentence. What is meant here is : (a primary suffix) other than *khyun* denotes an agent. How about (these two rules:) '(There is) elision of a case-ending' (P. 2. 4. 71) and 'No elision when a second member follows (P. 6. 3. 1)?' Here also there is this (single) sentence : (There is) elision of a case-ending, (in a context) other than where a second mem-

ber follows. If it is argued that this sentence belongs to two different times and so each time it denotes the meaning as laid down (at that time), just as Kauṇḍinya gets both curds and buttermilk when they pertain to different times, we refute it on the ground that the understanding of (these so-called two different rules) pertains to a single time (which has thus a single import).

Everywhere in the Śruti and Smṛti, supersession is (just) an inference of the non-proceeding (of the so-called superseded rule). In the (prohibition) 'a domestic fowl is not to be eaten' there is this same (kind of) 'supersession'. Surely here the eating does not follow any injunction. It is what presents itself being prompted by a desire and is (here) prohibited. Grammar also is a system based on (the authority of) the word and so absence of the proceeding (of a general rule) in the presence of a special rule is inferred.

[12]

"The word *ikaḥ* should be read in the case of *mid* etc." Since they do not end in *ik*, so the word *ikaḥ* should be read in the case of *mid* etc. The word *ikaḥ* as subordinate [to (or to which is subordinate) *alo'ntyasya*] does not present itself (here) because of [the absence of] concurrence. Therefore, in the rules (P. 7. 3. 82 etc.) the word *ikaḥ* should be read. "Further, the contingency of (Guṇa etc. being) a substitute for the whole (stem) which does not end in *ik*". One defect (already stated) is that *ikaḥ* will have to be read in the case of *mid* etc. Here is another : in the case of *yātā*, *vātā* etc. the Guṇa threatens to be a substitute for the whole. This is what (he[1]) thinks : The connecting together of the stem (final) with *ik* (takes place) when the cause is present. It takes place (only) when the cause is there. This being the case, just as the connecting together (takes place) when the Genitive is decided as denoting the substituendum, the connecting together should take place (only) when the (stem) ends in *ik*. Where, however, (this latter) cause of connecting together does not exist, there the Genitive (indicative of the substituendum) remains unconnected (and so the final sound — whatever it may be — is not available as a substituendum). His[1] view further is : The rule *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1) invests all stems with a (substituendum-) Genitive. With this Genitive thus invested, *ikaḥ* and *alo'ntyasya* are connected together in the case of the (stems) ending in *ik*; not those having an *ik* [as non-final], nor those not ending in *ik*. Now in the case of *yātā* etc. there is a (substituendum-) Genitive. So the Guṇa should be a substitute for the whole. That is why (the disputant in the *Mbh*) says : "The (substituendum —) Genitive of the final phoneme is connected with the final *ik*.

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[1] The advocate of the view stated in this Vār, according to the first interpretation.

And *aṅgasya* is a substituendum-Genitive. This being the case, the stem which does not end in *ik* ...." Since here is only one form of the Genitive (indicative of) the final phoneme (as undergoing the operation concerned), viz. *aṅgasya*, and that too when an *ik* is the final and since consequently this (substituendum-) Genitive *aṅgasya* presents itself only when the final phoneme is *ik*, so the other (disputant) says: "This defect is not there. Just as the (substituendum-) Genitive of the final phoneme is connected with the final *ik*......". As to what was said by you, viz. that (the rule *aṅgasya*) invests all the stems (with the character of a substituendum), that is not so. This being the case, where is a (substituendum-) Genitive in the case of *yātā* etc., and, in its absence, where is the (possibility of) a substitute for the whole? Further this *ca* is read in the sense of *hi*. And *hi* denotes reason. Therefore this (particular use of *hi*) also should be understood in the sense of a reason. Since a substitution for the whole threatens, therefore *ikaḥ* should be read in the case of *mid* etc. "Guṇa in the place of *ik*: it cannot come in the place of the final because of the injunction *ikaḥ*." For, when there is no connecting together of the final phoneme (with *ik*), then *mid* does not have a final *ik*. "The Guṇa, however, *is* enjoined." It will take place on account of the injunction. Do you mean to say by (the rule) *aṅgasya*? No, he says; by *mider* [*guṇaḥ*]. Thus even though the (substituendum-) Genitive *aṅgasya* is not there in the case of *vātā* etc., it is here, viz. *mideḥ*. And as that will remain unfulfilled, a substitute for the whole threatens.

[13]

"If in the place of *ik*, whatsoever [Guṇa and Vṛddhi are to be substituted]." The word *mātra* denotes entirety. Guṇa and Vṛddhi [will have to be replaced] in the place of every *ik*, whether occupying a final or a non-final position. *Aṅgasya* is not a substituendum-Genitive because *ikaḥ* is now the qualified and *aṅgasya* the qualificand. Here in the matter of Guṇa and Vṛddhi, there is no possibility of connecting (*aṅgasya* with *alo'ntyasya*) because a (Genitive) understood as denoting a substituendum (alone) is so connected and this cause is not present here. This being the case Guṇa and Vṛddhi become due (as substitute) for an *ik* in any position. Therefore prohibition (of it) should be taught in the case of a non-final (*ik*). (Objection:) The examples like *he agnicit* are not possible. Why? The words *hrasva* etc. occurring in the sūtras must qualify *aṅga*. So the Guṇa becomes due for (an *ik* forming a part of) an *aṅga* ending in a short vowel. So the proper illustration is *he buddhe*. Similarly, examples like *budhāḥ*, *duhitari*, *śuddhaye*, *śu*(*? pi*)*cavya* should be adduced, not like *agnicit*. (Reply:) This defect is not there. It is certain that on the Supersession view the Genitive *aṅgasya* does not become a recipient of the grammatical operation. The

laying down of Guṇa with reference to it (i. e. the *aṅga*) is secondary. How can then (the word *aṅgasya*) be qualified by *hrasva* etc. read in the sūtras ? So *ik* alone is qualified (by them) as being the recipient of the grammatical operation. As we cannot possibly say '*ik* of a short vowel', this is how the construction results : a short *ik* of the stem is replaced by Guṇa. Or, the Guṇa is principal as it is what is predicated. *Ik* and the stem being meant for it are subordinate. Now the expressions *hrasva* etc. cannot refer to (Guṇa[1] which is) principal. So when it is taken as referring to items which are subordinate to it, it is reasonably a qualification of (*ik*) which is directly connected with it, not of *aṅgasya* which accessory is connected with it only indirectly. For this reason also the examples (given viz. *he agnicit* etc.) alone are correct. Further, this is only illustrative. The prohibition of (Vṛddhi substitution in the place of) a non-final will have to be taught in the case of the rule *aco ñṇiti* (P. 7. 2. 115). Here also it will have to be understood that (the Vṛddhi is a substitute) of a stem- vowel, whatever position it may be occupying. (As a result of it) in words like *daridrāyaka* the Vṛddhi threatens (as a substitute) of a non-final vowel.

(Objection :) But there is no scope for the operation of this Paribhāṣā (P. 1. 1. 3) in the case of rules like *or guṇaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 146) because the substituedum is (already) stated. (Reply :) True. It is so. But this is why we say so : you did not admit the possibility of a non-final (undergoing Guṇa or Vṛddhi). (But) if the universal *aṅgasya* qualifies the particular *ikaḥ*, then here also the universal *aṅgasya* should in fitness qualify *hrasvasya* etc. And then there *is* the contingency of the non-final (undergoing Guṇa). If this is so understood then what is going to be said under *taddhitakāmyor iglakṣaṇāt* (P. 1. 1. 5 Vār. 4) is accounted for. Others explain (thus) : Here the application of *ikaḥ* is resorted to. (This means) for an *ik* belonging to a stem there is a Guṇa (substitution). For every *ik* ? No. For which, then ? For *u*. For what purpose is this repeated mention ? So that (the substituendum) in whatever position is understood (as undergoing the operation). But then what is going to be said cannot be properly explained. So that statement should be understood (as being made) in the context of the Subordination view (alone).

[14]

" (The rule) *pugantalaghūpadhasya* ...... (P. 7. 3. 86) (will serve) towards restriction ". The Guṇa (substitute) for the non-final is already achieved (by P. 7. 3. 84). The re-injunction will have restriction as its purpose. This is what (the author) shows by this : *aṅgasya* qualifes *ik* as the latter is

1 *Hrasva* is in Genitive, Guṇa in Nominative.

the recipient of the operation taught by the rule *sārvadhātukārdhadhātuka-yoḥ* (P. 7. 3. 84). (Objection:) But (P. 7. 3. 86) cannot reasonably be restrictive since there is (a Guṇa) to be laid down for the first time (by that rule.). What is to be so laid down? (Guṇa) in the form *hrepayati.* (But) the Guṇa for the non-final is achieved already. (True.) It may have been intended to be taught for the final *p*, and for the final *d* in *bhettā*. This is the reply : This (sūtra) is interpreted as a restriction by understanding the sūtra thus : *puganta=puki antaḥ* 'what immediately precedes a following *puk*' and *laghūpadha=laghvī upadhā* 'a light penultimate'. (Objection :) But this could be for (laying down a Guṇa substitute for *ā*) in *dāpayati*. (Reply :) Let there be a Guṇa substitute for *ā*, we will replace it by Vṛddhi. And in the case of vicious circle one can decide as desired. This latter part of the sūtra, viz. *laghvī upadhā* will serve for restriction viz. ['when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows (the Guṇa replaces a non-final, only if it is light']. "(This) restriction (will be) only of (that Guṇa) in whose context (the restriction is taught)." Thus [Guṇa] by a following *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* will replace only what precedes *puk* and nothing else. (Similarly) since the light penultimate of the stem is the recipient of the operation, there will not be [Guṇa] in *īhitā* etc., "but the Guṇa taught by *hrasvasya guṇaḥ* and by the following rules remains unrestrained........."

... "Even if the restriction is framed in this way viz. that only when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows, [Guṇa] replaces what precedes *puk* or a light vowel". Here......

.... but Guṇa still becomes due in *īhitā* etc. "And even if a two-way restriction was made." But how is a two-way restriction available, since a re-injunction (becomes) a restriction, and once one resriction is made there is no second re-injunction? True, we say. That is exactly why it is said 'Even if'. Even on this supposition that it could be so interpreted so as to make the *sūtra* aim at a two-way restriction, the Guṇa taught by *jusi ca* remains unrestricted. This is so because the penultimate here is light and the suffix *jus* also is *sārvadhātuka*.

[15]

"In that case this is neither subordinate to it, nor exception to it." As regards what you believe — viz. that these two Paribhāṣās expect (each other), either by the general-rule — exception relation or the Principal-subordinate relation, because they clash against each other in a common jurisdiction,— it is not so. One (of them) [viz. P. 1. 1. 52] proceeds to operate, without expecting the other (in any way) in rules like '*rājñaḥ ka ca*' [P. 4. 2. 140]; the other [P. 1. 1. 3] (operates by way of) mentioning the

position of *ik* as a substituendum in the matter of Guṇa and Vṛddhi. If the two somehow happen to collide in some common (sphere), it is not proper to regard them as mutually expectant merely on this account. Just as the lengthening (by P. 7.3. 102) and replacement by *e* (by P. 7. 3. 103), which are by no means expectant of each other, are seen to collide in a common form (like) *vṛkṣebhyaḥ*, similar is (the collision) of these Paribhāṣās. Now the Paribhāṣā *alo'ntyasya* is occupied with determining the part (to be actually replaced) of the collective Genitive (which names the substituendum); this (other) also [with mentioning the position of *ik* as a substituendum in the operation of Guṇa and Vṛddhi. " By superseding the *niyama* (i. e. P. 1. 1. 52)] Guṇa and Vṛddhi replace (the *ik*) by (the rule regarding) the conflict of equals ". If there had been the relation of (the principal and) the subordinate, then what kind of conflict (of equals) would there be with oneself, since the two form a single sentence? If there were the opposition (of a particular rule to a general one), " The conflict of equals between a general and a special rule would be improper. The scope for the *niyama* is (the rule) *rājñaḥ ka ca* (P. 4. 2. 140)" where the Paribhāṣā *iko guṇavṛddhī* [has no function. "The scope for *iko guṇavrddhī* (are the forms) *cayana, cāyaka, lavana, lāvaka*."[1]]. Where no difference made by the activity of the Paribhāṣā [*alo'ntyasya*] is seen, there its activity is useless. If (the rule) *ikaḥ*... having once taught that this Guṇa (is the substitute) of the final, the *niyama* also were to lay down (the substitute for the final only), [nothing] would be achieved (thereby). And so we think that the *niyama* is indifferent (to cases like *cayana*). " Here both the rules present themselves: (viz. in case like) *medyati mārṣṭi*. " The (substitute will have to be) for the final by the *niyama*, and for the non-final *ik* by this (Paribhāṣā). " This conflict-of-equals is not proper." He says " This rule (P. 1.1.3) is earlier, the *niyama* is later " in order to suggest, to begin with, that the order of the rules itself is not known to them. (He) says " The word para means desired " to indicate that here that word *para* is used, which means ' desired ', not the one which expresses a definite place in a sequence (viz. the later)....... " Even then the conflict-of-equals is improper (here). For conflict-of-equals (means) *dvikāryayoga* ". *Dvikāryayoga* is that where there is a connection of one original element with two (simultaneous) operations. That (element) which stands here in this position gets that name (?) (viz. *vipratiṣedha*) because of the *vipratiṣedha* consisting of being subject to the connection with two operations. Or, *yoga* means connection; *vipratiṣedha* is connection with two operations and so this particular connection itself forms the *vipratiṣedha*. Just as the word *virodha*

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[1] i. e. the rule P. 7. 3. 84 : *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* which teaches Guṇa and establishes forms like *cayana*, and P. 7. 2. 115 : *aco ñṇiti* which teaches Vṛddhi and establishes forms like *cāyaka*.

'conflict' denotes a particular kind of relationship, similarly the word *vipratiṣedha* also. "The connection with two operations is not necessarily the only (kind of) *vipratiṣedha*. What then? Impossibility also." You favour to look upon the *vipratiṣedha* as consisting of a connection with two operations, (but) (it is rather) the impossibility (inherent in the *dvikāryayoga* which constitutes) the *vipratiṣedha*, an impossibility where there is no connection with two operations. If *vipratiṣedha* is there where there is no possibility of connection with two operations, there also (it is of the nature of) impossibility only. (He) shows the impossibility when there is a connection with two operations: "Here, as for (cases like) *vṛkṣebhyaḥ*, (there is) a single substituendum and two substitutes, and there is no possibility..." But two substitutes do take the place of one substituendum. Just as two *pac* words replace one *pac* word, similarly why should not *ā* and *e* come as substitutes in *vṛkṣebhyaḥ* etc.? The reply: We do not say that (two substitutes for a single substituendum are) everywhere impossible. What then (do you say)? The kind (of double substitute which is suggested) in the particular example under consideration is not possible. For lengthening is there stated to be correct when a *yañ*-(consonant) follows immediately, and an *e*- substitute when a *jhal*-(consonant follows immediately). And there is no possibility that both (the substitutes) will be followed immediately by their respective causes. That is why it is said: "And there is no possibility that there could be two substitutes for a single substituendum." "Now here in (the form) *medyati* there are two substiuenda and a single substitute. And there is no possibility that ......". Here also the possibility is seen, e. g. (the single substitutes for both the preceding and the following phonemes, taught in the rules beginning with) *ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ* (P. 6. 1. 84), and also (the substitute *ra* taught for *r* and the penultimate of *bhrasj* in the rule) *bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anyatarasyām* (P. 6. 4. 47). Here is the reply: There is no possibility here. How? When *mider* is (understood as) the Genitive of the substituendum, it has to be connected with the final (of the stem). Once this connection is there, *ik* does not present itself (as the substituendum); (only) the non-*ik* (i. e.-*d*) presents itself. If *aṅgasya* is understood as a Genitive qualifying (the *ik*), then there is no connection with the final phoneme. "Here also the *niyama* presents itself". This is the implied idea: Why is it that in forms like *cayana* P. 1.1.3 proceeds, but the *niyama* is indifferent to it? Perhaps it may be (said) that (it does not proceed) because it makes no difference. Well, (we say that) this itself is the difference viz. that the operation of *alo'ntyasya* is to be superseded. (To explain:) As long as the rule *iko* ... (P. 1. 1. 3) is not framed, what do you think will happen? The *niyama* (will of course operate). Thus everywhere the *niyama* has already presented itself where this rule (P. 1. 1. 3) is taught, and therefore it is an *apavāda* (of P. 1. 1. 52). Since these two rules are thus related by the opposition (between the general

and the special rule), the view of the Kroṣṭrīyas that the one is unconnected with the other is not correct. " Even if somehow......" This is only an admission for the time being. Even if indifference of the *niyama* (were accepted) in cases like *cayana*, there will be difficulty (because of its similar indifference in forms like *anenijuḥ*), if conflict-of-equals were (accepted in the case of these two rules).

[16]

" Well then, where (it is laid down) that Vṛddhi takes place, Guṇa takes place ..." How do both these present themselves simultaneously ? (Reply :) It is not that all this, viz. ' Guṇa and Vṛddhi take the place of *ik* when the words *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ* are heard (as predicates) ' operates. What then ? Where Guṇa and Vṛddhi are laid down by (uttering) the words *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ*, there a Genitive meaning viz. *ikaḥ* also presents itself. Or, the expression *ikaḥ* presents itself. The acquisition of (participation in) the operation will be had from the particular rules (laying down Guṇa or Vṛddhi). Therefore (what is done is that) all the rules which contain the expressions *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ* are (thus) furnished with a (word in) Genitive, viz. *ikaḥ*. This alone is right that a Paribhāṣā should first be present in the main rule and should then receive its (role in the) operation from it. Without teaching any operation the expression *ikaḥ* is released (by Pāṇini), which (subsequently) becomes modified in accordance with the main rule (laying down Guṇa or Vṛddhi). We thus favour here *anārabhyavāda*. Since in all injunctive rules merely an expression *ikaḥ* is generated, the main sentence becomes thus : *mider iko guṇo bhavati* ' of *mid*, of *ik*, Guṇa takes place '. Unless one has exercised the activity (of testing or trying the two alternatives) one cannot expect the *alo'ntya* Paribhāṣā either in the relationship of subordination or in that of conflict; so human activity is first resorted to. Because of impossibility of a final *ik* in roots like *mid*, a man, proceeding voluntarily, understands *mid* etc. as qualifiers and the *ik*-s as the qualified, just as (one understands) the root *goh* as the qualifier of the penultimate in the rule *ūd upadhāyā gohaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 89). In the case of *jus* etc., however, [because of the possibility of a final *ik*, one understands *aṅga* as the qualified, and the *ik*-s as the qualifiers]. Why is not (the alternative which says :) the *ik* of the *aṅga* (undergoes Guṇa) when *jus* etc. follow accepted ? This is the reply : That is (a matter of) free choice; and if it is so, there is a helpfulness in many a case. A logical justification (for such a procession) is also offered thus : If *ikaḥ* is taken as the qualified and *aṅgasya* as the qualifier in those cases where the form of *aṅga* is not restricted, then, in that case, the direct connection of the *aṅga* with Guṇa by means of word will be lost, since it will be exhausted by (*ik*), which is the qualified. And there is no actual connection also,

because the Guṇa takes the place of *ik*. If, on the other hand, *aṅgasya* is qualified by *ik*, the verbal connection (of *aṅga*) with the main element (i. e. Guṇa) is not lost. As far as *ik* is concerned, although it is verbally separated from the main element in as much as it is (now only) a qualifier, still actually there is a connection with the main element, since the Guṇa is to take the place of *ik*. Therefore that alternative (of interpretation) should be preferred, where both *ik* and *aṅga* enjoy a connection with the main element. It is however seen to fail sometimes in the *śāstra*. So the (inconsistent) procedure of the *śāstra* should be followed (as it is).

[17]

" Or, in all these (Sūtras), the substituendum is mentioned ". (The author of the *Mbh*) says that on the *tacchesa* view it is not necessary to read (an additional word *ik*) in the sūtras laying down (Guṇa and Vṛddhi), since the substituendum is mentioned.

" Also in the case of *kṣipra* and *kṣudra* ". As regards what has been said on the understanding that the sūtra means that (the Guṇa) will (take the place) of *ik* because of the reading of the word *pūrva*, — (to that we say :) if *yaṇādi* is interpreted as *yaṇa ādiḥ* ' what precedes the *yaṇ*, ' (so that the Sūtra means :) what follows *yaṇādi* is dropped and what precedes, i. e. what precedes the *yaṇādi*, is replaced by Guṇa, then the forms *kṣepiṣṭha* and *kṣodiṣṭha* are accounted for. For here the phoneme *p* and the phoneme *d* form the *yaṇādi* and so the Guṇa in these two (superlative forms) [is explained. But in *yaviṣṭha*, a Guṇa substitute for *y*] becomes due. If, on the other hand, *yaṇādi* is interpreted as *yaṇ ādir asya* ' what begins with *yaṇ*,' (so that the Sūtra means :) the word-form beginning with the subsequent *yaṇ* is dropped and what precedes undergoes Guṇa, then, on this (view), the bit -*van* is dropped in the word *yuvan* and the form *yaviṣṭha* is explained. But, then, a Guṇa threatens to substitute the sound *p* in *kṣepiṣṭha*. — Well, in that case, Guṇa (-substitution) in *sthūla* etc. will be executed by (P. 6. 4. 146 :) *or guṇaḥ*. As regards the *asiddha* (' to be regarded as not existing ') nature (of the dropping of *u*) owing to (P. 6. 4. 22:) *asiddhavad atrā bhāt*, that is not obligatory. The present injunction of Guṇa (P. 6. 4. 156) is (to be understood as) meant for *kṣipra* and *kṣudra* only. Here the Guṇa will substitute what precedes the *yaṇādi* (i. e. *i* and *u* preceding *p* and *d* respectively).

(Objection :) But when *u* of *sthūla* etc. as ending in *ŭ* (i. e. *sthū* etc.) is replaced by Guṇa by (P. 6. 4. 146 :) *or guṇaḥ*, an undesired (Guṇa; of *tha* etc.) will be caused by this rule (P. 6. 4. 156). (Reply :) So the rule has to be split thus : (1) The portion following the *yaṇādi* of the words *sthūla, dūra, yuvan, hrasva, kṣipra* and *kṣudra* is dropped. Then (2) what precedes, under-

goes Guṇa. Only *kṣipra* and *kṣudra* come down (into the second rule), being marked with a circumflex accent. *Sthūla* etc. do not come down. In their case (the Guṇa takes place by) *or guṇaḥ.*

(Objection :) If so, then this (Guṇa) is not specifically taught for *ik* as such, because of the mention of the (specific) substituendum. In that case, (the Guṇa) becomes due in (such cases as) *bhinnaḥ, bhinnavān* (also). Reply : Even when the Guṇa is taught for *ik* as such, the prohibition can be objected on the ground that there is a intervention (between the substituendum and the cause of Guṇa); here it is said that the prohibition takes place ' because otherwise the reading (of the suffix) with *k* or *ṅ* as the code-letter becomes meaningless '. In the same way, in the present case also (the prohibition will take place) even when *ik* is not (mentioned as) the substituendum (because otherwise the code-letters *k* and *ṅ* will be meaningless).

Objection : Well, in that case, the reading (of the suffix) with *k* or *ṅ* as the code-letter will be meaningless in the case of (the Guṇa taught by) *or guṇaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 146) (and the Vṛddhi taught by) *ata upadhāyāḥ* (P. 7. 2. 116) and consequently prohibition will apply there (which is not desired). So *laghvī upadhā* will have to be qualified by *ik* and (the Guṇa) will have to be made for *ik* as such. (Objection against this objection) : ......

[18]

" Why is it that the reading of (the word) Vṛddhi is specifically questioned ? " From the words of the Vārttikakāra that ' the reading of (the word) Vṛddhi is for a subsequent (rule) ' it is inferred that the reading of (the word) Vṛddhi is questioned. So he is asked : " Why specifically... " etc. " When Guṇa is laid down the substituendum is nowhere mentioned. " Here (the negative praticle) *nañ* is so used as to be separated (from the verb with which it is really connected). (The sentence really means) : When Guṇa is laid down the substituendum is not mentioned in some places. For that purpose *ik* has to be read here first (as undergoing Guṇa) so as to preclude the stem-final (from doing so). When Vṛddhi is laid down, however, the substituendum is everywhere mentioned. So there is no purpose in (making the rule viz.) ' The restriction (making *ik* alone the substituendum) is effective when (the substitution) is laid down with (an utterance of) the technical term ' in the matter of Vṛddhi.

" The reading of (the word) Vṛddhi is for a subsequent (rule) ". The preceding prohibitory rule (P. 1.1.4) is rejected while the succeeding one (P. 1. 1. 6), on its part, has no general application. So he (the Bhāṣyakāra) cites this rule (P. 1. 1. 5) only : " (Pāṇini) will teach the prohibition by the rule *Kniti* (1. 1. 5); (Vṛddhi has been read in P. 1. 1. 3) so that that (prohi-

bition) should apply to Vṛddhi also ". " If Vṛddhi is taught (in the place) of *ac* (vowel), (then in the form) *nyamārṭ*, Vṛddhi (in the place) of *aṭ* also becomes due ". This is so because *aṭ* (also) is understood when *mṛj* is read, since what is furnished with (a code-letter) *ṭ* (becomes) the initial integral part (of that to which it is prefixed). ... But how is Vṛddhi (in the place) of *aṭ* (possible), for Vṛddhi, being a later (operation), should supersede (the prefixion of *aṭ*) ? It will (also) not take place again, as the operation is already once effected. If it is held that this (argument) is not reasonable because (the first Vṛddhi) was effected in a different word-element ... " When a change (affects) a non-final, then (it is allowed to affect) the penultimate (only) (if simultaneously more than one possibility are there) ". When Vṛddhi is already effected, there is no (possibility of) two Vṛddhis becoming due (simultaneously). What then (is the possibility) ? Only of *Vṛddhi* (in the place) of the non-final vowel (i.e. *aṭ*). If nevertheless *aṭ* is assumed in the *l*-stage, what prevents Vṛddhi in the *l*-stage ? So (it has to be assumed that this (i. e. *anantyavikāre* ... etc.) is said just taking the precedence of *iṭ* for granted.

" Here other grammarians ". Here is a question : Is it obligatory that (words) which are accounted for in another grammar must be accounted for here also ? No, he says. What then ? This (other grammar) also is a Smṛti. Option is there only where there is a conflict between two Smṛtis, unless one of the two has a seen purpose. In the present case, however, there is no conflict. In one, Vṛddhi is taught in a general way; in the other, an option in a particular context. So the form with Vṛddhi will be used on the basis of this Smṛti, and the one without Vṛddhi on the basis of the other. In another Smṛti a prohibitory rule *nyaṅkor na* is framed (to account for the form) *nyāṅkava.* Here (in Pāṇini's grammar) also *nyāṅkava* has been accepted by the whole body of the Śiṣṭas, on the view that the *uṇādi* words are unanalysable. So, he (the Bhāṣyakāra) gives an explanation. The Smṛtis, and also the Śrutis, are accepted (as valid) in specific periods of time. The immolation of cows and drinking of liquor, for instance. If indulged in on the plea that it (drinking) was practised by Śukra, it will lead to sin. The Smṛti about the cow-immolation pertains to a particular (past) period. Today it will entail a sin. (Correct) words are taught for worldly prosperity in the Smṛtis; the others lead to sin. As this word-form is fit to be used even today, it has to be derived grammatically here also. To that end let (the sūtra) be as [*mṛjer*] *vṛddhir acaḥ*. Then *aci kṅiti* (and finally) *vā*. The author of this is the Bhāṣyakāra who is the foremost of the Śiṣṭas.

" *Acikīrṣīt*. The deletion will supersede it ". Before (Vṛddhi) is effected, deletion of *ǎ* (P. 6. 4. 48) (takes place) by supersession-by-earlier-rule,

Even when it is effected (first), the deletion of *ā* (P. 6. 4. 64) will take place. " Because the elision of *ḍh* is as good as non-existent in *udavoḍhām* ". When Vṛddhi is effected first and (operations) like elision of *ḍh* are performed and *a* (? *ā*) is replaced by *o*, (Vṛddhi) will not take place again as that operation has been already done (once). " This is a prohibition of the Vṛddhi caused by a following *sic* (P. 7. 2. 1) also. How? A sūtra indeed expresses itself indistinctly, wanders, does not stand still even for a moment ". There (the expression) ' expresses indistinctly ' is used on the basis of the common feature of vagueness. Just as in the world one who speaks vaguely is addressed thus : ' What are you speaking indistinctly ?' Similarly here *neṭi* (P. 7.2.4) proceeds vaguely. It does not become specifically clear whether it prohibits this or that (Vṛddhi). Or, just as sound is common to all words, but when that alone is apprehended this much is said : ' some word, spoken by him, is sounding '. Similarly here also there is a prohibition which refers to al specific cases : Vṛddhi taught for a consonantal stem (P. 7. 2. 3), that when *sic* follows (P. 7. 2. 1) does not take place. Perhaps it may be argued : ' Even when expressing itself indistinctly, once it has accomplished its object with reference to one (particular Vṛddhi) which has to be prohibited it will, not not proceed to another '. To this he replies : " (it) wanders ". A general rule is meant for (all) particular cases. So (P. 7. 2. 4) will proceed to any one case as to another. If it is believed : ' while it proceeds to some particular (Vṛddhi) to be prohibited, the operation (of Vṛddhi) will begin elsewhere, and once begun it will not be possible to prohibit it even by a wandering rule ', (he) replies : " (it) does not stand still even for a moment. " Speech has (merely) an external resemblance. One and the same thing is said to be unsteady because of its quick movement. But this is not there in a word. What then (is the truth)? Those are (really) so many different prohibitory rules, each marked by a separate (Vṛddhi) to be prohibited. So there is no (Vṛddhi) to be prohibited which is devoid of a corresponding prohibitory rule. In that sense it is said : " (a rule) does not stand still even for a moment. "

Others explain : The expression *dhvanati* is used by reason of resemblance consisting in repeated activity. Just as the expression *dhvanati ghaṇṭā* ' a bell resounds ' is used when the sound of the bell is produced again and again, similarly these rules *sici vṛddhiḥ* (P. 7.2.1), *halantasyācaḥ* (P. 7.2.3), *neṭi* (7. 2. 4) are (each) spoken of as *dhvanati* when they proceed. Perhaps it may be argued : ' (a rule) proceeds only once '. It is not so. " (a rule) moves continuously " (i.e.) it revolves like a water-wheel. And revolving in this way " (it) does not stand still even for a moment ". Such being the case there is neither an injunction nor a prohibition in this matter, so that an inactivity of the rule(s) has to be (assumed). If (it is objected that) there will be

no finality because of an unending cycle, the definitness will be made in favour of prohibition, since (in such matters) the final decision is made in view of what is desired. " Is there anywhere else... ? " The question is asked because (ordinarily) generality is accepted. Since the (injunctive) rule has not proceeded " (he) replies : Yes, there is : *sujāte aśvasūnṛte*." (The Bhāṣyakāra) brings in this rule, accepting the reading *nāntaḥpādam*, not *prakṛtyāntaḥpādam* (P. 6. 1. 115). Here also the rule *nāntaḥpādam*, assuming an indistinct or general form, expresses itself indistinctly or vaguely, (prohibiting whatever is due) when *ă* follows *e/o*. Or, rules laying down *ay* etc. do not proceed at all. Well, how about the form *vṛkṣau* ? Here Vṛddhi taught by *vṛddhir eci* (P. 6. 1. 88) must the prohibited by *nād ici* (P. 6. 1. 104). If you hold that the two belong to two different contexts, here also in the case of *aśvasūnṛte* there is a different context of the general and the special rule. If, in the latter, a unity of context (is claimed) through meaning, the same (holds good) here also. Therefore a specific individual (operation) has to be accepted (as meant to be prohibited) : the long similar substitute (by P. 6. 1. 102) is alone prohibited, not (Vṛddhi also taught by) *vṛddhir eci* (P. 6. 1. 88). " The substitute *uvaṅ* (precedes) because of its being internal. " Vṛddhi depends upon *sic* and a Parasmaipada ending.

" The phoneme *v*, mentioned, dropped ". Here some dissolve the compound as *nirdiṣṭaś cāsau luptaś ca* ' (first) mentioned, (then) dropped.' But this is not proper, since what is mentioned does not go well with dropping. How can something which is mentioned be dropped ? Therefore, just as from (*y* in) *yasyeti* (P. 6. 4. 48) we resort to an understanding of *i*, similarly we shall understand, at the time of understanding (the sūtra), the phoneme *v* which was dropped. " I shall read : *avimavyor na* (no Vṛddhi for *av* and *mav*)." Perhaps it may be argued that (the grammatical system) becomes lengthy; so (he) says : " The two should be exchanged for *ṇi* and *śvi* (read in P. 7.2.5) ". " The procedure of the teacher (Pāṇini) suggests ". Is it that the principle of *antaraṅga* is not desired in the context of *sic* (by Pāṇini because he thinks) ' I am going to read the word Vṛddhi (in 1.1.3) ? ' No, he says. It is for allowing the application (of Vṛddhi) in forms like *anenāyīt, acecāyīt, acirāyīt, ajirāyīt* that the (*antaraṅga*-principle) is not desired. For, (otherwise) there will be a prohibition (of Vṛddhi) in the case of (the roots) *ciri* and *jiri* and the Intensive-stems without *ya* (*ṅ*), when after Guṇa and *ay*-substitute they will be ending in *y*.

[19]

" Since a Genitive indicates a substitnendum, (there will be) a replacing of (all) *ik* (sounds)." *Ikaḥ* (in P. 1.1.3) is a Genitive of substituendum. Therefore every *ik* will have to be replaced by Guṇa and Vṛddhi. Or else

it will have to be accepted that this is not a Genitive of substituendum. " The re-injunction (is) for (specifying) the one of the two ". But it could be for (stems) not ending in *ik* ? This (rule) having replaced *ik* by Guṇa sounds, the injunction in the jurisudiction of *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1) will be for non-*ik* sounds. How so ? An injunctive rule is stronger than a restrictive one, and so (the rules in the *aṅgādhikāra*) may be for (substituting Guṇa in the place of) a non-*ik*. [No.] This is the idea : The words *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ* continue in *iko guṇavṛddhī*. So, proceeding as an injunctive rule, it undergoes a subordination to another (rule) also, (the ultimate meaning being) that where Guṇa and Vṛddhi are taught, there (the word *ikaḥ*) should be seen to be present. " Also in (the matter of) *saṁprasāraṇa* ". Since *yaṇaḥ* is a Genitive of substituendum, replacement of all *yaṇ* sounds becomes due, (even in) *yātā vātā* etc. (But) then how (will) the name *saṁprasāraṇa* be (got) ? The rule will be split (in two). (One :) *ig yaṇaḥ* (which means) *ik* takes the place of *yaṇ*. Then (two) : *saṁprasāraṇam* (which means) that *ik* which results from *yaṇ* is called *saṁprasāraṇa*. " Reinjunction (will be) for (a specific) context." But, surely, even this (rule) could be understood as meant for non-*yaṇ* sounds and then it could be interpreted as meaning that the word *saṁprasāraṇa* is substituted in the place of *vac* etc. ? (No.) This is the idea : (The expression) *ig yaṇaḥ* presents itself here also. " (Also) in the case of (the rule) *ur aṇ raparaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 51). Even (in words) *kartṛ, hartṛ* ". Here (all) the *aṇ* sounds become due alternately (because of the absence) of any one most analogous. That is exactly why a nominal stem has been cited as an illustration. Elsewhere there will be restriction (on the particular *aṇ* to be substituted) proper for verbal roots like *ṝta id dhātoḥ* (P. 7.1.100), *ud oṣṭhyapūrvasya* (P. 7. 1. 102). " (The purpose is) achieved by reading (the rules concerned) in the jurisdiction of *ṣaṣṭhī*." (P. 1. 49). Once they are subjected to the jurisdiction of *ṣaṣṭhī* ' Genitive, ' (these rules) will perform their operations, (only when) urged by their causes and expecting a Genitive of substituendum like *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1), *vacyādīnām* (cf. P. 6. 1. 15), *ṝta id dhātoḥ* (P. 7. 1. 100), and not where there is no such Genitive, " These two rules will be made to follow in the jurisdiction of the Genitive." These two rules will be (*lit.* are) furnished with a circumflex accent. Then there will not be (*lit.* is not) any operation understood because of (their) subservience. " Or we shall make these two rules a necessary complement in the jurisdiction of the Genitive." The rule *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā* (P. 1. 1. 49) is (i. e. will be) split into two : ' *ṣaṣṭhī* '. (This means that the operation) which is previously mentioned, presents itself where there is Genitive. Only these two rules will be thus connected (with *ṣaṣṭhī*...) because of syntactic and semantic fitness. " Or he should be asked thus." When you justify that re-injunctions (like P. 7. 3. 84) are for specifying the one or the other, you have, of necessity, to connect (the two) thus : Where (the Sūtrakāra) utters (for

enjoining them) '*guṇaḥ*' or '*vṛddhiḥ*', there (the expression) *ikaḥ* presents itself. That is how (Guṇas in words) like *yātā* can be averted (by you). Now, when (mutual) expectation has to be there, why should expectation be made on the basis of independent rules ? Why should not (they be regarded) as one integrated sentence? We can then (supply what is) needed thus : Guṇa and Vṛddhi, which are taught by (uttering the words) *guṇaḥ, vṛddhiḥ,* they (take the place) of *ik*. This is what he says in the *Bhāṣya* : 'This will be made a necessary párt of it ... Well then just as this is made a necessary part of it, that also wiil be made a necessary part of this. "

NOTES

[1]

The sentence एतद्व्याख्या° ... वेदितव्यानि is obviously misplaced here. It evidently intends to justify absence of Patañjali's Bhāṣya on the Śivasūtras beginning with ढभष्। Its place is therefore after चोदनायाश्च भावात् पुनर्ङणनेषु च प्रवर्तते and before अथ किमिदमक्षरमिति in the commentary on the Āhnika II. A scribal confusion in some old manuscript seems to be responsible for this.

Secondly, the Śivasūtras on which Patañjali does not comment are not nine as stated here, but six. They are : घढधष्। जबगडदश्। खफछठथचटतव्। कपय्। शषसर्। हल्।

What is meant by the passage is that there are no special problems for these remaining Śivasūtras while the common problems have been already discussed in connection with the previous Śivasūtras.

[2]

The passage is not quite clear.

The reasons for obscurity are : (1) There is evidently a large gap in the MS. There is no Ṭīkā on the *Mbh.* right from the beginning of this Āhnika up to (apparently) the Vā संज्ञया विधाने नियमः (ed. I. 37.1—43.28). It is inconceivable that Bhartṛhari simply ignored all this portion of the text, considering that elsewhere his is almost a line-to-line commentary that loses no detail, even of small importance. It is therefore certain that at some point in the transmission of the text of the Ṭīkā a gap occurred, although our MS shows no sign of it.

As a result of this, it is not possible to ascertain, beyond doubt, which part of the *Mbh.* is being commented on here. Tentatively it can be said that the Vā संज्ञया विधाने नियमः is the topic here, because of the words संज्ञया विधानं and the explanation of the word *dyauḥ* which occcurs immediately before the Vā in the *Mbh.*

(2) Some readings are not quite certain. Thus Sw reads न (for तु) and नाश्रीयते, AL तु ... तदाश्रीयते which give diametrically opposite meanings. Whereas तु is almost sure in the MS, its °ह्तिमि। तमाश्री° is anybody's guess. Also, both editions read संज्ञया, whereas the actual reading in the MS is संज्ञाया [=संज्ञायाः] which cannot be ruled out altogether.

(3) The punctuation also is not beyond doubt. Following the MS, both editions read the text from इदमपि onwards as a single sentence. But this

raises problems of interpretation, on account of the apparent contrast between संज्ञया विधानं and स्वरूपेण विधीयते which refer to one and the same phenomenon viz. दिव औत्.

The context of the discussion seems to be this : A difficulty is expressed in *Mbh.* (I. 43.28) that if P. 1. 1. 3 is explained as restrictive, meaning that the phonemes *a, e,* and *o* (called Guṇa) and *ā, ai,* and *au* (called Vṛddhi) are to substitute *ik* sounds (i.e. *ĭ, ŭ, ṛ̆, ḷ*) only, then there will be a difficulty in the case of, say, *dyauḥ* (Nom. sing. of *div-*) where *au* will replace *i* (and not *v*, as desired) and produce an undesirable form. In reply the Vā संज्ञया विधाने नियमः says that the restriction applies only where the substitution is taught by uttering the term Guṇa and Vṛddhi; when the phoneme to be substituted is directly mentioned (as *au* in P. 7. 1. 84), it follows the usual practice (P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य). So even if we take P. 1. 1. 3 as restrictive, there is no harm to forms like *dyauḥ*.

So far, well and good. But now a new difficulty crops up, which seems to have been discussed in this passage. The words like *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* are admittedly technical terms (*saṁjñā*). As against these, the mention of *au* is by its own form, and not by a technical term. But this seems to be so only superficially. Even *au* can be regarded as its *saṁjñā* in view of P. 1. 1. 68 : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा which says that the own form of a word, unless this latter is a grammatical term, is its own name (in grammar). This being the case *au* is in a way as much a technical term as Vṛddhi and with this the argument of the Vārttikakāra falls to the ground.

A solution to this difficulty is given in our passage. According to it, this sort of *saṁjñā* (i.e. स्वरूपसंज्ञा, as taught by P. 1. 1. 68) is not intended (नाश्रीयते), as far as the interpretation of the Vā संज्ञया विधाने नियमः is concerned. This is evidently so because in that case no scope would be left for the Vā and its very framing would be superfluous.

Here स्वरूपं ... नाश्रीयते = स्वरूपं संज्ञात्वेन नाश्रीयते । Similarly औकारः स्वरूपेण विधीयते = औकारः स्वरूपसंज्ञया विधीयते ।

Observations : 1) As regards the variant readings (i) I accept तु, firstly because it is very clear in the MS, and secondly, because न (emendation of Sw) makes a statement which is factually wrong. The own form of a word *is* always present. (ii) I however accept Sw's नाश्रीयते as being nearer to माश्रीयते of the MS and as giving a good sense. (iii) I accept the emendation संज्ञया of the editions.

2) The very first word, क्वचित् (which is contradictory to सर्वत्र which follows), makes some difficulty. I am not sure that it did not belong to the previous sentence.

3) There are other possibilities of interpretation (with different punctuation and different readings). But they do not lead to any coherent and useful interpretation of the whole passage as such. So I refrain from attempts in that direction.

[3]

4) प्रकृतं गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमनुवर्तते । ... व्यापारार्थम् । This is an explanation of the Vā संज्ञया विधाने नियमः which says, as we saw above, that the restriction that the Guṇa and the Vṛddhi phonemes replace only the *ik* phonemes is valid only when the substitution is taught by actually pronouncing the terms Guṇa and Vṛddhi. The present passage demonstrates *one* way (which may conveniently be called as the *sāmarthya*-view) how this additional clarification can be shown to be inherent in Pāṇini's sūtras themselves, thus doing away with the necessity of expressly making the addition implied in the Vā. The idea is : Pāṇini did not need to read the sūtra 1. 1. 3 as इको गुणवृद्धी. He could simply read it as इकः. To the natural question, viz, then how could you get the idea of Guṇa and Vṛddhi, the reply is : प्रकृतं गुणवृद्धिग्रहणमनुवर्तते. This refers to the word *vṛddhiḥ* in P. 1. 1. 1 and *guṇaḥ* in P. 1. 1. 2. Here it is to be noted that अनुवर्तते does not mean that the words *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* actually come down from P. 1. 1. 1 and 2. What is meant is that they *could* come down. Still, Pāṇini reads them in P. 1. 1. 3. This must have a purpose. And the purpose is none else than to suggest that the restrictive rule इको गुणवृद्धी applies only there where the terms Guṇa and Vṛddhi are specifically mentioned (and not mere phonemes like *a ā* etc.). In आश्रितशब्दव्यापारार्थम्, the expression शब्द means गुण and वृद्धि. The full expression आश्रितगुणवृद्धिशब्दव्यापारार्थम् occurs in the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa, where Nāgeśa explains it thus : आश्रितो गुणवृद्धिशब्दव्यापार उच्चारणं येषु आदैक्षु विधीयमानेषु तेषु । The agent of the आश्रयणक्रिया is of course Pāṇini.

Punctuation and text : Following the MS, AL read a *daṇḍa* after सिद्धं. The rest (up to °व्यापारार्थम्) is another sentence in their ed. If we thus stop at *siddham*, what is achieved (किं सिद्धम्?) remains unspoken. So we better read a comma after सिद्धम् and read a full point after भवत इति (as in Sw). That makes it clear that इकः गुणवृद्धिभवनम् is सिद्धम्.

प्रकृते, adj. of गुणवृद्धी.

The MS reads इत्येवं सिद्धे which AL emend into इत्येत्र सिद्धे. I do not see the necessity. So I retain एवं (as Sw). Also the necessity of having to split इत्येवं into इति । एवं in order to make the sentence end with इति is not a grave objection against making the sentence end with इति. Instances are not rare where the scribe has joined in Saṁdhi the last letter of the preceding sentence with the first letter of the following one.

अयं तु ... स्थाने भवत इति supplies *another* explanation (the *anuvṛtti*-view) how the idea संज्ञया विधाने नियमः can be derived from Pāṇini's rules themselves as they are, without making any addition. Here we actually bring down, by *anuvṛtti*, the word *vṛddhiḥ* from P. 1. 1. 1 and *guṇaḥ* from P. 1. 1. 2 into P. 1. 1. 3 : इको गुणवृद्धी. Compounding the words, thus brought down, into *guṇavṛddhī*, the sūtra 1. 1. 3 now reads as इको गुणवृद्धी, गुणवृद्धी. It means that the Guṇa and Vṛddhi phonemes take the place of *ik* when they are taught in association (सहचरिते) with — i.e. by actually uttering — the words *guṇaḥ* and *vṛddhiḥ*.

सर्वत्रैव व्याकरणे ... सूचकयोः इति. We saw above that P. 1. 1. 3 : इको गुण-वृद्धी is not complete in itself. It makes only a general statement. It becomes really effective only when it is combined with, and thus strengthened by, the words *vṛddhiḥ* and *guṇaḥ*, brought down from the previous rules. To this Bhartṛhari provides a parallel from another section of Sanskrit grammar, viz. the primary suffixes (*kṛt*). P. 3. 4. 67 : *kartari kṛt* teaches the affixion of the *kṛt*-suffixes in the sense of the agent, i.e. to form agent nouns. Now, Bhartṛhari says, this is only a general statement (ग्रहणकवाक्यम्) which, by itself, achieves nothing. It has to be repeated (उपप्लवते), in each particular case, along with the other particulars relevant to that particular case, and to be integrated with the form which is to be derived (लक्ष्यसमवायि), i.e. with the components of the form to be derived. Only then it becomes effective (निर्वर्तकम्). To illustrate, we have the words दृतिहरिः and नाथहरिः in the meanings दृतिं हरति इति and नाथं हरति इति formed according to P. 3. 2. 25 : हरतेर्दृतिनाथयोः पशौ. Here the verbal root *hṛ*, which is in construction with the Upapadas *dṛti* and *nātha*, takes the suffix *iN* and the words *dṛtihari* 'carrying a water-bag' and *nāthahari* 'bearing a rope through the nose' are formed. But there is still one condition. The words are thus formed (with the suffix *iN*) only when the resulting words refer to a beast (पशौ). If somebody else carries the water-bag or the rope in the nose, he will not be called *dṛtihari* and *nāthahari*, but *dṛtihāra* and *nāthahāra* (P. 3. 2. 1). Similarly, स्तम्बेरम and कर्णेजपः are formed in the sense of स्तम्बे रमते इति and कर्णे जपति इति by the addition of the suffix *aC* acc. to P. 3. 2.13 : स्तम्बकर्णयो रमिजपोः'. But these words also are not formed in a general sense. स्तबेरम specifically means 'an elephant' (who delights in clums of grass) and कर्णेजप 'a backbiter'. This specific shade of meaning brought out by the primary suffix and the compound invariably following it, is stressed by the Vā : स्तम्बकर्णयोरित्यत्र हस्तिसूचकयोरिति वक्तव्यम् । This idea, that a general injunction is ineffective, until it is applied, along with other particulars if necessary, to a particular instance is expressed by Bhartṛhari in the *Vākyapadīya* 2.456 also with an identical example. Read

एकं ग्रहणकं वाक्यं सामान्येनाभिधीयते ।
कर्तरीति यथा तच्च पश्वादिषु विभज्यते ॥

which is also referred to in the *Laghumañjūṣā* (p. 1367). Puṇyarāja explains it thus: शास्त्रेऽपि च 'कर्तरि कृद्' इत्येकं प्रत्ययार्थप्रतिपादकं सामान्येन ग्रहणकवाक्यमुपादीयते। तच्च प्रत्येकं प्रत्ययार्थोपाधिषु पश्वादिषु विभिन्नेषु विषयेषु विभागेन संबन्धमुपनीयाभिमतलक्ष्यनिष्पत्तये व्यापार्यत इति प्रत्येकमेव तत् परिसमाप्यते।

The expression ग्रहणक (वाक्यम्) is used in our text, as said above, in the sense of a general statement (having no effective power until it is applied to a particular case). In the later grammatical literature the word ग्रहणक-(शास्त्र) is used to refer to the rule अणुदित् सवर्णस्य चाप्रत्ययः (P. 1. 1. 69).

उपप्लवते— (said of a rule) is repeated, is repeated in a particular context, i.e. to explain a particular formation (with additions if necessary), is particularised, realises itself in a particularised form (as required by the particular *lakṣya*). The dictum प्रतिलक्ष्यं लक्षणोपप्लवः enunciates the उपप्लव view. This technical use of *upa-plu-* is not found in the older authors viz. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Was Bhartṛhari the first to use it so?

Observation: Although the general drift of the passage is not very difficult to understand, the text itself is not very smooth and may have suffered some corruption. Also, although there is some vague resemblance between the treatment of P. 1. 1. 3 as clarified in the light of P. 1. 1. 1 and 2 on the one hand and the treatment of P. 3. 4. 67 as particularised in the light of P. 3. 2. 13, 25 etc. on the other, yet one does not see the exact correspondence. The relation of the general and the particular, obtaining in the case of the Kṛt suffixes, is missing in the case of Guṇa and Vṛddhi.

Readings: (1) The MS reads अयं तु : ... प्रतिपादयन्ति. Since this ungrammatical reading cannot be original, editors have changed it, both reading अन्ये. The reading अयं need not necessarily refer to Patañjali, but to the *vādin* in whose mouth this view is put. I cannot say definitely whether it further suggests that this view is not acceptable to Patañjali, and that he accepts only the first explanation (*sāmarthya*-view) given above. At least Nāgeśa seems to take such a stand, relying on the use of the word *sāmarthya* in the *MBh*, and says that Patañjali's own inclination (*svārasya*) is in the first view. His disciple Pāyaguṇḍa gives the arguments in detail in his *Chāyā* to confirm Nāgeśa's view, into which I do not go here. As against this, one cannot ignore that it is the second explanation, which favours a direct *anuvṛtti*, that is pursued further in detail in the *MBh*.[1]

(2) तन्निवर्तते of the MS is emended into तन्निर्वर्तकं in both the previous editions, and I am inclined to accept it, although तन्निर्वर्तनं also, requiring a

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[1] *Read* This one, however, conveys *for* Others, however, convey *in the Translation*,

lesser change, will serve the purpose equally well. (3) लक्ष्यसमसमवापुयप्लवते of the MS is interpreted (ignoring one सम) as लक्ष्यसमये उपप्लवते by Sw and as लक्ष्यसमन्वये उपप्ल° by AL. With a comparatively minor change I restore लक्ष्यसमवाय्युपप्ल° which yields an equally good sense. The previous editions have ignored वा; also our य्यु is nearer to पु than the other two reconstructions.

[4]

यदि तदनुवर्तते......पस्थानात् । The *Mbh* sentence points out a difficulty that would follow, if the *anuvṛtti* mentioned above were accepted. In that case the *adeṄ* phonemes, i. e. *a*, *e* and *o* will have one more name, viz. Vṛddhi (apart from Guṇa, taught in P. 1. 1. 2). And this prospect is certainly not desired. But, it may be said, where is the possibility of the word *vṛddhiḥ* coming into contact with P. 1. 1. 2 (which mentions the *adeṄ* sounds) ? It will directly present itself into P. 1. 1. 3. No, says Bhartṛhari. An *adhikāra* (i.e. heading of a section) has to be physically present in each of the Sūtras (प्रतियोगम्) coming under its jurisdiction: 'प्रतियोगमधिकारस्योपस्थानात् ।' योग = सूत्र. So the contact of *vṛddhiḥ* with P. 1. 1. 2 is unavoidable.

ननु च ... प्रसक्ता स्यात् । In this part of the Ṭīkā it is said that the difficulty has not been properly pointed out in the *Mbh*. The real difficulty is a different one. If the proposed *anuvṛtti* were admitted, then the name Guṇa will have to be given to *ā ai au* — that is the difficulty. To explain : The word Vṛddhi denotes *ā ai* and *au* acc. to P. 1. 1. 1. It is also to be taken as read with a *svarita* (circumflex) accent, when alone it can go down into the following rules (acc. to P. 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः). Now, being आदैच् पदार्थक, (as defined in 1. 1. 1) when the word *vṛddhiḥ* will come down in P. 1. 1. 2, there it will denote *ā*, *ai* and *au* (P. 1. 1. 2 now being अदेङ् गुणः, आदैच्). This will mean that *ā ai au* also (like *a e o*) will have the name Guṇa. And this is surely not desired.

अयमभिप्रायः ...... वृद्धिसंज्ञा स्यादिति । This passage answers the objection raised above by clarifiying the idea (अभिप्रायः) behind the difficulty as pointed out by Patañjali.

The passage is not quite clear, but there is no serious difficulty in understanding its drift. It was claimed above that the word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down in P. 1. 1. 2 in its capacity as आदैच्पदार्थक and consequently denotes *ā ai au*, which latter, therefore, will be getting the name Guṇa. It is now pointed out that the word *vṛddhiḥ* does not come down as आदैच्पदार्थक (which capacity it did not have even in P. 1. 1. 1), but as denoting its own form, viz. *v-ṛ-d-dh-i-ḥ*. Consequently this term does not convey here the sounds *ā ai au* and so there is no danger of their getting the name Guṇa. (So the difficulty pointed out in the *Mbh*. viz. अदेङां वृद्धिसंज्ञापि प्राप्नोति, stands).

That this must be the argument in the reply given here follows as a logical necessity. What is more, it is also confirmed by the corresponding portion of Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* which makes the position crystal-clear. Read: पूर्वसूत्रे संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धायोपात्तो यादृशो (= स्वरूपपदार्थकः Nāg.) वृद्धिशब्दस्तादृश एवोत्तरत्रानुवर्तते इत्यदेङ्मित्युक्तम् । तेनेतत्र चोदनीयम्, वृद्धिशब्दोऽनुवर्तमान आदैचः प्रत्याययतीत्यादैचां गुणसंज्ञा प्राप्नोतीति ।

The obscurity of the passage is partly due to the uncertainty of readings. (1) प्रदेशानां of the MS is retained by AL, but emended into प्रदेशेषु by Sw. (2) संबंधात् of the MS is emended into °संबंधा by AL. (3) Owing to spreading of ink, it is difficult to make out the original in the MS which is reproduced as शब्दप्रसक्ता by AL and as शब्दपसक्तः (?) by Sw. (4) °नुमीयमानोपि तथाभूतो of the MS is retained by Sw but emended into °नुमीयमानापि तथाभूता by AL.

Our problem now is how to eke out the intended idea from this corrupt text.

First as regards the readings. (1) Although प्रदेशानां makes no sense and the emendation प्रदेशेषु makes a good sense, I am unwilling to take that much latitude. I would rather read प्रदेशान् (involving a smaller change). Or, प्रदेशानां may be retained with [कृते] understood after it (as suggested by Acharya Limaye in an oral discussion. He also suggests the emendation: प्रदेशानां कृते संज्ञा प्रवर्तमाना संज्ञान्तरेण संबन्धात्, thus changing कृत into कृते and shifting it after प्रदेशानां). Finally, some word may have been lost after प्रदेशानां. (2) I retain °संबंधात् of the MS. I think °संबंधा and संबंधात् ultimately give practically the same meaning. (3) As regards the illegible letters after शब्द् and before °नुमीयमानो, the first letter is definitely shown to be प by the MS. So I cannot accept प्र of AL. The second and third letters have been read as सक्तः and सक्ता. The first letter may be स, but it can equally be र as the MS shows only some initial part of the letter which is same in both स and र. There is no evidence whatsoever to decide the second letter as क्तः or क्ता and I do not know what made the older editors to decide on this (unless it be the word प्रसक्ता in the preceding sentence). There is one more thing. Both the editions have ignored one more letter which is clearly there in the MS. It seems to be a conjunct consonant ending in य and from a partly visible stroke I conclude the previous sign represents the consonant *t*, so that the whole conjunct is to be read as त्य.

coming back to the intervening two letters (left undeciphered above) I guess, on the considerations of meaning that they may be रैवे. Joining this to the preceding and following letters, the portion reads as शब्दपरैवेत्यनुमीयमानोपि. For the sake of clarity I dissove the Saṁdhi and write as शब्दपरैव,

इत्यनुमीयमानोपि. (4) I retain °नुमीयमानोपि तथाभूत: of the MS. Only I supply वृद्धिशब्द: as the substantive for these two adjectives. It fits into the passage admirably well and is also used here by Kaiyaṭa (see the passage quoted above).

Now the interpretation. I take the last part first : अनुमीयमानोऽपि [वृद्धि-शब्द:] तथाभूतोऽनुमीयते । Here अनुमीयमान: =अनुवृत्तत्वेनानुमीयमान: (cf. अनुमीयमानात् वृद्धिग्रहणात् above). तथाभूत: evidently refers to शब्दपरा which precedes. I understand शब्दपरा in the sense of स्वरूपपरा ' denoting one's form '. (Cf. Nāgeśa's paraphrase स्वरूपपदार्थक: of the words तादृश: and यादृश: in Kaiyaṭa quoted above.) Usually the expression शब्दपर is the opposite of अर्थपर. So here also it is the opposite of संज्ञिपर ' denoting the sounds *ā ai au* ' and means स्वरूपपर ' denoting its own form *v-ṛ-d-dh-i* '. Bhartṛhari means that the word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down in the same capacity which it had in the preceding rule viz. as स्वरूपपदार्थक:

Here an objection suggests itself. A technical term denotes its own form only in the Sūtra where its conventional meaning is introduced. Everywhere else it will convey the conventional meaning. Now the term *vṛddhi* is already introduced (in P. 1. 1. 1) with its conventional meaning. So once it leaves that sūtra and comes down in P. 1. 1. 2, it is no longer स्वरूपपदार्थक. It must denote the sounds *ā* etc. which are defined as its meaning in P. 1. 1. 1.

The line प्रदेशानां ...... शब्दपरैव gives a reply to this objection. A technical term, even when it has left the place where it is introduced, is still denotative of its form only (शब्दपरैव) as long as it is not present in a प्रदेशसूत्र. And P. 1. 1. 2 is surely not a प्रदेशसूत्र where the term Vṛddhi is to be used. It is merely connected (by *anuvṛtti*) with another term (संज्ञान्तरेण कृतसंबन्धात्) for some technical purpose. So it has still to be taken as स्वरूपपदार्थक.

So, the author concludes, the *Mbh* rightly says अदेङामपि वृद्धिसंज्ञा स्यात् (and not आदैचां गुणसंज्ञा स्यात्).

[5]

सम्बन्धमनुवर्तिष्यते. So now it is established that the difficulty is correctly pointed out in the *Mbh*. If the word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down in P. 1. 1. 2, it will result into a name of *adeN̄*. So some remedy has to be thought out. संबन्धमनुवर्तिष्यते is the first of a series of remedies suggested by Patañjali.

I supply वृद्धिशब्द: or वृद्धिग्रहणम् as the subject of अनुवर्तिष्यते. The meaning is that the word *vṛddhiḥ* will continue or maintain (अनुवर्तिष्यते) its connection with *ādaiC*. The idea is that even while coming down, the word वृद्धि: will not come down by itself; it will come down along with *ādaiC*. In other words,

it will continue to be a name of *ā ai* and *au* even in P. 1. 1. 2. The part *ādaiC*, which has also come down, serves to ward off *adeṄ* from being a denotation of the name Vṛddhi.

Kaiyaṭa gives a different grammatical explanation of the expression संबन्धम्. He takes it as equivalent to संबद्धम् (qualifying वृद्धिग्रहणम्) : संबध्यते इति संबन्धम्। कर्मणि घञ्। I find this rather unnatural. Kaiyaṭa continues : ... आदैज्ग्रहणसंबद्धं वृद्धिग्रहणम् 'अदेङ् गुणः' इत्यत्रानुवर्तते। तेन अदेङ्भिर्न संबध्यते। इह (= P. 1.1. 3) त्वनुवृत्तमादैचो जहाति। कान्तारोत्तरणाय सार्थस्येव त्यागोपादाने। (It will be seen, incidentally, that Kaiyaṭa takes *anuvartate* in a technical sense, while I have taken it in the popular sense).

After this lucid exposition given by Kaiyaṭa, the one given by Bhartṛhari appears somewhat obscure. He says that the *anuvṛtti* is first inferred (अनुवृत्तिरनुमिता) on the strength of the Svarita accent. This apparently refers to the word *vṛddhi* although it is not said so specifically. Apparently, further, *ādaiC* also is to be understood to have come down at the same time on account of *sam̐bandhānuvṛtti*. This is stage No. 1. After this (उत्तरकालम्), perceiving that *ādaiC* also has come down, the reader will conclude (प्रतिपद्यते) that the presence of *ādaiC* here is merely to indicate the absence of connection (संबन्धाभावम्) between *vṛddhiḥ* and *adeṄ*. The presence of *ādaiC* in P. 1. 1. 2, by this *anuvṛtti*, is not to teach anything further about either Vṛddhi or Guṇa, but to hint merely at this (एवमर्थैव), viz. at the absence of entaglement of *vṛddhiḥ* with *adeṄ*. एवमर्था = अदेङ्भिः सह वृद्धिग्रहणस्य संबन्धाभावज्ञापनार्था।

Note that उत्तरकालम् is not connected with संनिहिताः (*ādaiC* comes down simultaneously with *Vṛddhiḥ*, not subsequently) but with संबन्धाभावं प्रतिपद्यते.

लिङ्गासङ्गाच्चोत्तरत्र संबन्धमिति. Here संबन्धम् is connected with प्रतिपद्यते as its another object. Bhartṛhari says that the reader will further understand that on account of the affixion of the Svarita accent, the word वृद्धिः will further go down in P. 1. 1. 3.

यथैव अनुदेशाः ... यथा 'इग्यणः' इति। In order to illustrate this rather negative role played by the *sam̐bandhānuvṛtti* here — viz. to prevent the contact of *vṛddhiḥ* with *adeṄ* — Bhartṛhari quotes a parallel of P. 1. 3. 10 : यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम्. This Sūtra says that when in one part of a grammatical rule there is a certain number of items and in another part of the same rule also there is an equal number of items connected with other group, then the connection of individual items takes place according to the serial order respectively; i.e. the item numbering one of one group is connected with the item numbering one in the other group, the second with the second, and so on. The items in the preceding lists are usually called उद्देशिनः, and those in the subsequent अनुदेशिनः Bhartṛhari quotes the example of P. 1. 1. 45 : इग्यणः संप्रसारणम् which says that

Ik substitutes *YaṄ* (in specified contexts) anJ is called *saṁprasāraṇa.* Now *ik* stands for *ĭ ŭ r̥̆ l̥* and *yaṆ* for *y v r l* (by P. 1. 1. 71), so that P. 1. 1. 45 practically says that *ĭ û r̥̆ l̥* replace *y v r l.* At this stage, in order to clarify which substitute replaces which original, P. 1. 3. 10 : यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम् steps in and decides that *y* is replaced by *i*, *v* by *u* and so on.

Now what is the similarity between the working of this rule P. 1. 3. 10 and the *saṁbandhānuvr̥tti* in P. 1. 1. 2 ? It is this. In any concrete example, only one pairing off is materialized and the operation involved takes place. When we form a passive *ijyate* e. g. from *yaj-* (by P. 6. 1. 15 : वचिस्वपियजादीनां किति), the *i* : *y* pair is materialized. At this time what happens to other pairs, *u* : *v*, *r̥* : *r*, *l̥* : *l* ? What part do they play in the formation of *ijyate* ? None, positively. But they play a negative role. They are tied each to their own specific counterpart (प्रतिलब्धयथासंख्याः) by the numerical principle enunciated in P. 1. 3. 10 and thereby wrong pairings-off are prohibited. There is no danger of *u r̥ l̥* replacing *y*. Since they have no scope in a form like *ijyate*, they reire (निवर्तन्ते) as far as that form is concerned. This also is a sort of *sambandhānuvr̥tti*, hinting at the absence of connection between *y* and *u* etc. Bhartr̥hari says that the *saṁbandhānuvr̥tti* in our passage is also of the same nature.

Readings : (1) स्वरितासख्याद् of the MS is emended into °तासङ्गाद् by Sw and into °तत्वासङ्गाद् by AL. I adopt the first as involving a lesser change.

(2) The last sentence : लिङ्गासङ्गाच्चोत्तरत्र संबन्धमिति is my emendation of the MS लिंगासख्या चोत्त°. This had been a riddle to the older editors, who have read संख्या (for सख्या) and left the whole thing as it is. My reconstruction : (a) I think ख्या is a scribal error for ङ्गा. This is not an idle guess. In line 21 above, as we just now saw, MS reads °सख्या° (for °सङ्गा°). I believe that in both the places the scribe wrote सख्या under the influence of °यथासंख्या (line 20). (b) लिंग (for लिङ्गा) and चो (for च्चो) also seem to be scribal errors. (c) लिङ्ग was mistaken (on account of the nearby संख्या) as meaning ' gender ', whereas it rather means ' the sign ', viz. स्वरित. (d) This is not an independent sentence altogether (as is understood by the older editions), but a continuation of the previous sentence, adding a noun clause as another object to the verb *pratipadyate*.

I would have liked to make one more emendation, viz. to read अनुवृत्तेरनुमाता ' one who infers the *anuvr̥tti* ' (for °त्तिरनुमिता. L. 21). This would make the whole construction elegant, by doing away with the awkward pause after *anumitā* and by providing a substantive for the adj. *pratipadyamānaḥ* which follows. But since the sentence is not unintelligible without it, I resist the temptation.

[6]

अथ वा मण्डूकगतयो ...... ऽनुवर्तते । Another suggestion put forward by Pat. to justify the absence of connection between *vṛddhiḥ* and *aden*. The idea is that the word *vṛddhiḥ*, being an अधिकार, will jump over P. 1. 1. 2 (without going through it) into P. 1. 1. 3 like a frog. On this alternative, as Bhartṛhari says, the word *vṛddhiḥ* alone comes down, without *ādaic* (मुक्त्वादैचौ). This is so because now there is no need of it.

प्रपार्थिनो मण्डूकाः ...... °मण्डूकगत्या साम्यम् । Here the resemblance between an *adhikāra* word jumping over intervening rule(s) and alighting into the rule where it is syntactically and semantically connected is brought out. Actually the original passage in the *Mbh.* is quite simple. It reads : यथा मण्डूका उत्प्लुत्योत्प्लुत्य गच्छन्ति तद्वदधिकाराः । Bh. however seems to have made the whole thing unnecessarily complicated and obscure. अक्षीणवृत्तयः is not quite clear. It may mean " those whose physical activities are not impaired, " able to jump. तथाभूतां क्रियाम् ... ... गुरुत्वा :, ' They start such an activity (or movement) in the mid-air where the heaviness i. e. downward gravitation[1] is checked.' This apparently refers to the middle stage in jumping when one is in the air, and does not allow his body to go down by its weight. अथ ...... पतन्ति represents the last stage in jumping, when the frogs alight on their intended spot (इष्टदेशं). एवं शब्दे ...... साम्यम् sums up the parallelism.

A doubt can very naturally arise here. It is all right for a frog to leap from place to place, because it is a living animal. But how can an inanimate word do so (ननु मण्डूकस्य चेतनत्वात् तथा गतिसंभवेऽपि शब्दस्य कथं सा, as Nāg. puts it) ? एवं शब्देऽपि अर्थकृता answers this anticipated question. I supply क्रिया after this. This sentence says that in a word also there is a similar movement (*kriyā*) which is governed by considerations of intended meaning (*arthakṛtā*). A word can jump over intervening words and become connected even with a distant word, provided it belongs there syntactically and semantically.

Kaiyaṭa explains this very briefly but very clearly : वृद्धिशब्दस्येहाकाङ्क्षावशादुपस्थानं, न त्वेदङ् इत्यत्र । . The idea is well expressed in a stanza quoted in the *Chāyā* :

यस्य येनाभिसंबन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तेन सः ।
अर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानामानन्तर्यमकारणम् ॥

This of course ultimately boils down to this : The person who is interpreting a text, connects two words even if distant from each other, provided

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1 It is interesting to note that an expression °*gurutvapratibandha*° occures in the *Vṛtti* on the *Vākyapadīya* I, 3 (page 19, line 4, Iyer's ed.).

they are syntactically and semantically related. Bhartṛhari puts this idea in his own words thus : यस्मिन्नर्थित्वं समीहते तत्रैवानुमिमीते । Here अनुमिमीते is of course to be completed as अनुवृत्तत्वेन अनु° as above.

Readings and punctuation : (1) पपार्थिनो of the MS is taken to be यथार्थिनो in both the editions. I accept प्रपार्थिनो suggested by Acharya Limaye. This supplies a motive for the frog-leap. Mere अर्थिन: remains vague. A frog is प्रपार्थी, a word अर्थार्थी. The text could be reconstructed as पयार्थिनो, with पय as the first member. We have such examples (of पय) as पयोष्णी ' Name of a river ', पयोपवसन ' a kind of fast when milk is the only food ' (P. 6. 3. 109 Vā 6) etc. Still this is rather a Vedic usage which Bhar. will not resort to. Lastly, पयोर्थिन: also would do. (2) अक्षाणवृत्तय: is probably rightly corrected into अक्षीण° in older editions. The scribe's habit of dropping the sign of *ī* is seen in two more words in the present passage itself viz. in समाहते (for समी°) and अनुमिमाते (for °मिमीते). (3) MS अथवैकमिषद्देशे is read as अथवैकमिव देशे (?) by Sw and अथ चैकस्मिन् देशे by AL. While I accept च (for वा), I have my own suggestion for the 6th letter which is the real crux. I read it as ष्ट, and the last letter as शं. So the whole thing reads as अथ चैकमिष्टदेशं. I think this gives a satisfactory meaning with minimum change. (4) [ऽ]प्यापकृता is emended into [ऽ]प्यर्थंकृतं in both the editions. I accept the emendation, but I keep the last letter as it is : ऽप्यर्थंकृता. What is more, I do not continue the sentence, as in the MS and in the editions, but end the sentence here, supplying क्रिया as the substantive of अर्थक्रिया.

[7]

अथ वैकयोगः करिष्यत इति । The full *MBh.* passage, referred to by this *pratīka*, is as follows : अथ वैकयोगः करिष्यते । 'वृद्धिरादैजदेङ्गुणः' । ततः 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इति । न चैकयोगेऽनुवृत्तिर्भवति ।

This is Patañjali's another alternative solution : Let us combine P. 1. 1. 1 and 2 into one rule (with a verb भवति after it, as Bhar. adds) which would then read as : वृद्धिरादैजदेङ्गुणः[1] [भवति] । The question of *anuvṛtti* comes when there are two rules in question. There cannot be any *anuvṛtti* within one and the same rule (न चैकयोगेऽनुवृत्तिर्—). So there is no danger of *vṛddhiḥ* being entangled with *aden* (even when it goes down further into P. 1. 1. 3 on account of its Svarita accent).

पृथक्क्रियायोगादेकयोगत्वम्— This explains why the proposed combination will represent a single rule (*yoga*), although there will be still two subjects (आदैच्, अदेङ्) and two predicates (वृद्धिः; गुणः). As it is, we supply the verb *bhavati* once after P. 1. 1. 1 and once after P. 1. 1. 2. In the proposed combined rule this verb will be supplied only once (भवतिरेक उच्चारणेऽध्याह्रियते).

1 After all, Pāṇini composed his grammar in the *saṁhitāpāṭha*.

So now there is a single action (viz. भवतिक्रिया). As there are no two actions (पृथक्क्रियायोगात्=पृथक्क्रियायाः अयोगात्), the whole thing will represent a single rule.

But an objection may be raised : Although you may read *bhavati* only once, actually it will have to be repeated when the rule is interpreted : (1) आदैज् वृद्धिर्भवति, (2) अदेङ्गुणो भवति. So inspite of there being one verb theoretically, we have practically two verbs. How can we still maintain that there is only one *yoga* ? Bhar. anticipates this objection when he says : यद्यपि प्रतिपत्तिकाले भवतिर्भिद्यते.

एक एव प्रतिपत्तिकालः ... ... शून्या इति । This replies the objection. True, that *bhavati* will have to be connected with the two pairs of the name and the named. But the understanding of the two pairs will not take place one after another, but simultaneously (एक एव प्रतिपत्तिकालः). That Vṛddhi is a name of *ādaic* and Guṇa of *aden* will be understood at one and the same moment. This is so because, as the *Chāyā* explains, the verb *bhavati* is connected with the pairs of the name and the named simultaneously : यदैवादैचां वृद्धिसंज्ञा प्रतीयते तदैवादेङां गुणसंज्ञेति समूहालम्बनवत् प्रतीतिक्रमः । संज्ञिविशेषसंबद्धसंज्ञाद्वयस्याध्याहृतभवतिक्रियया युगपत् तन्त्रेणान्वय इति भावः ।

The result is that at no time *ādaiC* are devoid of the name of Vṛddhi, and *aden* of Guṇa. Since the expressions *vṛddhiḥ* and *aden* are thus already elsewhere engaged, they have no desire for each other and consequently there is no danger of the name Vṛddhi being imposed on *aden*.

Kaiyaṭa almost repeats the argument of Bhar. and much in the same words. Read : एको भवतिरध्याह्रियते । 'वृद्धिरादैजदेङ्गुणो भवति' इत्येकवाक्यत्वं संपद्यते। यद्यपि प्रतिपत्तिकाले भवतिक्रिया भिद्यते, तथाप्येककाला प्रतिपत्तिरित्यादैच्संबद्धा वृद्धिसंज्ञाऽदेङ्संबन्धा गुणसंज्ञेति नास्ति वृद्धिसंज्ञाया अदेङ्भिः संबन्धः ।

It may be noted in passing that Nāg. does not agree with the *Mbh.* statement : न चैकयोगेऽनुवृत्तिर्भवति. On the strength of such sūtras as तदस्मिन्नस्तीति देशे तन्नाम्नि (P. 4.2.67) and others, he believes that *anuvṛtti* in one and the same rule is not ruled out. He however does not contradict Pat. openly, but as usual merely says that the present statement of the *Mbh.* is merely a view expressed by an *ekadeśin*, that is it does not represent the final and considered view of Pat.

[8]

अथ वान्यवचनाच्चकाराकरणादि[ति]। The full text of the *Mbh.* represented by the *pratīka* is as follows ; अन्यवचनाच्चकाराकरणाच्च प्रकृतापवादो विज्ञायते, यथोत्सर्गेण प्रसक्तस्यापवादो बाधको भवति ।

Pat. himself explains this (*svapadāni ca varṇyante* !) thus : [अन्यत्रचनात् =] अन्यस्याः संज्ञाया वचनात्, [चकाराकरणाच्च =] चकारस्य चानुकर्षणार्थस्याकरणात्, प्रकृतापवादः प्रकृताया वृद्धिसंज्ञाया गुणसंज्ञा बाधिका भविष्यति, यथोत्सर्गेण ... etc. According to this explanation, the term Guṇa, being introduced newly and without a word *ca* ' and ' which would have brought down *vṛddhiḥ* and made it an optional name (along with Guṇa) of *aeṅ* sounds, supersedes it altogether. The result is that Guṇa alone is the name of *aeṅ* sounds. This is on the same lines as in the case of general rules (*utsarga*) like P. 3. 2. 1 : कर्मण्यण् and special (*apavāda*) like P. 3. 2. 3 : आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः where the special rule supersedes the general rule.

किमत्रोत्सर्गापवादाभ्यां ... विशेषः। Since the case of general rule and special rule is cited as a parallel by Pat., Bhar. starts a discussion as to the points of similarity and difference (विशेषः) between the *utsarga* and the *apavāda* on the one hand, and P. 1. 1. 1 and 2 on the other.

विशेषस्तावत् ... .. इत्यादैचां भवति। Bhar. starts with pointing out the difference first in the two situations. In the case of *utsarga* (e.g. P. 3. 2. 1) and *apavāda* (P. 3. 2. 3) there is the relationship of the general and the special or particular (सामान्यविशेषभावः). Under the *adhikāra* धातोः (P. 3. 1. 91), there is a general rule कर्मण्यण् (P. 3. 2. 1) which teaches affixion of the suffix *aṇ* (in the sense of the agent) after a verbal root when it is preceded by a grammatical object which is in construction with it. This results in (compulsory) compounds like कुम्भकारः ' potter ', (from कुम्भ+कृ+अण्). Now a further rule आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः (P. 3.2.3) lays down a suffix *ka* in a similar context, provided the verbal root happens to end in *ā* and has no preverb (*anupasarga*). So we have forms like गोदः ' giving a cow ' (from गो+दा+क). Now a root ending in *ā* is as much a root as any other one; it equally belongs to the class of verbal roots (*dhātu*). As such the suffix *aṇ*, which is taught for the whole class of roots, is equally due (प्रसक्त) after roots like *dā* also. But only P. 3. 2. 3 is allowed to operate here, superseding the general rule P. 3. 2. 1, because otherwise the special rule P. 3. 2. 3 will have no scope at all, and would be therefore meaningless). The roots in *ā* have this as their speciality (विशेषः), viz. the final *ā*, which the other roots (धात्वन्तरेषु) lack. अस्य=आकारान्तस्य धातोः अनन्तर्भावः=असमावेशः। '

एवमिह ...... [आ]दैचां भवति। Here the difference of the relation between P. 1. 1. 1 and 2 from that between P. 3. 2. 1. and 3 is intended to be brought out. Bhar. evidently says here that neither *aeṅ* sounds (= *a e o*) are included in *ādaic* sounds (= *ā ai au*), nor *ādaic* in *aeṅ*. So a negative particle *na* appears to be missing in the first clause.

So the conclusion is that the relationship of the general and the special (such as we see in P. 3. 2. 1 and 3) is missing in P. 1. 1. 1 and 2.

Readings and punctuation: (1) सामान्यविशेषवत्व of the MS is emended into °षभाव by Sw and °षवतोः by AL. I accept the former. (2) Both the previous editions read कर्मण्यण् for the कर्मणि of the MS. I maintain the MS reading as it is, as being an abbreviated form of the Sūtra. (3) AL add a *daṇḍa* after आकारान्तस्येति सामान्यम्. Sw keeps the punctuation of the MS. The association आकारान्तेषु धात्वन्तरेषु is confusing. So I add a *daṇḍa* after आकारान्तेषु making the sentence end there. (4) But the most difficult part in this passage is represented by the five letters : स्थानातभवि which follow after धात्वन्तरेषु in the MS. Both the older editions think that स्थानात् भवति is meant[1] (Sw suggesting that वि is scribal error for ति, and व being dropped, which he supplies). But I for one fail to understand any significance of *sthānāt* in this context. Further what looks like भवि may really be र्भाव (much the same as above in अस्यान्तर्भाव in this very passage). If स्था could be read as स्या, then I would supply only one letter त्व before this (तु to indicate the contrast, + अ, the first letter of अस्य = आकारान्तस्य mentioned above). The whole would then read, with some other minor changes, as : धात्वन्तरेषु त्वस्यानन्तर्भावः. This would explain why the class of *ā*–roots stands out apart (अनन्तर्भाव) from the other roots (which do not end in *ā*). I am not very confident about this emendation but I do think that it must come nearer to what Bhar. must have intended. (5) The addition of व is already mentioned above. (6) आदैचा of the MS is read as आदैचोः by Sw and as आदैचो by AL. (further changing भवति into भवन्ति). The correct emendation, of course, should be आदैचां (connected with अन्तर्भावः). Cf. अदेकाम् in the previous clause.

अथ किं सामान्यम् ...... चेत्येतत् सामान्यम्। Having explained the difference between the two situations, Bhar. now points out similarity between the two. The similarity consists in this : In both the pairs of rules, application of one is doubtful, while that of the other is quite clear (संदिग्धासंदिग्धत्वम्); there is no doubt whatever. In the case cited as a parallel, it is doubtful (संदिह्यमाना) whether the general rule P. 3. 2. 1 can apply to roots in *ā*. Since roots ending in *ā* are as much roots as those not ending in *ā*, the general rule P. 3. 2. 1, which is taught for all roots (*dhātoḥ*, P. 3. 1. 91), should apparently apply to them also; on the other hand P. 3. 2. 3 specifically teaches a different suffix for roots in *ā*. Thus there is a conflict and, prima facie, the application of P. 3. 2. 1 with reference to roots in *ā* becomes doubtful. On the other hand, there is no doubt whatsoever that the special rule P. 3. 2. 3 applies to roots in *ā*, simply because the Sūtra is expressly taught for that purpose and, if it did not apply to them, it would become meaningless. Its application is undoubted (असंदिह्यमानो विशेषः). Similarly in the present case also when the

1 Acharya Limaye also suggests that भवि = भवि[ष्यति].

word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down in P. 1. 1. 2 it remains doubtful whether it is connected with *aden* as their name. This ambiguousness is there, because we do not know whether the real destination of the *anuvṛtti* is P. 1. 1. 3, and *vṛddhiḥ* is present in P. 1. 1. 2 simply because it cannot be avoided (नान्तरीयकत्वात्), or whether this *anuvṛtti* has a purpose to serve in connection with P. 1. 1. 2 also (एतदर्थापि). If *vṛddhiḥ* is simply on its way to P. 1. 1. 3 and does not have any effective role to play in P. 1. 1. 2 (in spite of its physical presence there), then Vṛddhi will not be a name of *a e* and *o*; if however its presence in P. 1. 1. 2 is meant to be effective, Vṛddhi will be the name of *a e* and *o*.

We do not know what was in Pāṇini's mind. Hence the doubtfulness about the effect of the *anuvṛtti*. P. 1. 1. 2, on the other hand, has no such doubtfulness at all (असंदिग्धम्). The Sūtra is taught expressly in order to make Guṇa a name of *a*, *e* and *o* and if the term Guṇa did not perform this function, the Sūtra will be meaningless (अकृतार्थम्).

Thus one doubtful element and one free-from-doubt element is common (सामान्यम्) to the two situations.

The above explanation, which seems to be intended by Bhar. is based on some emendations, and for a small passage like this, the number of emendations is rather large. I am fairly certain about some, while the others, though I am not absolutely sure about them, have a fair chance of representing the original :

Readings : (1) सदि—धसंदिग्धत्वे of the MS is taken to be संदिग्धत्वं by both the editions evidently under the impression that the scribe repeated some letters inadvertently, and that the superior stroke indicating final *e* is really an Anusvāra. To me it is plain that संदिग्धासंदिग्धत्वे (in the dual) is meant, referring to the संदिग्धत्वम् and असंदिग्धत्वम् in both the situations as explained above. (2) The reading संदिह्यमानो विशेष: is adopted in both the editions. But this is opposed to the fact. As we saw above both the विशेषs (1. P. 3. 2. 3; 2. P. 1. 1. 2) are unambiguous according to Bhar. So we cannot accept the combination संदिह्यमानो विशेष:. Secondly, as we saw above, the उत्सर्ग viz. P. 3. 2. 1, is ambiguous in its operation towards roots in *ā*. This fact should find a mention in this passage, but it is missing. For these reasons I read the passage (with emendation) as : यथैवोत्सर्गचोदनायां [संदिह्यमानायाम]संदिह्यमानो विशेष:. This brings out the contrast well. (3) नानुमीयकत्वाद् of the MS is rightly taken to be नान्तरीयकत्वाद् and I agree wholeheartedly with it. (4) इकात्रर्चिता of the MS is emended into इकोऽत्रार्थिता by both the editions. While [अ]र्थिता is a good emendation, I do not see any justification for इको here. It is इह which is required. So I read the whole thing as इहाप्यर्थिता. (the word अपि ' also ' is significant.) (5) उतैवमर्थों याति of the MS is emended into

उतैवमर्थापोति by both the editions. While °र्थापोति undoubtedly represents the original correctly, I am doubtful about the third and the fourth letters. I rather think that एतदर्थापीति should be the original (where एतद् refers to P. 1. 1. 2). (6) कृतार्थ of the MS is retained as it is in both the editions, which is surprising. अदेङ् गुणः is *not* कृतार्थ at this stage. It is वृद्धिरादैच् which is कृतार्थ. अदेङ् गुणः will be कृतार्थ only when we finally connect गुणः with अदेङ् as the name and the named respectively. So I read [अ]कृतार्थः. (7) Lastly, °सदिग्ध-ध्यचे(or चे)त्येनस्यामाप्यमत्र of the MS is a formidable corruption, — at least on the surface. The previous editions have correctly deciphered the last five letters as सामान्यमत्र. (The sentence ends with सामान्यम्. The word अत्र belongs to the next sentence. The absence of *daṇḍa* at the end of a sentence is quite frequent in the MS.) The emended text of the editions thus is : असंदेग्धव्यं (Sw असंदिग्धं)[1] चेत्येवं न सामान्यम्. Although I accept सामान्यम्, I do not accept the preceding न, because that would be defeating Bhartṛhari's very purpose behind this passage. The passage purports to bring out the similarity between the two situations (cf. अथ किं सामान्यम्? at the beginning). The final summing up now must contain some such expression as ' this is the similarity '. To read a न is detrimental to the very purpose of the passage. I read चेत्येतत् (for चेत्येवं न of the eds.). So my full text is : अदेङ् गुण इति तु [अ]कृतार्थम-संदेग्धव्यं चेत्येतत् सामान्यम्.

The whole argument is put very clearly and forcefully by Kaiyaṭa thus.

यथा कप्रत्ययेनाण् बाध्यतेऽसंदिग्धत्वादनवकाशत्वात् तात्पर्याच्च कविधेः । अणस्तु विपर्ययात् । एवम् ' अदेङ् गुण ' इत्यत्र वृद्धिग्रहणमनुवृत्तं सत् संदिह्यते — किमुत्तरार्थैवेहास्यानुवृत्तिरथेहार्थापीति । सावकाशा च वृद्धिसंज्ञा, तात्पर्यं च नास्ति (' अदेङ्मात्रोद्देशेनाप्रवृत्तत्वादिति भावः ' छाया) । गुणसंज्ञा तु तात्पर्यादसंदेहान्निरवकाशत्वाच्च वृद्धिसंज्ञासंबन्धमदेङां बाधते ।

Observation : In this passage Bhar. has used the present participle संदिह्यमाना (अनुवृत्तिः) which is equivalent to संदिह्यते (i.e. as a predicative). It is doubtful whether it could be accepted as a standard use. In any way, Pāṇini (3. 2. 124) has definitely laid down the condition अप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे ' when the present participle is not in apposition with a noun in the Nominative ' for forming a present participle.

अत्र चोद्यते ... प्रकृतस्यापवाद इति । This passage contains a question viz. why it should not be possible for both Vṛddhi and Guṇa to be names of the *aden* sounds and the reply to it. अत्र चोद्यते ... समुच्चयो न भवति ? इति represents the question. The suffixes like *aṇ* (P. 3. 2. 1) have more than one designation. This *aṇ*, for example, is called a प्रत्यय, and also कृत्. Both names apply to

[1] असंदिग्धं, though apparently more preferable, is to be rejected, as it does not take note of the letter व्य (i.e. व्यं) in the MS.

one and the same named without any conflict. Why should not there be a similar peaceful coexistence (समुच्चयः) between Vṛddhi and Guṇa ? Why should they not both of them be names of *aeṅ* sounds ?

The position is like this : The term प्रत्यय is introduced in P. 3. 1. 1. So whatever linguistic elements are introduced in the *Aṣṭ.* after this rule should get *pratyaya* as their name. Now *san* is introduced in P. 3. 1. 5. So this *san* gets the name *pratyaya.* The rule P. 3. 1. 1 enjoining this name has found scope (सन्नादिषु कृतार्था). So whether it is still to apply after P. 3.1.5 is doubtful (संदिह्यमाना). In P. 3.1.93 Pāṇini teaches a term कृत्, which is to apply to any element taught in the jurisdiction of P. 3.1.91 : धातोः, provided it is not a finite verbal ending (तिङ्). P. 3.1.95 : कृत्याः announces that elements introduced hereafter will get the name कृत्य. In the next rule, P. 3.1.96, three suffixes are taught, viz तव्यत्, तव्य and अनीयर्. Since the name कृत्य has yet to find a scope (it is still अकृतार्थ), there is no doubt (असंदिह्यमानाभिः) that it will apply to तव्यत् etc. So तव्यत् etc. get the name कृत्य. But what about the name प्रत्यय, which has already found scope in सन्? In practice that name also applies to तव्यत् etc. (the jurisdiction of P. 3. 1. 1 : प्रत्ययः is up to the end of the fifth Adhyāya), which latter therefore now has two names, कृत्य and प्रत्यय. Further the suffixes like तव्यत् are taught in the jurisdiction of P. 3. 1. 91 : धातोः. So they get a third name viz. कृत्. (Actually कृत्य is a sub-class of कृत् suffixes). तद्धित (P. 4. 1. 76) denotes the secondary suffixes which come after a nominal stem (P. 4. 1. 1) to form a secondary or derivative noun. The तद्राज suffixes (P. 4. 1. 174) form a sub-class of the तद्धित suffixes. The question now raised is, if there can be a coexistence of the name प्रत्यय (which is already कृतार्थ and is now doubtful) and the names कृत् and कृत्य (which have yet to find a scope and whose applicability is not doubtful) with reference to the named (like तव्यत्) or those secondary suffixes called तद्धित (including sub-divisions like तद्राज), what is there to prevent Vṛddhi and Guṇa from being simultaneously two names of the same named, viz. *aeṅ* sounds ?

अत्रोच्यते ... प्रकृतस्यापवाद इति contains the reply. Although the general trend of the argument is not difficult to follow, the text is not quite smooth, owing to uncertainty of readings and punctuation in some places and some unusual expressions.

The following points of difference between the two cases of (1) the name *pratyaya* combining with the names *Kṛt* etc. and (2) the Guṇa not so combining with Vṛddhi, but superseding it, are mentioned :

(1) The word Vṛddhi occurs and functions in the rules which derive the words ; not so *pratyaya.* (2) Vṛddhi the name, and *ādaiC*, the named, are taught at one and the same time (i.e. in one and the same rule). In the case

of the name *pratyaya*, however, it alone is taught first. The various elements named by it are mentioned later, in different rules, at different times (भिन्नकालत्वात्). This underlines the fact that the name *pratyaya* is not linked with one named as Vṛddhi with *ādaiC*. (3) The relation between *pratyaya* etc. on the one hand and *Kṛt*, *Kṛtya* etc. on the other is that of general and particular. As such, there is no conflict (अविरोधात्) between them (which makes the combination possible). On the other hand there is no such relation of general and particular between Vṛddhi and Guṇa. This makes the समुच्चय of the two impossible.

सोऽयमभिसंबन्धेन — Pāṇini teaches the relationship of the name and the named between Vṛddhi and *ādaic* by mentioning both of them in the Nominative. This use of the identical case in both elements indicates their identity (which is of course only assumed, not real[1]). To this particular mode of indicating identity by using the two words in the same case viz. nominative, is given the name of सोऽयमभिसंबन्धः ' the relationship : that (is) this ' by Bhar. This expression is quite frequent in the *Vākyapadīya* (with an *iti* added after *so' yam*, probably for the sake of metre), e. g. II. 40, 128, III. 14. 84, 85, 188, 225, 228, 343, 348.

The expressions संज्ञाव्यापारम् and संज्ञिव्यापारम् are rather unusual. They look like Tatpuruṣa compounds but I think they form a Bahuvrīhi, qualifying वृद्धिग्रहणम् understood.

Readings and punctuation : (1) The emendation ल्युडादिषु of Sw is unnecessary. सन्नादिषु of the MS (also accepted by AL) is quite satisfactory. (2) Sw is quite correct in emending असंदिह्यमाना to असंदिह्यमानाभिः. I accept the emendation. (3) प्रदेशेन of the MS is emended in both editions to प्रादेशिकेन. I think that the final न is added due to the carelessness of the scribe. प्रदेशे gives quite a good meaning. Cf. प्रदेशे occurring below. (4) व्यापारेणा of the MS is evidently wrong for व्यापारेण as conjectured in the previous editions. (5) I put a *daṇḍa* after उपकरिष्यत इति because I do not think that this clause also forms a reason (along with भिन्नकालत्वात् and अविरोधात्) for the absence of समुच्चय. It is just an independent statement. (6) In इदं व्यक्तं, the pronoun इदं (= the noun clause इको गुणवृद्धी ... उपकारः करिष्यते) is the subject and व्यक्तं [अस्ति] the predicate. (7) °स्थितं वृद्धिशब्देन of the MS is retained in both editions as it is. I emend it into °स्थितवृद्धिशब्देन taking it as a subject of the passive verb करिष्यते. I naturally read कश्चिदुपकारः (as in the editions), though I wonder how the editions account for it with their reading °स्थितं. (8) I retain प्रकृतस्य of the MS. The editions have changed it to प्रसक्तस्य to make it agree

1 Explained as तादात्म्याध्यासरूपः by the commentators.

with the *Mbh* text (यथोत्सर्गेण प्रसक्तस्यापवादो बाधको भवति). But Bhar. may be quoting from memory. Besides, the expressions प्रकृतापवादो and प्रकृताया ... बाधिका also appear in the same *Mbh.* (see above).

Kaiyaṭa states the argument briefly thus : प्रत्ययसंज्ञा तु संज्ञिविशेषेणासंयुक्ताधिकारेणैव विधीयमाना कृत्यादिसंज्ञाविषयेऽपि प्रवर्तते । Commenting on this Nāg. says : सा (प्रत्ययसंज्ञा) हि स्वस्य बहुविषयत्वलाभाय कतिपयानन्तरविषयलाभेऽपि पुनः पुनर्विषयान्तरमाकाङ्क्षते । बहुविषयत्वं चास्याः संज्ञिविशेषासंबन्धेनाधिकारकरणादवसीयत इति भावः ।

[9]

अथ वा, वक्ष्यत्येतदिति । The full text of the *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* is : अथ वा, वक्ष्यत्येतद् — अनुवर्तन्ते च नाम विधयः । न चानुवर्तनादेव भवन्ति । किं तर्हि ? यत्नाद् भवन्ति, इति ।

Here by वक्ष्यति 'he will say', Pat. is referring to the Bhāṣya under P. 5. 2. 4 : *vibhāṣā tila* ... There also is a similar difficulty. It is desired that the suffix *khañ* taught in P. 5.2.1 should come down in P. 5.2.4. It is not difficult, but then how to prevent it from being operative in 5. 2. 2 where it is not desired ? While giving one of the alternative solutions (which run almost on the same lines as those given here) Pat. says : अथ वैतज्ज्ञापयत्यनुवर्तन्ते च नाम विधयो न चानुवर्तनादेव भवन्ति । किं तर्हि ? यत्नाद् भवन्ति । This passage is referred to here.

This passage means that Sūtras or their parts can continue their physical presence in the subsequent rules (until their limit is reached) by understanding a Svarita, but mere presence does not confer effectiveness. For that some additional special effort is necessary. The reading of the word *vibhāṣā* in P 5. 2. 4 constitutes such an effort.[1] So *khañ* is effective there only, without any effect in P. 5. 2. 2 and 3. Similarly in the present case the reading again of *guṇavṛddhī* (though the two words could come down from P. 1. 1. 1 and 2) is a special effort. So *Vṛddhiḥ* is effective only in P. 1. 1. 3, and not in P. 1. 1. 2 also, although present there. Read : ' विभाषा तिलमाषा... , इत्यत्र ... .. अनुवर्तमानश्च खञ् यत्नाभावाद् व्रीहिशाल्यादिभिर् (P. 5. 2. 2) न संबध्यते, अपि तु विभाषाश्रुत्या यत्नेन तिलादिभिरेव संबध्यते । तथेहापि वृद्धिग्रहणम् 'अदेङ् गुणः' इत्यत्रानुवर्तमानमपि यत्नाभावाददेङ्भिर्न संबध्यते । इह तु पुनर्गुणवृद्धिग्रहणं यत्नो भवति । (कै°). Nag frames the result thus : स्वरितलिङ्गेनानुवर्तमानं यत्राकाङ्क्षा तत्रैव संबध्यते ।

The Ṭikā passage apparently contains the same idea as expressed later by Kaiyaṭa. But it has to be modified and supplemented before it can express the intended idea.

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[1] विभाषाग्रहणमेव ज्ञापयति — अनुवर्तमाना अपि अधिकारा यत्र यत्र यत्नो विभाषाग्रहणादिकस्तु तत्रैव भवन्ति, नान्यत्रेति । अन्यथा विभाषाग्रहणमनर्थकं स्याद्, अनुवर्तनादेव खञः सिद्धत्वात् । (कै०)

Emendations : (1) In व्याकरणगणनपि (MS), the गण seems to be merely a repetition of रण (with a change in the first letter). I think AL are right in assuming the original reading to be व्याकरणेनापि. (2) After निरर्थित्वे[1], I assume असंबन्धं (or a word to that effect, like संबन्धाभावं); similarly I read °श्रुतिरुपसूचयति.[2] Bhar. thus tells us, that a word which has come down in a subsequent Sūtra by *anuvṛtti* will not have any effective connection with it if that rule has no need (निरर्थित्वे), as is hinted by Pāṇini himself, who specifically reads the word *vibhāṣā* for that purpose in P. 5. 2. 4. (3) The remaining part of the sentence says the same thing positively. So I add : यत्रार्थित्वं तत्रैव.

विभाषाश्रुति° = the word विभाषा in P. 5. 2. 4. But for the valuable help provided by Kaiyaṭa, it would have been very difficult to understand this reference. अनेन = अनुवृत्तेन. संनिपतितव्यम् = संबद्धव्यम्। In connectoin with the frog-leap it has a literal meaning, as in संनिपतन्ति above (2. 1).

ग्रामान्तरं गच्छत इव मूलोपसर्पणम् indicates unintentional and unproductive activity. This parallel occurs in the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 4. 50 : ग्रामान्तरमयं गच्छन्मूलान्युपसर्पति, कुड्यमूलान्युपसर्पतीति। (I. 333, 20-21).

[10]

अथ वोभयं निवृत्तं तदपेक्षिष्यामहे। This is the last of the series of suggestions put forth by Patañjali to insure that the word Vṛddhi does not get connected with *aeṅ*.

The device of *apekṣā* suggested here indicates that the technical *adhikāra* depending on the Svarita is not to be used. Since there is no Svarita, there is no *anuvṛtti* (*nivṛtti*=*ananuvṛtti* as Nāgeśa says). Now the popular technique of *apekṣā* consists in reading a sentence in such a way as would necessitate the addition of some words to make the sense complete. In the present case, we divide the Sūtra *iko guṇavṛddhī* into two parts. We first stop after *iko* (now *ikaḥ*). Naturally it does not make a complete sentence and raises the expectation, ' What of it ? ' In reply to this question one takes a look at the preceding sūtras and conveniently brings down the word *vṛddhiḥ* from P. 1. 1. 1. and *guṇaḥ* from P. 1. 1. 2 into P. 1. 1. 3. (When interpreting the Sūtra we of course take into consideration the original *guṇavṛddhī* read in P. 1. 1. 3.) Since, on this alternative, *vṛddhiḥ* is directly drawn into P. 1. 1. 3, there is no possibility of its being entangled with *aeṅ*. Read : " अपेक्षालक्षणं लौकिकमधिकारमाश्रयति " (कै°)। " उभयं निवृत्तमिति। स्वरितलिङ्गानासङ्गेनाननुवृत्तिरेव निवृत्तिरित्यर्थः। अपेक्षेति। इक इत्येतावन्मात्रस्येतराकाङ्क्षत्वात् "। (ना०)

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1 This emendation (by Sw) of the MS रिरथित्वि is very happy.

2 This suggestion came from Shri V. B. Bhagavat Shastri.

The *apekṣā* thus consists in refusing to look upon[1] some statement as independent and in making it dependent on something else (according to our convenience).

Bhar. does not explain what this *apekṣādhikāra* is. He straightaway enters into the discussion of the applicability or otherwise of the Paribhāṣā अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वा if the *apekṣādhikāra* is applied.

ननु च .... वेति । This contains an objection against *apekṣādhikāra.* Bhar. merely says that in that case the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya vidhir* ... ... etc. will also step in. So what ? one may ask. But the answer is clear. In that case we can supply only *guṇaḥ,* which immediately preceds (*anantara*), and not *vṛddhiḥ* also, which is somewhat distant. So, with the *apekṣādhikāra,* you can get only partly what you want. The Paribhāṣā stands in the way of dragging *vṛddhiḥ* in P. 1. 1. 3.[2]

अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वेति is Paribhāṣā No. 61 in the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāgeśa. It is thus translated : " (A rule, may it enjoin or forbid anything), either enjoins or forbids (only) that which is nearest (to it in some other rule) " (Kielhorn, *Paribhāṣenduśekhara,* 2nd ed. page 338).

यत्र ह्युभौ ... °नुमानमिति । The objector continues, anticipating an objection against his view and giving his reply. How is it that inspite of the Paribhāṣā, even the distant word *vṛddhiḥ* comes down in P. 1. 1. 3 along with the nearer word *guṇaḥ,* when Svarita is used ? If the Paribhāṣā can be set aside in the case of a *Svaritādhikāra,* let it be set aside in the case of the *apekṣādhikāra* also. The reply to this seems to be that Svarita and *apekṣā* do not stand on the same level. Svarita is an objective fact and the elements marked with it are bound to come down by *anuvṛtti,* whethes they are one or two, and nearer or distant. The *apekṣā* however can be satisfied with the utilisation of the nearer element and has no right to go beyond it. Thus, on the force of the *apekṣā* one can bring down only *guṇaḥ,* and not *vṛddhiḥ* too. That seems to be the argument.

सत्यम्, एवमेतत् ... ... किंचिदपेक्षत इति । This is the reply to the above objection. It explains how ultimately the Paribhāṣā *anantarasya vidhir vā*... etc., even when observed, here does not come into our way. It is like this :

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1 Towards the end of this Āhnika an expression *apekṣiṣyāmahe* occurs in the *Mbh,* commenting on which Kaiyaṭa says : *asya svātantryaṁ nirasitum ity arthaḥ.*

2 This view is mentioned in the *Mbh* e. g. under P. 4. 2. 92 : *śeṣe* where Pat. says : अयुक्तैवं बहुनोऽपेक्षा । अपेक्षमाणोऽयमनन्तरं योगमपेक्षेत । But, as usual, Pat. immediately voices the other view also. बहुनोऽप्यपेक्षा भवति, he continues, तद्यथा । 'कषादिषु यथाविध्यनुप्रयोगः' (P. 3. 4. 46) इति ससामान्यकं सविशेषकं सर्वमपेक्ष्यते । (Kiel II. 290. 9–11)

When you are supplying something according to your needs, from a number of items which are mentioned previously, it all depends on how you look at them. You can either look at them as so many different items, in which case you can reasonably supply only the nearest item. But if you choose to look upon the different items as *one* group, or whole, then you can supply the whole group, and even the Paribhāṣā in question then cannot stand in the way.

Observation : The verb *apekṣ* is used in this passage in three slightly different meanings : (i) (passive) be needed, required, (ii) take a view of things according to one's needs and (iii) supply the needed items. Actually all three denote three phases of one process which begins when we artificially break a self-contained sentence, and thus make the first part, e. g., now deficient and thus need addition of items from outside.

(2) Pat. is in the habit of mechanically repeating often verbatim, a chain of alternative arguments, whenever an occasion presents itself. The arguments listed here in sections 3-10 are repeated, with some modifiations, under P 2. 3. 35;[1] 5. 2. 4[2]. See also *Mbh.* under P. 4. 2. 92[3].

[11a]

किं पुनरयमलोन्त्य ... पवाद: । Here another discussion on P. 1. 1. 3, and a major one at that, begins. Here Kāt. and Pat. discuss the relationship between this Sūtra and P. 1. 1. 52 : *alo 'ntyasya.* The discussion is necessitated by the fact that when Guṇa or Vṛddhi is taught as a substitute, P. 1. 1. 52 also is interested. P. 7. 3. 84 : *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* e. g. teaches the substitution of Guṇa in the place of Aṅga (P. 6. 4. 1 : *aṅgasya*), when suffixes named *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* follow. Since Guṇa is predicated, P 1. 1. 3 is naturally interested. But what is important to note is that since the element to be replaced is mentioned in the Genitive (*aṅgasya*), P. 1. 1.52 is also interested here because it says that when the element to be replaced is mentioned in the Genitive, then the substitute replaces the last phoneme of the original element. Thus when the Guṇa substitution is to be effected, P. 1. 1. 3 would insist that it replace only *ik* phonemes, while P. 1. 1. 52 would insist on the replacement of the last phoneme (*antyo'l*) of the Aṅga. Now in those cases where the *ik* happens to be the last phoneme, there is no problem (e. g. in the formation of words like *cayanam, cetā* from *ci.*). But where *ik* happens to be a non-final sound, that presents a problem. When e.g. the stem *mid* is to undergo a Guṇa substitution (P. 7. 3. 82), *i* has to be replaced according to P. 1. 1. 3, *d* according to P. 1. 1. 52. How are we to reconcile the conflicting claims ?

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1. Kiel. I. 457. 4-15. 2. Kiel. II. 372. 9-19. 3. Kiel. II. 290. 7-14.

One way out of the difficulty is of the nature of compromise. Both Paribhāṣās join together to form one single sentence (*ekavākya*). Here we have further the option to look upon either of the two as subordinate (*aṅga*) and the other as the principal (अङ्गिन्). अलोन्त्यशेषः = अलोन्त्यपरिभाषायाः शेषः or अलोन्त्यः (अलोन्त्यपरिभाषा) शेषः अस्य। (अलोन्त्य is short for the sūtra अलोऽन्त्यस्य।) This is how the two Paribhāṣās can work in a spirit of give and take. The net result of this arrangement will be that P. 1. 1. 3 will work only where P. 1. 1. 52 can work and also vice versa. The other way is that of making P. 1. 1. 3 an *apavāda* of P. 1. 1. 52 i.e, to make P. 1. 1. 3, which is a speical rule, supersede or set aside (*nivartaka*) the general rule P. 1. 1. 52.

Bhar. further observes that Pat. has himself (*svayam*) stated that one-sentence interpretation leads to a compromise and two-sentence interpretation to supersession. This is the *Mbh* passage in question : यद्येकं वाक्यं तच्चेदं च, अलोऽन्त्यस्य विधयो भवन्ति, इको गुणवृद्धी अलोऽन्त्यस्येति ततोऽयं तच्छेषः। अथ नानावाक्यम्, अलोऽन्त्यस्य विधयो भवन्ति, इको गुणवृद्धी अन्त्यस्य चानन्त्यस्य चेति ततोऽयं तदपवादः। (Kiel I. 44. 16-18).

तत्त्वेकवाक्यत्वं नानावाक्यत्वं .... एतत् सर्वं वक्तव्यम्। Here Bhar. raises certain questions on the *Mbh* which has mentioned the two ways of adjusting the relation between the two Paribhāṣās. The following questions are raised :

(1) a. The two Paribhāṣās have been taught at different times and are separated from each other by a number of rules. How then can they be combined into a single sentence inspite of this distance of time and place (कालभेदेन श्रुतयोरनेकयोगव्यवहितयोः)? b. The logical justification for the one-sentence and two-sentence views has not been supplied.

(2) One cannot presuppose that the relation between the two Paribhāṣās is open to doubt. The facts of the case support either the one-sentence view or the two-sentence view. There is no justification of the doubt (संदेहानुपपत्तिः). And the combination of the two (एकवाक्यत्व and नानावाक्यत्व) is an impossibility.

(3) Apart from two possibilities mentioned, two others remain, viz. option (*vikalpa*) and combination (*samuccaya*). These also should have been mentioned. Lastly

(4) the two-sentence construction is here said to be the cause of supersession. But elsewhere (viz. under P. 3. 4. 67 Vā 2) it is said to be the cause of coexistence (*samāveśa*, same as *samuccaya*). This involves self-contradiction.

The suffix *khyun* (= *ana* with an infixion of *m* after the Upapada) is taught in P. 3. 2. 56 : आढ्यसुभगस्थूलपलितनग्नान्धप्रियेषु च्व्यर्थेष्वच्वौ कृञः करणे ख्युन्

after the root *kṛ* in the sense of instrument (*karaṇa*), when this root is preceded by the Upapadas like *āḍhya* 'rich' in the capacity of the grammatical object, when they have the sense of *cvi* but without *cvi* being actually used. Thus *āḍhyaṁkaraṇam* 'that by which one who is not rich is made rich.'

Now Kātyāyana commenting on P. 3. 4. 67 : *kartari kṛt* 'a *kṛt* suffix denotes agent' says : तत्र ख्युनादिप्रतिषेधो नानावाक्यत्वात् । The suffixes *khyun* etc. are included in the class of the *kṛt* suffixes and so they will denote the agent by the general rule *kartari kṛt* . This is not desired. Therefore Kātyāyana suggests that a rule should be framed, prohibiting their use in the sense of agent. This is objected to in the *Mbh* on the ground of superfluousness. P. 3. 2. 56 specifically lays down *khyun* in the sense of instrument. As a result of it they cannot have an agentive meaning. As against this it is pointed out these suffixes will have both these capacities in view of the two rules (while only instrumental meaning is desired). The objector then points out that P. 3. 2. 56 being a special rule the instrumental meaning will automatically set aside the meaning of agent and so there is no need of a fresh prohibition. Anticipating this objection the expression *nānāvākyatvāt* has been used in the Vārttika. It is pointed out that a special rule supersedes a general rule only if the two are such as can be combined into a single sentence. If the two remain two unconnected independent sentences an option results. In the present case the two represent entirely different sentences, without a possibility of their combination into a single sentence. Since the supersession on the strength of a single sentence is not available here, a fresh provision prohibiting the agentive meaning of *khyun* is necessary, maintains the Vārttikakāra. Read the *Mbh* : तत्र ख्युनादीनां प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । ख्युनादयः कर्तरि मा भूवन्निति । ननु च करणे ख्युनादयो विधीयन्ते ते कर्तरि न भत्रिष्यन्ति । तेन च करणे स्युरनेन च कर्तरि । ननु चापवादत्वात् ख्युनादयो बाधकाः स्युः । न स्युः । किं कारणम् ? नानात्राक्यत्वात् । नानावाक्यं तच्चेदं च । समानवाक्येऽपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्ते, नानात्राक्यत्वाद् बाधनं न प्राप्नोति । (Kiel. II 177. 22–178.4).

Bhar here lays finger on this discussion in the *Mbh*. and points out that whereas there (under P. 3. 4. 67) an absence of combination into a single sentence is regarded as leading to combination, in our present discussion (on P. 1. 1. 3), an exactly opposite view is held, viz. that in such a case the special rule is regarded as superseding a general one. This involves self-contradiction.

All this requires an explanation (एतत् सर्वं वक्तव्यम्).

Readings : (1) निवर्तकः inferred by Sw is a very happy choice which I accept at once. It would seem that निवर्तकः was first corrupted into निरर्तकः on account of the similarity between व and र in the Devanāgarī and since it did not make any meaning it was then deliberately changed into निरर्थकः as we find in the MS. Of course even निरर्थकः can be made to yield some useful meaning—an

exception would be 'meaningless' if even in its special field a general rule was allowed to operate. But निवर्तकः is still preferable as it offers a good contrast to शेषः etc. (2) तत्त्वेकवाक्यत्वं (of the MS) is read as नन्वेक° by Sw. It is true that the passage contains objections or questions. But the MS clearly reads तत्त्वे° and, secondly, *nanu* is not indispensable for an objection. So I retain the reading of the MS. (3) नैवेतद् of the MS is read as चेत् । तद् by AL and as नैवैतद् by Sw. I accept the latter. (4) The original for चैकस्मिन्नैव is not quite clear. AL's चैकस्मिंश्चित् is interesting. But such an use of चित् with एक is not known in the classical Sanskrit. (5) किमर्थावेतावेवो° of AL represent the MS more faithfully than किमर्थं चैवो° of Sw. (6) Sw's edition 'corrects' स्युन्नादि to स्युनादि as found in the *Mbh.* I prefer sticking to the MS original (so also AL), since it is in agreement with P. 8. 3. 32, although generally this rule is often disregarded in grammatical literature itself.

b (1). यत्तावदुच्यते, व्यवहितयोः ... ... etc. This begins the reply to the first objection. Absence of physical contiguity is no bar to relationship. On the other hand, mere physical presence cannot lead to a meaningful connection, if there is no semantic connection between the two expressions. What is needed is a mutual expectation, a capacity to supplement each other syntactically and semantically. If this is there, the connection is there, contiguity or no contiguity.

The sentence cited by Bhar. ('अर्थतो ह्य°... कारणम्') to support his view looks like an Anuṣṭubh line. It is very similar to a part of the Mīmāṁsāsūtra 4. 3.11 : यदि वाऽऽम्नानसामर्थ्याच्चोदनाऽर्थेन गम्येतार्थानां ह्यर्थवत्त्वेन वचनानि प्रतीयन्तेऽर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानामानन्तर्येऽप्यसंबन्धस्तस्माच्छ्रुत्येकदेशः[1] । I quote a relevant portion of the *Śābarabhāṣya* on this sūtra : अन्तिकादुपनिपतितं हि पदं वाक्यार्थमुपजनयितुमलं भवति न दूरादवतिष्ठमानम् । अत्रोच्यते । व्यवहितमपि हि पराणुद्य व्यवधायकमानन्तर्येण मनसि विपरिवर्तमानमलमेव भवति विशेषमुपजनयितुम् । यथा

इतः पश्यसि धावन्तं दूरे जातं वनस्पतिम् ।
त्वां ब्रवीमि विशालाक्षि या पिनक्षि जरद्गवम् ॥

इति । अत्र 'इतः पश्यसी'ति शब्दो बुद्धौ भवति । सः, 'दूरे जातं वनस्पतिम्' इत्येतैः पदैः व्यवहितेन जरद्गवमित्यनेन शब्देन व्यवधायकान्यपोद्य संबंध्यमानः संबध्यते । अर्थानां ह्यर्थवत्त्वेन हेतुना व्यवहितान्यपि वचनानि संबध्यन्ते । यानि पुनरर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानि तान्यानन्तर्येऽपि सति न परस्परेण संबन्धमर्हन्ति । यथा, 'या पिनक्षि जरद्गवम्' इत्येवमादीनि ।

The Anuṣṭubh line quoted by Bhar. is almost identical with the part of the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra (and the two examples also are similar). We do not know whether Bhar. turned (but why ?), with some modification, a prose sentence into an Anuṣṭubh line. The *Chāyā* quotes a stanza more than once,

[1] Anandashrama 2nd ed. (1973) I. 70.

where the first line is यस्य येनाभिसंबन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तेन सः । with the second line अर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानाम् etc. as quoted in the *Dīp.*

To illustrate his contention Bhar. cites a passage which was already cited by Pat. under P. 1. 1. 58 : 'अनड्वाहमुद ...... मद्राक्षीः । There the point which Pat. wants to make is that (sometimes) the words may not be uttered in their proper sequence by the speaker; but the listener can modify the sequence of words suitably so that the rearranged words can give a coherent sense. As an example Pat. cites the words अनड्वाहमुदहारि etc. which are meaningless as they stand and then he rearranges them also (which is not done by Bhar.). Read : अनानुपूर्व्येणापि संनिविष्टानां यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति । तद्यथा– अनड्वाहमुदहारि या त्वं हरसि शिरसा कुम्भं भगिनि साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति[1] । तस्य यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति । उदहारि भगिनि या त्वं कुम्भं हरसि शिरसानड्वाहं साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति । The rearranged sentence brings out the intended sense which is : 'O sister, bringing water, you who are carrying a jar on your head, saw the bull, rushing (towards you) from a side.'[2] एषामानन्तर्येण ... सरणमिति । This explains why in the passage अनड्वाहमुदहारि etc., even though some words are close enough, e. g. शिरसा and वहसि, they cannot be connected together because of impossibility (असंभवात्) of carrying a bull on the head (by a woman ! we may add). Similar is the difficulty in connecting कुम्भं and अभिधावन्तम्. तस्याः क्रियायाः = वहनक्रियायाः, सरणक्रियायाश्च । सरणम् 'running'. Incidentally, this meaning of the verb *sṛ* is attested in the Veda, and even Pāṇini (7. 3. 78) teaches substitution of *dhau* for *sṛ* (in certain contexts) which implies the meaning 'run' for *sṛ*. अभिधावन्तं and सरणं are related to each other in the same way as वहसि and वहनम्.

Here a question arises: If the jumbled order of words is not supposed to be conducive to any meaning, how is it that some meaning can be understood (at least by clever persons, we may add) from it ? The sentence एतन्निबन्धनम् ... उपप्लवते answers this question. एतन्निबन्धनम् = असंभवनिबन्धनम्. Because it is evident that the sequence of words as uttered cannot yield intended meaning, so it must be assumed that the words heard must have been rearranged in the mind of the listener (उपलब्धुः) so as to form a different sentence (with the proper word-sequnce).[3] बुद्धिविषयम्, mental. उपप्लवते, is

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1 There are two minor variations (probably unintended) in the citation as it is found in the *Dīp.* : वहसि (for हरसि) and भगिनि कुम्भं (transposed).

2 This *Mbh* passage is indicated by the *pratīka* '*udahāryādibhiḥ*' in the *Vākyap.* II. 246. The full text quoted by Puṇyarāja (which is only slightly different) reads : भगिनि, या त्वं शिरसानड्वाहं वहसि सा त्वं प्राचीनं कुम्भममभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीः ।

3. It is possible that एतन्निबन्धनमुपलब्धुः means 'of one who has understood (the meaning) on the basis of this (jumbled word-order)'.

produced, formed. यथैत्रोपांशु ... प्रतिपद्यते furnishes a parallel. उपांशु गुणयन्, going over or repeating a passage in a low voice, muttering. तन्निबन्धनम् = बुद्धिविषयवाक्यनिबन्धनम्. केचिन्मन्यन्ते... Here, Bhar. records a different view held by some. They held that meaning understood in this way does not have the word as its source. Bhar. here makes only a negative statement. He does not clarify it positively. He may probably be referring to the Mīmāṁsakas who hold that unconnected word-meanings, conveyed by words, are integrated into sentence-meaning by the operation of *lakṣaṇā*. In their view sentence-meaning is *aśabda*.

एवं व्याकरणेऽपि ... पृथगुपदेशः स्यात्। Bhar. illustrates the argument (अर्थलक्षणः संबन्धो नानन्तर्यकृतः) by means of the grammatical rules. The rule P. 1. 4. 21 : *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* and P. 4. 1. 1 : *ṅyāp-prātipadikāt* are separated from each other by hundreds of rules. Still they are to be connected together because they concern a common matter. P. 4. 1. 1. says that the suffixes *sup* etc. (i. e. case-endings), among others, follow nominal stems while P. 1. 4. 21 further says that out of these case-endings those named *bahuvacana* (P. 1. 4. 102) are used when plurality is intended to be conveyed. Thus the two rules are supplementary to each other and they can be combined together so as to give a unified meaning even though read far away from each other in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In that case, one may ask, why has Pāṇini read them at distant places like this ? Why did he not read them together ? एतत्तु ... ... उपदिष्टम् supplies the reply. P. 1. 4. 21 is useful not only in the field of case-endings. It is equally useful in the field of finite verbal endings also. Under these circumstances, if Pāṇini had tied it with 4. 1. 1, it could not have been used for verbal endings also. Hence its reading at a separate place (भिन्नदेशम्). Incidentally, mention of P. 1. 4. 21 is only illustrative. What is said applies equally to 1. 4. 22 : *dvyekyor dvivacanaikavacane*.

एवमिहापि ... ... पृथगुपदेशः स्यात्। The argument in the previous illustration is now applied to the present case. Although *alo 'ntyasya* and *iko guṇavṛddhī* are related, Pāṇini does not read them together. The reason is : *alo 'ntyasya* is concerned not only with Guṇa and Vṛddhi, but in many other cases. e.g. P. 4. 2. 140 : *rājñaḥ ka ca* which teaches that *rājan* (i.e. by 1. 1. 52, its final) is replaced by *k* when the secondary suffix *cha* (= *īya*) follows. If Pāṇini had tied up 1. 1. 52 with 1. 1. 3, it would not be used in cases likes 4. 2. 140 just mentioned.

All this goes to show that distance is no bar to combining rules, provided they are related.

(2) Now follows the refutation of the *saṁdehānupapatti* argument.

अथ चार्थलक्षण: ... ... स्यादिति। The sentence is obscure. I take it as leading the refutation of the 2nd objection. Bhar. says that there is nothing surprising if a doubt arises whether *aṅgāṅgibhāva* is to be effected or *bādhā*. When the circumstances of a particular case are such that prima facie both can apply, it is very natural that a doubt as regards the choice should arise. On the other hand, the circumstances of some other case may be such that *aṅgāṅgibhāva* alone, or *bādhā* alone would be possible, and no doubt could arise even at the outset. For the *aṅgāṅgibhāva* alone he cites the example of P. 3. 4. 67 : *kartari kṛt* and P. 3. 2. 25 : *harater dṛtināthayoḥ paśau* (already once discussed above in *Dīp.* 3). P. 3. 4. 67 teaches a *kṛt* suffix generally in the sense of agent while P. 3. 2. 25 adds that the particular *kṛt* suffix taught there takes place, in the circumstances mentioned, provided the agent, to be denoted by the suffix, is a beast. Here the *aṅgāṅgibhāva* alone is possible and that alone materialises. To explain : The agent, spoken about in P. 3. 4. 67 is, in the first place, a mere power (*śakti*). As such it requires a substance (*dravya*) as its substratum (*āśraya*), residing in which it can function. On the other side, a substance like a beast without any power is useless. Both therefore are in need (*apekṣā*) of each other. Naturally the two rules have to cooperate with and supplement each other. The result is that the two are combined into a single sentence *paśau kartari* which means that the suffix in question comes in to denote the agent when it is a beast (not otherwise). Bhar. rules out two other possibilities about the meaning of the suffix : 1. The suffix cannot denote the beast alone (without an agentive power), because a suffix coming after a verbal root is naturally supposed to denote some producer of action. 2. The suffix cannot denote the beast in the capacity of the grammatical object etc. simply because this meaning is not taught. This shows how *aṅgāṅgibhāva* ' mutual supplementation ' alone is possible in this case.

एक एव = अङ्गाङ्गिभावो वा, बाधा वा। कर्तृपशुचोदनायाम् = कर्तृभूतपशुचोदनायाम्। द्रव्यनिमित्तानुविधायित्वात् is not clear.

The passage ' पशौ ' इति द्रव्यभूतस्य ... ...भवितुमर्हतीति explains why पशौ शुद्धे प्रत्यय: is impossible, कर्मादीनामचोदितत्वात् justifies why (पशौ) कर्मादिगुणयुक्ते प्रत्यय: is impossible. It would have been perhaps better to read a *daṇḍa* after पशौ शुद्धे प्रत्यय:।

एवमणिञो ...... बाधकत्वेनैवापेक्षा। Here Bhar. cites a case where supersession (*bādhā*) alone is possible. The general suffix in the sense of ' his descendant ' (*tasyāpatyam*, P. 4. 1. 92) is *aṇ* taught in P. 4. 1. 83 : *prāg dīvyato'ṇ* ; P. 4. 1 95 : *ata iñ* teaches the affixion of the suffix *iñ* in this sense if the nominal stem ends in *a*. When a meaning, say, ' Dakṣa's descendant ' is to be expressed, the suffix *aṇ* which is taught for all nominal stems (i.e. without any formal

condition) as well as the suffix *iñ* taught for stems in *a* presents itself. Now, the intended meaning can be conveyed by *any one* of the two suffixes. Both are not required together (in contradistinction to *kartari* and *paśau* in the previous case). So only one is to be retained. Which ? Naturally, the special suffix (विशेषविहितः) supersedes the general suffix (सामान्यविहितम्). (The relation of the general and the special is already discussed above in *Dīp*. 8.) In the previous case there was उपकारित्वेनापेक्षा, in the present बाधकत्वेनैवापेक्षा.

इह त्वङ्गस्य ... . From here onwards Bhar. explains how in the matter of determining the relationship between the present two rules (P. 1. 1. 52 and P. 1. 1. 3), both possibilities (*aṅgāṅgibhāva* and *bādhā*) are there. If one looks upon *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1) as *sthāna-ṣaṣṭhī* then there is *aṅgāṅgibhāva*. If, however, *aṅgasya* is looked upon as *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* and *ikaḥ* as the *sthāna-ṣaṣṭhī* (meaning ' in the place of *ik*, a part of the *aṅga* '), then there is *bādhā*. The *aṅgāṅgibhāva* view, again, has two sub-varieties according as whether P. 1. 1. 52 is looked upon as the principal (*aṅgin*) and P. 1. 1. 3 its part or limb (*aṅga* or *śeṣa*) or vice versa.

I. (i) P. 1. 1. 3 śeṣa of P. 1. 1. 52 :

When P. 7. 3. 84 lays down Guṇa, three rules are concerned : (a) *aṅgasya* 6.4.1. (b) *alo'ntyasya* 1.1.52 and (c) *iko guṇavṛddhī* 1.1.3. To start with, we can take *aṅgasya* as the *sthāna-ṣaṣṭhī*, meaning that the Guṇa is to replace the *aṅga*. Now P. 1. 1. 52 comes in because *aṅga* (to be replaced) is mentioned in the Genitive. Because Guṇa is involved, so P. 1. 1. 3 also steps in (इह त्वङ्गस्य गुणवृद्धी भवत इति षष्ठी गुणवृद्धी च । षष्ठीमपेक्ष्य ' अलोऽन्त्यस्य ' संनिपतति । गुणवृद्धी अपेक्ष्य ' इकः ' इति संनिपतति ।) Now, on this *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* view, we have two further options. We can either (a) first combine P. 6.4.1 with P. 1. 1. 52 and then make *ikaḥ* qualify *alo'ntyasya*, or (b) we can make *ikaḥ* qualify *aṅgasya* and then secondarily bring in *alo'ntyasya*. On the first option, the sentence thus becomes अङ्गस्य अलोऽन्त्यस्य गुणः, स च भवन् इको भवति । Thus here P. 1. 1. 52 becomes principal, and P. 1. 1. 3 subordinate to it (तत्राङ्गस्येति यदा समुदायशब्दोऽन्त्येऽप्युपसंह्रियते[1], इदमवयवस्य[2] विशेषणम् ' इकः ' इति । एवमयं [= इको गुणवृद्धी] तच्छेषो [= अलोन्त्यस्य शेषो] भवति, विशेषणत्वेनान्त्यस्यालः ।). Incidentally, Bhar. points out that when we connect *aṅgasya* and *alo'ntyasya*, the final phoneme will always mean the final phoneme of the Aṅga, even though *aṅgasya* is not *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* (but *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* as we have stipulated). This is so because an Aṅga is nothing but a group of phonemes which can be regarded as the parts building up the whole in the form of the Aṅga (अवयवसमुदायाश्च हि

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[1] उपसंह्रियते = नीयते, संबध्यते (is connected with).

[2] इदम् = इकः । अवयवस्य = अलोऽन्त्यस्य ।

किंचित् अन्यदस्य रूपमस्ति । इदमेव हि तस्य रूपमस्ति ।). That is why when P. 7. 3. 43 teaches the optional substitution of *p* in the place of the Aṅga *ruh*, or P. 4. 2. 140 the substitution of *k* in the place of *rājan* (when the suffix *cha* follows), the replacements affect the final *h* of *ruh* and the final *n* of *rājan*.

(ii) P. 1. 1. 52 śeṣa of P. 1. 1. 3 :

अङ्गस्येति समुदायशब्दो ... .. शेषतामापद्यते । This explains how *alo'ntyasya* becomes subordinate to *iko guṇavṛddhī*. Here we first connect *ikaḥ* with *aṅgasya* making *ikaḥ* the qualifier and *aṅgasya* the qualified (*iko 'ṅgasya*). This then gives occasion for P. 1.1.72 : *yena vidhis tadantasya* to be busy, thus making *ik* equivalent to *iganta* ' ending in an *ik* vowel '. The sentence thus means in the first instance : Guṇa is substituted in the place of Aṅga ending in *ik*. We then secondarily add *alo'ntyasya*. The whole injunction thus means : इगन्तस्याङ्गस्य गुणो भवति, स च भवन् अलोऽन्त्यस्य । Here the *alo'ntyasya* plays a subordinate role towards *iko guṇavṛddhī* because *ikaḥ* now occupies the principal position in combination with *aṅgasya*.

Here what Bhar. has emphasised is that in the previous view *aṅgasya* is straightway connected with the final phoneme (*antye'li*), while in the present view the Aṅga is first qualified by *ik* and then connected with the final phoneme (अङ्गस्येति समुदायशब्दोऽन्त्येल्युपसंह्रियमाण इका प्राप्तदन्तविधिरुपसंहारेण युज्यते, इगन्ताङ्गस्य गुण इति । एवमपि इगन्ताङ्गस्य गुण इति विशेष्यत्वेनालोन्त्यशेषतामापद्यते । Here it should be noted that अलोन्त्यशेष° here is a Bahuvrīhi : अलोन्त्यः शेषोऽस्य (' इको गुणवृद्धी ' सूत्रस्य).

II. P. 1. 1. 3, *apavāda* of P. 1. 1. 52.

अथ त्वङ्गस्य ... ... बाधकत्वमस्योह्यते । Here Bhar. explains which construction leads to *bādha* or *apavāda* ' supersession. ' Here *aṅgasya* is taken, not as *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* but as *avayavaṣaṣṭhī*, connected with *ikaḥ* which represents the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, i. e. *ik* is now represented as the *sthānin*, i. e. the element to be replaced. The injunction now reads as : अङ्गस्य इकः गुणः ' Guṇa replaces the *ik* of an Aṅga.' Since *aṅgasya* is no more *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, it does not matter whether the *ik* vowel occupies a final position of the Aṅga or not, In other words *alo 'ntyasya* is superseded by *iko guṇavṛddhī*.

Bhar. hastenes to add that this does not mean that *alo 'ntyasya* proceeds but is ultimately overpowered by the stronger rule *iko guṇavṛddhī*. All that this *bādhā* means is that *alo 'ntyasya* simply does not proceed, because it has no occasion at all to proceed, as *aṅgasya* is not *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* (... एवं सति ' अलोऽन्त्यस्य ' इत्येतस्य गुणवृद्धिविषये अत्यन्तमप्रवृत्तिरिति बाधकत्वमस्य [= ' इको गुणवृद्धी ' इत्यस्य] ऊह्यते । इयमेव च बाधा याप्राप्तिरिति ।)

तत्र तच्छेषकल्पनायाम् ... प्रधानविप्रकर्ष इति । Bhar. here makes a brief comment on the relative positions of *aṅgasya* and *ikaḥ vis-à-vis* the *guṇaḥ* which,

being the predicate, forms the main thing. On the *tacchesa* (i. e. *aṅgāṅgibhāva*) view, *ik* is separated from the predicate (इकः प्रधानविप्रकर्षः); the literal meaning is that the Guṇa is laid down for the Aṅga alone by the injunction.

On the supersession view, on the other hand, there is Guṇa for *ik*, while Aṅga is separated from the main predicate.

The whole position is mentioned briefly by Kaiyaṭa thus : किं पुनरिति । उभयथा संभवाद्दोषदर्शनाच्च प्रश्नः। तत्राङ्गस्य गुण इति षष्ठीनिर्देशाल्लिङ्गादलोन्त्यस्येत्युपतिष्ठते, गुणश्रुत्या त्विक इति । तत्र यदि पूर्वमिकाङ्गं विशेष्यते, इगन्ताङ्गस्य गुणो भवतीति स च भवन्नलोऽन्त्यस्येत्यन्त्यस्य भवति, तदा सोऽस्य शेषो भवति। यदा त्वङ्गस्येति पूर्वमेवान्त्यमलं षष्ठी नीयते अङ्गान्त्यस्य गुण इति, पश्चादिकान्त्योऽल् विशेष्यते, तदा तस्यायं विशेषणत्वात् तच्छेषो भवति। अथ त्वङ्गस्येति गुणवृद्धिविधौ न स्थानषष्ठी, किं तर्हि ? इगपेक्षयावयवषष्ठी, तदा स्थानषष्ठ्यभावादलोऽन्त्यस्येत्यस्यानुपस्थानमिति तदपवादपक्षो भवति । अप्राप्त्यनुमानमेव हि बाधो, वचनेन प्राप्तस्य बाधायोगात् ।

Readings and punctuation : (1) I take तस्या क्रियाया of the MS as representing तस्याः क्रियायाः (with AL). It does not matter if we take it as standing for तस्यां क्रियायां as Sw does. (2) वमर्णाम् of the MS must originally have been च सरणम् (as Sw already assumes it), rather than वर्णनम् (AL). See notes above for the grammatical difference between सरणम् and अभिधावन्तम्. (3) MS एवं व्याकरणेप्यर्थलक्षणः संबंधानार्थकृतो । Both the previous editions have retained नार्थकृतो. But this evidently involves self-contradiction, since अर्थलक्षण and अर्थकृत are synonymous. I conjecture that we have to read there नार्यकृतो with two letters, viz. नंत lost after ना. Thus the original text is conjectured to have been नानंतर्यकृतो which suits the intended meaning admirably well. संबन्धा is corrupt for संबन्धो. (4) Sw unnecessarily changes तिङर्थ into तिङन्त – . (5) I take अथ वा of the MS as अथ च, as beginning the next topic. (6) In the repeated passage, MS तत्रैवसैव (both times) is evidently तत्रैकस्यैव as Sw has happily reconstructed. (7) द्रव्यनिमित्तानुविधायित्वात् is better taken as beginning a fresh sentence. (8) What Sw reads as ग्रहः is really देहः (repeated), the last two letters of संदेहः (9) सद्वितायापेक्षा° is very probably सद् द्वितीयापेक्ष° as Sw thinks. (10) 'पशौ' इति ... etc. seems to be a dependent clause, modifying the following main clause. (11) I take उपकारित्विनापेक्षयां of the MS as standing for उपकारित्वेनापेक्षायां (as Sw) but the न which he reads after it definitely goes against the intended meaning. (11) संनिपाते तयोर् can equally be संनिपतितयोर् as AL take it. (12) There does not seem to be any reason for changing अभिधानात् into अभिधानम् (with a *daṇḍa* after it). (13) षष्ठ्या and षष्ठ्याम् are evidently scribal errors for षष्ठी and षष्ठीम् respectively. I read a *daṇḍa* after गुणवृद्धी च, thus making the sentence end there. This makes the intended meaning of the passage at once clear. (14) MS °यसनिग्रात्योपद्यंमस्ये° is read as °य संनिपातात् यौगपद्यमलोन्त्यस्ये° by AL and as °यः (?) सन्निपातः । यद्यङ्गस्ये° by Sw. I agree with Sw in reading यद्यङ्गस्य° I take the first word tentatively as संनिपाते. (15) I take अन्त्येभि– of the

MS (and eds.) as अन्त्येऽल्वि– which is typical of this context. (16) प्रन्यत्यसमुदायात् of the MS (and प्रत्यय° of eds.) is clearly meaningless. It should be अवयवसमुदायात्. (17) अन्त्येत्युप° (in both places) is preferable to अस्तीत्युप° (AL). (18) I do not read a *daṇḍa* after तच्छेषो भवति (as eds. do), because I think that it is explained by the following phrase : विशेषणत्वेनान्त्यस्याल: । Note that अन्त्यस्याल: is कर्मणि षष्ठी. (19) The obscure °नाप्रायालिंगायाति is read as °नाप्राप्तलिङ्गात् इक इति by AL and as ° नाश्रय[णाद्]लोऽङ्गान्त्यस्येति by Sw. I for one reconstruct the original as °नांत्यस्यालोंगस्येति which, with proper punctuation, I write as नान्त्यस्याल: । अङ्गस्येति (this latter word beginning a fresh sentence). (20) वदत्त- of the MS is correctly interpreted as तदन्त- by Sw. (21) What is read as [उ]-च्यते by the eds. looks rather to be [ऊ]ह्यते. (22) The obscure °कर्षास्यवेत्रवाविधिनात्तमिति is read as °कर्षस्य सत्त्वेऽत्र वा विधिर्नोक्त इति by AL and as °कर्ष:, अस्य त्वत्र वा विधिनोक्तमिति (?) by Sw. In view of the following sentence which states the opposite position as obtaining on the Apavāda view, I reconstruct the text as : कर्षोंगस्यैव (i. e. °कर्ष:, अङ्गस्यैव) गुणो विधिनोक्तमि (? °क्त इ)ति. This suits the intended meaning quite well, but does some violence on the text of the MS. I propose it as a tentative one until a better supported text is suggested.

(3) Reasons for not considering the samuccaya 'combination' and the vikalpa 'option' views.

In our present context, P. 1. 1. 3 insists on the Guṇa replacing the *ik* vowel (final or non-final) and P. 1.1.52 on replacing the final phoneme (*ik* or non-*ik*). So long as the final phoneme happens to be *ik*, there is no problem. But supposing there is a non-final *ik*, as e. g. in the case of the root *mid*, which phoneme is to be replaced by Guṇa ? The *samuccaya* view would favour two simultaneous Guṇas, one replacing *d* (by P. 1. 1. 52) and the other *i* (by P. 1. 1. 3). Bhar. here shows the utter impossibility (असंभवात्) of such a double Guṇa.

In the actual life we see a combination taking place when a number of items can lead to a result both individually and jointly. Jointly, they would contribute each in its own way and would heighten the result. There is no conflict between them, e. g. between soup, salt, ghee etc. which heighten the taste of the food. But such a combination is impossible in the case of Guṇa. To explain : the element to be replaced has to be mentioned with the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. If *aṅgasya* is regarded as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, then *ikaḥ* will be a *viśeṣaṇaṣaṣṭhī*, i. e. it will qualify *aṅgasya*. On this view there will be Guṇa substitute for the final of the Aṅga (i. e. *aṅgasya alo' ntyasya*) i. e. *d* only. If, on the other hand, you treat *ikaḥ* as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* then *aṅgasya* will have to be a *viśeṣaṇaṣaṣṭhī* qualifying it, itself ceasing to be a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. In that case Guṇa will replace *i* only, not *d* also. You cannot simultaneously take both

aṅgasya and *ikaḥ* as *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* and so the two *Guṇas* do not present themselves simultaneously. So there is no question of *samuccaya.* The use of the words *evem api* suggests that Bhar. has here given a second reason for the impossibility of *samuccaya.* Actually he has given only one.

The sentence इत्येवमपि ... कार्यरूप: is very corrupt in the MS. What I have given is only a provisional reconstruction but I think it serves to bring out Bhar's line of reasoning.

एकार्थानां विरोधवतां ...... षष्ठ्या: कार्ययोगित्वात्। In this passage Bhar. explains why 'option' (*vikalpa*) also is equally impossible in determining the mutual relationship of P. 1. 1. 3 and 1. 1. 52. The basic reason, though not stated in clear-cut terms, is the same as in the case of *samuccaya*, viz. that the two alternatives do not present themselves simultaneously, this in turn being due to the circumstance that a Genitive is capable of only one interpretation at a time. In the ordinary life, when it is said: देवदत्तं भोजय प्रासादे गृहे, both a palace and an ordinary house seem equally well (एकार्थानाम्) for feeding D°. But the two are mutully exclusive (विरोधवताम्). You cannot feed D° in a palace and in an ordinary house at one and the same time. So a choice results (although the word *vā* is not actually used). Thus *vikalpa* comes in in the context of items which severally lead to the same result but they being mutually exclusive, only one can be chosen at a time. And the important condition is that the two alternatives are equally available simultaneously, though you have to choose only one. In our case the Guṇa for the final phoneme (*d*) and for *ik* (*i*) do not present themselves simultaneously. You can have only the one or the other, because only one kind of Genitive be brought into operation (एकस्या: षष्ठ्या: कार्ययोगित्वात्) at a time. Taking *aṅgasya* as a *sthānasaṣṭhī* you can have a Guṇa for the final (but not for *ik* also at the time because *ikaḥ* at that time is *viśeṣaṇaṣaṣṭhī*); taking *ikaḥ* as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* you can have a Guṇa for *ik* (but not for the final of the Aṅga, because *aṅgasya* at that time is *viśeṣaṇaṣaṣṭhī*). And neither *aṅgasya* nor *ikaḥ* can be, at one and the same time, both kinds of *ṣaṣṭhī*. Since the two alternatives do not present themselves simultaneously, *vikalpa* is out of question.

Kaiyaṭa puts the whole position very briefly thus: समुच्चयस्त्वसंभवान्नोपन्यस्त:। न हि युगपद् द्वौ षष्ठ्यर्थौ संभवत: – स्थानेयोगोऽवयवयोगश्चेति। विकल्पोऽपि न भवति, एकत्वात् षष्ठ्यर्थस्य । तस्मात् तच्छेषतदपवादपक्षावेवात्राशङ्कितौ।

Readings : (i) अशक्यं of Sw will be equally well. But the MS has, after all अशक्ये and there is no reason to change it. (2) The corrupt MS reading °ऽच्च पोपदा चेत्पतिपद्यते requires emendation. Here AL read °वच्चालोऽन्त्यस्य चेत् प्रति° and Sw °वच्च यो यदा चेत् प्रति°. I agree with Sw in reading य for प in both places,

only I read या instead of यो because षष्ठी is the topic and *yā* naturally suits it well. (The stroke for *O* may be a scribal error). Both older editions agree in reading चेत् but on close scrutiny it becomes clear that there is no sign for *t* and that the MS really reads *ce prati*° (as noted by AL). Ignoring the sign for *e* (again a scribal error) I read just च. Lastly प्राप्नुवत् (neut. sing. Nom. or Acc.) cannot be fitted grammatically in the sentence where या is the subject, गुणं the object and प्रतिपद्यते the verb. I therefore change प्राप्नुवच्च into प्राप्नुवन्तं, an adj. to गुणं. The change may appear rather violent to some, but then the whole construction becomes at least tolerably clear. *Aṅgam* is the object of *pra-āp* so it should not be changed into *aṅge* (as Sw does). (3) तदे-तरया of the MS is quite satisfactory. Still I would like to suggest [तदा] तदि-तरया to match या यदा. (4) समुच्चयातकार्यरूपविकल्प: of the MS is a dispair. I first split विकल्प: from it and make it the initial word of the following sentence (as Sw does) which starts discussion on *vikalpa.* Since what remains marks the conclusion of Bhar's argument against *samuccaya,* I read न in the place of त. The other two changes, समुच्चयो and रूप: are required by grammar. I do not know the purpose of the word रूप. (5) The भोज्य of the MS can very well be looked upon as standing for भोज्या (the Visarga being dropped because of the following ए). It is not necessary to change it into भोज्यते. (6) The MS °ह्यांगस्य वा भव । न्यतमेन is corrupt. [अ]न्यतमेन seems to have crept in erroneously under the influence of अन्यतमेन which occurs in the corresponding passage above which contains the worldly parallel. It is rightly dropped (along with preceding भव) in his edition by Sw. (7) What looks like युज्य or युग्प in the MS is a crux. AL read the whole sentence as न पुनर्न प्रवर्तते । If we consider the whole tenor of the argument (which puts its finger on the absence of simultaneous alternative in our present case as against their presence in the worldly parallel cited), it will seem that a word like युगपत् is here necessary and I think Sw has hit upon it very happily. I would only read वर्तते instead of his प्रवर्तते. Orthographical considerations require it. I am unable to make anything out of पया(? यथा) देवद् which follows immediately in the MS. It seems to be rightly dropped by Sw.

(4) Discussion of conflict in the context of One-sentence and Many-sentence constructions :

Initiating the discussion on the *taccheṣa* and the *tad-apavāda* views, Pat. had said that a single-sentence construction leads to co-ordination (making one the principal and the other the subordinate) and many-sentence one to conflict and supersession (यद्येकं वाक्यं ... ततोऽयं तच्छेषः । अथ नानावाक्यं ... ततोऽयं तदपवादः). In the *Dīp.* commenting on this it was pointed out that the second part of this statement conflicts with a statement made elsewhere in the *Mbh,* viz. under P. 3. 4. 67 Vā 2, which says that an exception does not set

aside the general rule if the two form two independnt sentences, Bhar. now takes up this subject to thrash it completely.

As usual Bhar. takes an example from the ordinary life to start with. It is a sentence viz. **दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय** (probably an instruction given by the master to his servant) saying that curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas and buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya. Now Kauṇḍinya also is a Brāhmaṇa. What prevents then from giving curds to him as instructed in the first part of the sentence? His being Kauṇḍinya cannot rule out his being a Brāhmaṇa. He may get buttermilk because of his being Kauṇḍinya. But why should he not get curds since he is a Brāhmaṇa? Why should the second part of the instruction rule out the first one? That is the question.

Although Bhar. himself thinks that in the expression *dadhi brāhmaṇebhyo* etc. two sentences are involved, he first mentions the view of some others who regard (**प्रतिपन्नाः**) it as one sentence because a single finite verb is used. It is the unity of verb which matters. That gives the sentence its unity. inspite of the plurality of recipients and the things given. Bhar. gives another example, viz. **देवदत्तं मांसेन**[1] **भोजय, दध्ना भोजय, शाकेन भोजय.** Here also it is held by some that the whole is a single sentence. True the verb occurs more than once. But repetition is due to the different articles of food mentioned each time. Feeding as such is one. So this too is one sentence.

Having mentioned this view, Bhar. now states the other view, viz. that **दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो** etc. constitutes two sentences, which he ascribes to **इहभवन्तः** 'this venerable person'. We do not know whom he is referring to. (Incidentally, **इहभवन्तः** is an honorific expression like **अत्रभवत्, तत्रभवत्** etc. Its formation is explained by P. 5. 3. 11 : **इदमो हः** and 14 : **इतराभ्योऽपि दृश्यन्ते.** The expression **इहभवत्** is not so frequeent as **तत्रभवत्** etc. still for its use see e.g. *Mbh* : **इहभवन्तस्त्वाहुः — न भवितव्यमिति । किं कारणम्? समानार्थेन वाक्येन भवितव्यं प्रत्ययान्तेन च । यश्चेहार्थो वाक्येन गम्यते, इष्टः पुत्रः इष्यते पुत्रः इति, नासौ जातुचित् प्रत्ययान्तेन गम्यते** under P. 3. 1. 8, Kiel II. 19.15.) Here it is pleaded that the two different objects of giving (curds and buttermilk) differentiate two acts. So we must suppose that the verb 'give' is used twice. (Though not specifically uttered in the second part of the instruction, it is implicit there.). This brings us again

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[1] For मांसेन भोजय, cf.:

तृषा शुष्यत्यास्ये पिबति सलिलं स्वादु सुरभि
क्षुधार्तः सञ्शालीन् कवलयति मांसादिवलितान् ।
प्रदीप्ते रागाग्नौ सुदृढतरमाश्लिष्यति वधूं
प्रतीकारो व्याधेः सुखमिति विपर्यस्यति जनः ॥ **शतकत्रयादि-सुभाषितसंग्रह, २५३**

to the original question. If here are two different acts, why is there no combination (समुदाय = समुच्चय. Or the original reading may by समुच्चय itself) ? Why does not Kauṇḍinya get buttermilk plus curds in practice ?

In reply Bhar. simply says : अदृष्टत्वात् ' because it is not seen.' This is no reply. It symply says : well ! it is not simply done. Kauṇḍinya is not seen to get both. But why ? Avoiding a straight reply Bhar. goes on to say that even a common man, uninfluenced by the hair-splitting discussions of the Śāstras understands the same meaning from the instruction. To him also the sentence is ultimately equivalent to दधि अस्मै (= कौण्डिन्याय) न देयम् ।

True, we say. That is a fact. But nobody challenges it. It is no use merely repeating the fact. What we want to know is its logical explanation. That aught to be given (... अवश्यमुपपत्तिर्वक्तव्या). When thus pressed, Bhar. starts to give it with the words इयमुपपत्तिः । In the view of those (येषां तावत्) who regard दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो ... etc. as two sentences, the activity first mentioned is set aside by the activity mentioned afterwards. (' Old order changeth, yielding place to new ! ') In the present context the giving of curds (which had become due on account of Kauṇḍinya's Brahminhood) is subsequently set aside by giving of buttermilk (which is mentioned with the specific name of Kauṇḍinya). Although Kauṇḍinya is generally included in the class of people denoted by the word Brāhmaṇa, still that Brahminhood materialised in the particular form of Kauṇḍinya is not covered by that word as far as the giving of curds is concerned (ब्राह्मणश्रुतौ ... ... कौण्डिन्यो नोच्यते). The sentence फलमपि दातुः ... भवति is ambiguous. It seems to mean : The donor will get the religious merit (of giving curds) only if it is given to the Brāhmaṇas alone, not if given to Kauṇḍinya. Or it may mean : even if something is given to K°, the donor will get the merit, not of having given to K°, but of having given to a Brāhmaṇa. The first way is better. There is one more point of diffirence. Kauṇḍinya is not essential for the activity of giving curds to the Brāhmaṇas. It can take place even without him. But that is not the case with the activity of giving buttermilk. It cannot take place in his absence. (Note that विना is connected with कौण्डिन्येन, not with दधिदानम्.)

तस्मादत्र ... ... नापि विकल्पः । Bhar. here specifically explains at last why *samuccaya* is not possible (i. e. why K° does not get both) — and also why *vikalpa* also is not possible (i. e. why there is no option : either curds or buttermilk). The thing is : K°'s title to curds is not beyond doubt. It is donbtful (संदिग्ध) because he is not mentioned positively as a recipient of curds. He happens to be a Brāhmaṇa and so one merely presumes that he may have been intended to be one of the recipients of curds (तेन रूपेण = सामान्यरूपेण). But after all this is just an inference and so doubtful. On the other hand his mention as a recipient of buttermilk is a direct one and so beyond doubt

(असंदिग्ध). Further, Bhar. argues, it is axiomatic that inference and direct perception (प्रत्यक्ष) do not stand on the same level. Giving of buttermilk to K° is more authoritative than that of curds on all account. Lastly, it is again axiomatic that combination or option can take place only between things of equal status. Where the status is not equal, what is more authoritative (because based on direct perception) must supersede what is less authoritative (because based on mere inference). That is why ultimately in the present case the giving of buttermilk sets aside that of curds to K° in the present case. That is the *upapatti.*

Explanation No. 2 : अपरेषां दर्शनम्...etc. According to this view the speaker has not expressed all that he has to say. A part of it remains unexpressed which, therefore, has to be inferred (वाक्यशेषस्यात्रानुमानम्). Here it is presumed that the speakar wanted to say expressly : न कौण्डिन्याय after दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्. But actually he leaves it to be inferred. On what basis is one to draw such an inference ? His words तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय are supposed to furnish such a clue (लिङ्गम्) to his reluctance to give curds to K° although the latter is a Brāhmaṇa.

Explanation No. 3 : अपरे मन्यन्ते ... etc. In the two previous explanations, K° is supposed to be included, as a Brāhmaṇa, in the persons denoted by *brāhmaṇebhyo*. In this third explanation it is held that K° may be a Brāhmaṇa, still the expession *bhāhmaṇebhyo* as used by the speakar does not include him (अस्मिन् दर्शने ब्राह्मणरूपेणाप्रतिपादितो दधिदाने कौण्डिन्यः ।) The argument used here seems to be that a common noun like *brāhmaṇa* does not necessarily include all the individuals of that caste in its denotation. How many, and who, are to be included depends upon the intention of the speaker. Particular persons, say like *Kauṇḍinya* and *Māṭhara* may be included (*antarbhūta*) in some cases of the utterance of the word *brāhmaṇa*, but excluded (*uddhṛta, utkālita*) in others. But how is one to know, it may be asked, whom a speaker includes or excludes whek he uses a common noun ? It is believed that there is some clue in his words which hints at his intention. In the present case it is held that the words तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय furnish such a clue. It is not necessary to presuppose a वाक्यशेष as in the previous explanation (तत्रायं ब्राह्मणशब्दोऽन्तरेण वाक्यशेषानुमानमुत्कालितकौण्डिन्येषु ... ... तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेत्यस्मात् प्रतिपद्यते ।). उत्कालित lit. 'driven away', i. e. excluded cf. उत्कालितपुंस्का गावः in *Mbh.*

अयमन्यान् ... प्रतिपाद्य इति । A fact which helps the listener (*pratipattā*) to draw the correct inference (i.e. that the speaker has excluded K° from the Brāhmaṇas in the matter of giving curds) is that he himself resorts to the same or similar method when he wants to exclude somebody. Thus being a native speaker of the language, and also being intelligent, he makes no mistake as to the correct denotation of the general terms. अयं = श्रोता, प्रतिपत्ता.

येषां तत्त्वेकं वाक्यं ... etc. So far the discussion proceeded on the view that दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो etc. forms two sentences. But, as mentioned before, there is also the view that here a single sentence is involved. Here there is only one activity; it is the means which differ. One means, viz. buttermilk, is directly mentioned. Thus being stronger it sets aside the other means, viz. curds, which is only inferred and hence doubtful (संदिह्यमानम्).

(4b) Reconciliation of the two apparently contradictory statements in the Mbh regarding combination and supersession on the two-sentence view.

ल्युडादिषु च समा° ... etc. Bhar. says that the reason for the *Mbh* statement under P. 3. 4. 67 Vā 2 to the effect that the two-sentence construction leads to combination or co-existence (as against the statement here that it leads to supersession) is that there the two topics are different. When the two topics are different, then the two-sentence construction leads to combination or co-existence. (In our present case, however, there is a single topic. viz. the substitution of Guṇa and Vṛddhi — and the relationship between P. 1.1.3 and P. 1. 1. 52 in this matter—and so combination is not available.). यथा प्रकरणभेदादपत्ये ... etc. This passage contains some other examples of this combination due to *prakaraṇabheda*. (1) The *adhikāra* sūtra P. 4. 1. 83 : प्राग्दीव्यतोऽण् has its jurisdiction up to P. 4. 4. 2 तेन दीव्यति- etc. In this *adhikāra* there are many topics like तस्यापत्यम् (P. 4. 1. 92), तेन रक्तं रागात् (4. 2. 1), शेषे (P. 4. 2. 92) etc. The general suffix in the sense of तस्यापत्यम् is *aṇ* as laid down in the *adhikāra* rule P. 4.1.83. Now a special rule in the *apatya* section is P. 4.1.105 : गर्गादिभ्यो यञ्. This *yañ* supersedes *aṇ* as far as the *apatya* meaning is concerned but not in other meanings like 4.2.1. etc. where the topic (i. e. meaning) changes. (2) The sentence एवमेव च क्तो ... विहितलक्षणस्य is not quite clear. It seems to means : The normal suffix to indicate present is *laṭ* (P. 3. 2. 123 : वर्तमाने लट्). The suffix *kta* (past passive participle) has normally the meaning of past (P. 3. 2. 102 : *niṣṭhā*). The rules P. 3.2. 187–188, ञीतः क्तः and मतिबुद्धिपूजार्थेभ्यश्च however lay down that in the case of roots mentioned in these two rules, the suffix *kta* denotes a present action. The *kta* thus coming in here must be supposed to supersede *laṭ* which is the normal suffix for present — Thus राज्ञां मतः ' one who is respected by kings '. This *kta*, Bhar. adds, superseds *laṭ* only in this context. It cannot replace *laṭ* which is taught as indicating past (e.g. P. 3. 2. 118 : लट् स्मे, acc. to which *laṭ* in combination with *sma* denotes past).

Observation : I have given only a literal explanation of the text. All implications of it are not clear. According to Bhar. it would seem that a construction like राज्ञां मतः supersedes राजभिर्मन्यते altogether, but one wonders if this would agree with the facts of the language. (The *Padamañjarī* remarks (on P. 3. 2. 187) : तत्र येन नाप्राप्तिन्यायेन क्तस्यैव वर्तमानविषयतया भूतविषयता बाध्यते... एवमुत्तरविहितस्यापि । ज्ञातमित्येतत्तु भूतेऽपि भवति, 'तेन' इत्यधिकारे 'उपज्ञाते' इति

इति तद्धितविधानात्। वर्तमाने हि 'क्तस्य च वर्तमाने' इति षष्ठ्या भाव्यम्। एवं च 'पूजितो यः सुरैरपि' इत्यादीनां साधुत्वं चिन्त्यम्। Thus according to Haradatta the present meaning of *kta* supersedes its past meaning (not that *kta* supersedes *laṭ*).— Also the *samāveśa* and the *bādhā* are not clear.

(3) The sentence तथाधिकरणिका° ...... छवेयामति is quite corrupt and is therefore obscure.

एवं भिन्नप्रकरणत्वात् कर्तरि कृद् ... ... समावेशनं प्रतिपन्नः। This sums up the argument based on *prakaraṇabheda*. In one context the suffix *khyun*, as a *kṛt* suffix, has agentive meaning; in another, as *khyun*, instrumental meaning. (The subject of प्रतिपन्नः is the Vārttikakāra primarily, then the Bhāṣyakāra also.)

Refutation of the samāveśa view :

तत्र परिहार उच्यते। Bhar. has so far presented the *samāveśa* view. Now he refutes it. (It may be noted that subsequently both Kātyāyana and Patañjali in their discussion on P. 3. 4. 67 have refuted the *samāveśa* view for different reasons.) The meaning 'agent' is based on the general capacity of the primary suffix (*kṛt*); 'instrument' is based on its special form, viz. *khyun*. And the meaning laid down specifically sets aside the general meaning (विशेषश्रुतिरर्थः सामान्यश्रुतिमर्थं बाधते). The example of this suffix *iñ* superseding *aṇ* has occurred already.

एवं लडित्येतस्मिन् शब्दे ... etc. Here some more examples of the supersession of the general by the special are given. (1) *Laṭ* denotes present time in general. But in combination with *sma* it has past as its special sense. The special sense (past) supersedes the present. (2) *kta* usually denotes past. But coming after roots which are furnished with the code-letter *ñi* or those having the meaning of 'to respect' etc., this *kta* is prescribed in the present sense. Since this latter meaning is based on connection with special roots, it must supersede the general meaning. (3) *yaṅ* is ordinarily taught in the sense of intensive action (P. 3. 1. 22: धातोरेकाचो हलादेः क्रियासमभिहारे यङ्।) P. 3. 1. 24 : लुपसदचरजपजभदहदशगॄभ्यो भावगर्हायाम् however teaches the affixion of *yaṅ* after roots *lup*, *sad* etc. when badness of activity denoted by the verb is intended to be conveyed. Thus लोलुप्यते 'cuts off badly', सासद्यते 'sits badly' etc. Here the special meaning, badness of activity, sets aside the general meaning, viz. intensiveness of action taught in the introductory rule (अधिकारसमभिहारता). The result is that *yaṅ* comes in after roots *lup* etc. even in the absence of intensiveness of activity, provided its badness is there. (4) P. 4. 1. 120 : स्त्रीभ्यो ढक् teaches the suffix *ḍhak* after feminine nouns (formed with a feminine suffix) in the sense of तस्यापत्यम् 'his / her child' in a general

way, e. g. *sauparṇeyaḥ* 'son of Suparṇā'. The *Ślokavārttika* on this rule adds that the suffix *ḍhak* coming after *vaḍavā* 'mare' by this rule denotes *vṛṣa* 'stallion, stud-horse'. Here also the general meaning तस्यापत्यम् is set aside (to denote which *aṇ* will have to be used). Read : 'वडवाया वृषे वाच्ये। ... ... वडवाया वृषो वाडवेयः' (महाभाष्य). 'वाडवेयो वृषः स्मृतः। अपत्ये प्राप्तस्ततोऽपकृष्य विधीयते तेनापत्ये वाडव इति भवति (*Kāś.*)।

ये त्वेकवाक्यवादिनस् ... कर्तरि भवतीति । Now the other i.e. एकवाक्य view. Having shown how on the *nānāvākya* view the instrumental meaning supersedes agentive meaning in the case of the suffix *khyun*, Bhar. now proceeds to show how the same effect takes place on the *ekavākya* view. Combining the two rules कर्तरि कृत् and आढ्यसुभग ... करणे ख्युन् (only this latter part is referred to here as representing the sūtra) into one sentence (marked by a single main verb) we now get the rule : ख्युनोऽन्यः कर्तरि 'a *kṛt* suffix other than *khyun* [which denotes instrument] denotes agent'. (Correspondingly the popular sentence would be : कौण्डिन्यादितरेभ्यो ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम् ।) That is how the special meaning sets aside the general meaning. इह कथं 'सुपो लुक् ... सुपो लुगिति । The rule P. 2. 4. 71 : सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः teaches the elision of case-endings in some contexts, e. g. of the inflected nouns when they enter into a compound (and thus form a new *prātipadika*). A section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* beginning with अलुगुत्तरपदे (6. 3. 1) lists cases where this elision does not take place. The elision is not optional but obligatory. How are the two rules to be combined into one ? The reply is : उत्तरपदादन्यत्र सुपो लुक्. Here this उत्तरपद of course means an उत्तरपद as taught in P. 6. 3. 1-24, not any *uttarapada* (nor any *pūrvapada*, but one mentioned in this specific section). अथ वा, नानाकालं वाक्य ... परिहार उक्तः । Here Bhar. anticipates an objection against the single sentence construction of rules like कर्तरि कृत् and करणे ख्युन् on the basis of their being uttered at different times. Since (says the objector) the two sentences belong to two different times, they are independent. Since they are independent, both will have their own effects. This means that there will be a co-existence of the meanings, agentive and instrumental. (The latter will not supersede the former.) The objector gives a parallel from the ordinary life. When there is an instruction at the morning meals that Kauṇḍinya be given curds, and another at the afternoon meals, that buttermilk be given to Kauṇḍinya, the buttermilk to be given at the afternoon meals does not set aside curds to be given at the morning meals.[1] The reason is that the two pertain to two different times. The same may happen here also. अर्थादेककालम् is the reply given by

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[1] Cf. Kaiyaṭa under P. 3. 4. 67 Vā 2 : इह ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम् तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेत्याभिन्नकालत्वादेकं वाक्यं विशिष्टस्य दानस्य प्रतिपादकमिति तक्रेण दधि बाध्यते । यदा तु कालभेदेन वाक्यद्वयमुच्चार्यते पूर्वाह्णे ब्राह्मणभोजनप्रकरणे दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतामिति, अपराह्णे तु तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय दीयतामिति, तदा तक्रेण दधि न बाध्यते । तथेहापि कालभेदेन वाक्यद्वयोच्चारणाद् बाध्यबाधकभावो नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

Bhar. himself. He says that the two rules may belong to the different times as far as their utterance is concerned. But the understanding of the meaning (अर्थप्रतिपत्ति) of the two is simultaneous. One cannot be understood without the other. From this point of view the two constitute a single sentence. And, finally, this results into the supersession of the general meaning by the special one. परिहार उक्तः may refer to एक एव प्रतिपत्तिकालः (*Dīp*. 7 above). Or this may refer to the initial statement : तत्र परिहार उच्यते, bringing the whole discussion now to an end.

सर्वत्र चाप्राप्त्यनुमानं ...... विशेषशब्दसांनिध्येऽनुमीयते । Here Bhar. makes an observation on the theoretical position when a general rule is ' superseded ' or ' set aside ' by a special rule. It is not to be supposed that the general rule is operative or seeks to operate even in the domain of the special rule and that it is set aside by the special rule. Such a sacrilege is unthinkable in the case of word which is sacred and all-powerful. What we have therefore to suppose is that the general rule is inactive (अप्राप्त्यनुमानं) in this case. This is what is called *bādhā*. This is true everywhere where word is the authority : in *śruti* and *smṛti*. And, after all, Vyākaraṇa is also a *smṛti* where the word is the authority (शब्दनिबन्धना).

What in cases like अभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुटः ? one may ask. The reply is that this prohibition does not overrule any positive text laying down eating of a domestic fowl. A person does not proceed to eat meat because of any injunction. He does it because he likes it (अर्थित्वप्रयुक्तं), which is here prohibited. Kaiyaṭa also makes a similar but brief remark here : अप्राप्त्यनुमानमेव हि बाधो, वचनेन प्राप्तस्य बाधायोगात् ।

Readings : (1) Sw's विरोधपरिहारः does not make any difference of meaning. (2) Sw retains the corrupt text of the MS viz. यथैव भुजि तेन्तकरण. (3) The MS इह भवतु तस्याहु: makes no sense. Sw has hit upon the original text correctly. Only, I would join the two words as इहभवन्त°. (4) क्रियान्तरं (with क्रियां) is nomiative meaning the second act. With क्रिया (ALSw), it will be accusative, denoting the first act. (5) Sw reads न तु कौण्डिन्यायेति । तक्रं (for यत्तु कौ°). But कौण्डिन्याय rather seems to be connected with what follows. Beside यत्तु is very clear in the MS. (6) The MS reading सक्षाकत्तु is obviously corrupt. AL सता कर्तुं (where सता goes with प्रत्यक्षतक्रदानेन) seeks to read here an instrumental absolute construction, which is unusual. Sw thinks that क्षा stands for क्षी (such phenomena are not unusual in this MS). Inserting a प before it, he gets सपक्षीकर्तुं. I, for one, think that समकक्षीकर्तुं was the original text. (7) MS वक्तु (AL °क्तुं) is changed into त्यक्त्वा by Sw. I think त्यक्तुं involves a minor change (was the original reading, by any chance, वर्क्तुं [√वृज ' avoid] ?). (8) The MS उत्स्कलताकोडिन्येषु is taken as उत्कलितकौण्डि° by AL, as उद्धृत° by Sw. I take it as उत्क्राडित° from the point of meaning and its use in the *Mbh*. (9) चेत्

in the MS (retained by both AL and Sw) keeps the construction hanging and does not bring out the intended meaning. I therefore read : प्रवृत्तश्चे[त्येत]द्वयं. Also अप्रवृत्तः in the MS is corrupt, contradicting the intended meaning. (10) For consistency I read प्रतिपादया[स्थे]वम् for the MS °दयत्येवम् (corrected into °दय (इ)त्येवम् by Sw.). (11) Sw drops the second तक्रम् (properly read in the MS), but it is necessary, being a quotation as indicated by the following *iti*. (12) What looks like यद्य is taken to be यत्र by Sw. Since a parallel case is here cited, यथा seems to be intended. (13) I take वत्वा of the MS as च क्तो (with AL; Sw कृत्वा). (14) MS भूतकालविहितलक्षणसस् is corrupt. Sw retains it leaving the meaning doubtful by a question mark. I read °लक्षणस्य (with AL), adding a न to make the meaning clear. (15) The corrupt MS पाछवेयामति is read as [अ] पि छेन स्यादिति by AL, as बाधा चेयमिति (again with a question mark) by Sw. I admit my inability to suggest any useful emendation. (16) The रूपात् of the MS (retained by AL and changed into ल्युन्त्त्वात् by Sw) is evidently to be read as ल्युन्रूपात्. Cf. ल्युन्रूपत्वम् which occurs in line 11. (17) समावेशत्वं of the MS is read as °वेशत्वं by AL as °वेशं न (against the meaning) by Sw. I read tentatively °वेशनम्. (18) I read (with AL) ल्युडित्येकस्मिन् शब्दे. Sw drops शब्दे (read by MS; it is meaningful) and does not add इति (though it is necessary). (19) MS कालान्तरं बाधते एव (after which a *daṇḍa* is given in the editions) is better read as °धते। एवं in view of the following sentences which begin with एवं. (20) MS तेपि (eds. तेनापि) is probably क्तेऽपि. See Notes. (21) The MS reading इनिष्टिति या भूता तां makes no sense. Sw merely changes तां into नां, making the word भूतानां, which still leaves the text obscure. AL read विशिष्टा या भूता तां which still yields no sense. I think the original text was probably इति निष्ठेति या भूतता तां. It appears that the letters ति (confused with नि) and त were dropped hapl. (22) MS वर्तमानकाले (retained by Sw doubtfully) evidently requires an emendation into °कालो. (23) AL अपि क्रियासमभिहारता स्यात् has no support, and also it is not acceptable from the point of view of meaning. Sw's reading अपि क्रारसमभिहारता(म)स्य suits the meaning very well. (24) MS ऊढेरपि is evidently to be read (with Sw) as रूढे°. (25) MS त्यकवादिनम् is to be read either as त्वेकत्ववादिन^{ाम्} (Sw) or, preferably, as त्वेकवाक्यता (AL). (26) I follow editions in reading दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो (against MS वृत्ति ब्रा°). It is however possible that the original sentence read as : यथैवेदमेकवाक्यवृत्ति [दधि] ब्राह्मणेभ्यस्तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय दीयतामिति एवमिदमप्येकवाक्य[वृत्ति] कर्तरि ... etc. (27) Sw emendation of अत्रापीदं into °प्येकं is neither supported by the MS nor is it necessary. (28) Sw unncessarily changes तु बाधा into च बा°.

[12]

The *tacchesa* view is examined here. The Vār. No. 1 here runs as : वृद्धिगुणावलोऽन्त्यस्येति चेन्मिदिमृजिपुगन्तलघूपधर्च्छिदृशिक्षिप्रक्षुद्रेष्विग्ग्रहणम्। The Bhāṣya repeats the Vār. and supplies कर्तव्यम् as a predicate. Kāt. says that if the

taccheṣa (= *vṛddhiguṇāv alontyasya*) view is to be accepted then an additional word *ikaḥ* will have to be read in some rules enjoining Guṇa and Vṛddhi, like *mider guṇaḥ* (P. 7. 3. 82) *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* (P. 7. 2. 114) etc. Otherwise the final sounds *d*, *j*. etc. will have to be replaced by Guṇa or Vṛddhi as the case may be. As this is not desired, a word *ikaḥ* will have to be expressly read in those rules to assure that Guṇa and Vṛddhi replace only *ik* sounds. In other words, the rules will have to be read as ***mider guṇaḥ*** *ikaḥ* etc. or in some such way.

Bhar's मिदादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति is only a laconic paraphrase of this Bhāṣya. He repeats the same thing with the addition of the word अनिगन्तत्वात् which gives the reason for the addition proposed by Kāt. This is explained in the passage तेषामुपसंहारात् ... इग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति ।

The passage is corrupt. इत्ययमेको (in the MS.) is evidently an erroneous anticipation (doubtless due to the second occurrence of मिदादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति later on) of that expression which properly occurs later. Sw is perfectly right in reading अंगमिग्ग्रहणं for the MS गमिग्र.° But this does not suffice. Some modification and additions are still necessary. Firstly, should उपसंहारात् be read as अनुपसंहारात्? उपसंहार is coming or bringing together. In the present case, (1) the property of being an *ik* and (2) the property of being a stem-final should reside in one and the same vowel entity if *ik* is to undergo Guṇa. But that is just *not* the case here. So अनुपसंहारात् was expected. Secondly, even अङ्गमिग्ग्रहणं is not sufficient. It does not make sense. If Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*[1] here is any clue the complete text should be अलोऽन्त्यस्येत्येतदङ्गमिग्ग्रहणं. Here the whole compound अलोऽन्त्यस्येत्येतदङ्गम् qualifies इग्ग्रहणं (hence the singular : संनिपतति). Also, here अङ्गम् does not mean 'a stem', but 'subordinate' (i.e. a synonym of *śeṣa*). So the whole expression means : the word *ik* (i.e. *ikaḥ*) subordinate to (or, to which is subordinate[2]) *alo'ntyasya*. In plain language this just means that the *ik* is not the stem-final. Since no Guṇa can take place, Kāt. points out that *ikaḥ* will have to be expressly mentioned in these rules if *ik* is to undergo Guṇa.

सर्वादेशश्चानिगन्तस्य. This is the second *Vār* on this topic. It is interpreted in two ways in the *Mbh.* In its first interpretation, the *Vār* is taken as pointing out another defect in the *taccheṣa* view : In the case of forms like *yātā*, *vātā* (3 sing. first Fut. from *yā*, *vā* respectively) the whole stem will have to be replaced by the Guṇa substitute, that will be the false result

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1 मिदादीनामनिगन्तत्वादलोऽन्त्यस्येत्येतदङ्गमिग्ग्रहणं न संनिपततीति तेषु प्रदेशेष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् ।

2 Read *Chāyā* on this : प्राग्वत् समासद्वयम् । Here प्राग्वत् refers to the twofold dissolution of the compound तच्छेष as तस्य शेषः and as स शेषोऽस्य ।

(*prasaṅgaḥ*) which would follow. Read the *Mbh* : सर्वादेशश्च गुणोऽनिगन्तस्य प्राप्नोति । याता वाता । किं कारणम् ? 'अलोन्त्यस्य' इति षष्ठी चैव ह्यन्त्यमिकमुपसंक्रान्ता, अङ्गस्येति च स्थानषष्ठी । तद्यदिदानीमनिगन्तमङ्गं तस्य गुणः सर्वादेशः प्राप्नोति ।

Bhar. introduces this 'additional' defect in the passage मिदाष्वि° ... ... सर्वादेशो गुणः प्राप्नोति । The argument is clarified in the following एवं मन्यते ... गुणेन सर्वादेशेन. The passage thus is a paraphrase of the *Mbh.* quoted above. The points made here are: (1) अङ्गस्य (P. 6. 4. 1) is a स्थानषष्ठी. (2) This Sūtra makes all stems (*aṅga*) recipient of the Guṇa operation (when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows), no matter whether the stem ends in *ik* or not. (3) If the stem ends in *ik*, then there is an उपसंहार, i.e. *ik*-ness and stem-finalness come together (and both the Paribhāṣās are satisfied). Finally (4) When the stem-final is not an *ik*, there is no उपसंहार. But the Guṇa-substitution has simply to be done. There is no escape from that. You cannot substitute the Guṇa in the place of the final (*d*, *j*, etc.) because it is no *ik*. Result? Substitute the Guṇa in the place of the whole stem.

निमित्तभाव- 'The presence of the cause'. This cause of उपसंहार is two-fold: (1) Presence of a स्थानषष्ठी, and (2) of a final *ik*. निर्ज्ञातायाम् = निर्णीतायाम्. अनुपसंहृता षष्ठी, Genitive (i.e. a Genitive denoting a substituend) has not been connected or brought in relation with *ikaḥ*. भेदेन, by repetition, the same as *upaplava* ('प्रतिलक्ष्यं लक्षणभेदादित्यर्थः' छाया). सर्वेषु अङ्गेषु = इगन्तेषु अनिगन्तेषु च. The latter may have a non-final *ik*, or no *ik* at all. इग्वत्सु = मिदादिषु. अनिगन्तेषु = यातादिषु. The expression is not happy because it can include cases like *mid* which are already covered by इग्वत्सु. (यातादिषु पुनरस्ति) षष्ठी = स्थानषष्ठी (invested by अङ्गस्य, as alleged here).

Cf. कैयट : अङ्गस्येत्येतद्भेदेन सर्वाङ्गेषु व्याप्रियते । तत्रेगन्तेष्वेवालोन्त्यस्येति विधिरन्यत्र तु षष्ठ्या अन्तेऽल्यनुपसंहाराद् याता वातेति सर्वादेशो गुणः प्राप्नोति'। On this Nāg : अङ्गस्येति च स्थानषष्ठीति । अङ्गस्य स्थाने भवति । स च यत्रान्त्य इक् तत्रान्त्यस्येक इत्यर्थ इत्यभिमानः । तदाह — भेदेनेति । शास्त्रस्य बहुविषयत्वायेत्यर्थः ।

Observation: Actually the objection is equally applicable in the case of *mid* etc. also. But Pat. is here silent about it, because this point is being taken up in the course of the second explanation of the Vār.

From इतरोऽङ्गस्य etc. begins the refutation. The point made here is that the rule in one stroke lays down the Guṇa substitution for the *iganta* stem — i.e. for the final of the stem when it is *ik*. There is no injunction requiring this operation when the stem does not end in *ik*. A stem not ending in *ik* is not mentioned anywhere in Genitive (which indicates a substituend). The possibility of the Guṇa-substitute in itself is not there, much less of its substituting the whole stem. Why then this hue and cry?

इतरः, the refuter. अलोन्त्यषष्ठी= A Genitive i.e. a word read in the Genitive whose final phoneme undergoes the operation which is taught for that word acc. to P. 1. 1. 52. The Genitive (denoting a substituend), whose final is to undergo the substitution, has only one form i.e. is mentioned only once here, viz. *aṅgasya* and that too when an *ik* is the final sound (सा चान्त्ये इकि). As a result the Genitive *aṅgasya* presents itself (अवस्थिता = उपस्थिता) as a substituend only when the final sound is *ik* (अन्त्ये इक्येव). भवता, the objector. भिन्नानि (अङ्गानि) = इगन्तानि तदितराणि च. The subject of *saṁskaroti* is the rule *aṅgasya*. संस्करोति, invests (with the character of a substituend). It has here the same sense as षष्ठीं प्रतिपादयति above in the objection and which is referred to here.

The full text of the *Mbh.* runs thus : नैष दोषः । यथैव ह्यलोऽन्त्यस्येति षष्ठी अन्त्यमिकमुपसंक्रान्ता, एवमङ्गस्येत्यपि स्थानषष्ठी । तद्यदिदानीमनिगन्तमङ्गं तत्र षष्ठ्येव नास्ति, कुतो गुणः कुतः सर्वादेशः ? On this Kaiy.: अङ्गस्येति षष्ठ्युच्चारितैवान्त्यमलं नीतेति नास्या अपरं रूपमस्तीति नास्ति सर्वादेशगुणप्रसङ्गः । Nāg. draws the conclusion thus : एवं च संग्राहकवाक्यस्येगन्तमात्रविषयकत्वादनिगन्तविषयकलक्षणाभाव एव । It will be seen that Nāg. interprets षष्ठ्येव नास्ति of the *Mbh.* as the absence of an injunctive rule which would lay down Guṇa for a stem not ending in *ik* by mentioning it with a substituend-Genitive ('तद्विषयकतादृशषष्ठीघटितलक्षणम्' छाया).

Interpretation II

Since the सर्वादेश mentioned in the Vār. is not possible in the case of forms like याता, वाता etc. Pat. interprets the Vār. in a different way. The सर्वादेश refers to the forms of *mid, mṛj* etc. themselves, mentioned in the previous Vār. Not only Guṇa is not available for *i* (as said there), but there is the further possibility of the Guṇa claiming the whole stem *mid* etc. for replacement. It was a different thing in the case of याता etc. where it was shown that there is no स्थानषष्ठी in the case of stems like या, वा. But in the case of *mid* etc. there *is* a specific स्थानषष्ठी, viz. मिदेर्गुणः, मृजेर्वृद्धिः etc. Since the replacement of the final is prohibited in the *tacchesa* view, because it is not *ik*, and of *i* because it is not final, the substitution will claim the whole stem.

And so *ikaḥ* should be added in all such rules (as urged in the previous *Vār*). And so, the present Vār. only gives a reason ([1]ह्यर्थे चायं चः पठितः), why the *ikaḥ* must be added in the rules.

The *Mbh.* concerned runs thus : एवं तर्हि नायं दोषसमुच्चयः । किं तर्हि ? पूर्वापेक्षोऽयं दोषः । ह्यर्थे चायं चः पठितः । मिदिमृजि ... क्षुद्रेष्विग्ग्रहणं सर्वादेशप्रसङ्गो ह्यनिगन्तस्येति । मिदेर्गुणः । 'इक' इति वचनादन्त्यस्य न । 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इति वचनादिको न । उच्यते च गुणः । स सर्वादेशः प्राप्नोति । एवं सर्वत्र ।

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1 हिश्च हेत्वर्थः । (Nāg.)

Bhar. explains the argument in the passage beginning with ह्यर्थे चायं चः पठितः. अन्त्यस्य = जकारस्य. उपसंहारनिमित्तस्य, viz. of a final *ik*. वचनात्, because of the injunction. षष्ठी अङ्गस्येति वातादिषु ... The general rule *aṅgasya* is insufficient to make *yā*, *vā*- etc. a substituend for Guṇa because there is no final *ik*. *mideḥ*, *mṛjaḥ* etc. are specific substituend-Genitives. This Genitive will remain unsatisfied or unfulfilled (अनुपसंगृहीता) if there is to be no Guṇa at all because of the technical difficulties pointed out.

The *Pradīpa* । मिदादिष्विग्ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमित्यत्रैवार्थे हेतुत्वेनेदमुपात्तमित्यर्थः । उच्यते चेति । मिदेरिति चोदनया ।

Readings :— (1) For the dropping of the erroneous anticipation of इत्यमेको and the re-construction of [अं]गमिग्ग्रहणं from the MS गमिग्र° following Sw, see Notes above. I have also given the reason for inserting अलोऽन्त्यस्येत्येतद् before this. (2) I accept प्रतिपादयति of Sw, but with षष्ठीं as required by grammar, though neither read by MS, nor reconstruted by edition. (3) Sw's च नास्ति gives exactly the opposite meaning. The claim is that the स्थानषष्ठी *is* there. (4) येयं षष्ठी is syntactically connected with अङ्गस्येति. So I do not read a *daṇḍa* after येयं षष्ठी as in MS Sw. उपसंहारे सति of the MS and the editions goes against the intended meaning. When the stem-final is not *ik*, उपसंहार does not take place. So I resort to *akārapraśleṣa*.

Notes: Having shown that the *taccheṣa* view requires an additional expression *ikaḥ* in rules like *mider guṇaḥ* so as to arrive at the correct forms, Kāt-Pat. now take up the *tadapavāda* view for consideration (अस्तु तर्हि तदपवादः *Mbh.*). According to this view, the *ik* is to undergo Guṇa irrespective of its position, final or non-final (सर्वस्येकः, अन्त्यानन्त्यविषयस्य). Thus *iko guṇavṛddhī* overrides *alo'ntyasya*.

Here one simply gives no scope to *alo'ntyasya* to operate. The mechanism by which this is made possible is to refuse to look upon *aṅgasya* as a स्थानषष्ठी. One rather looks upon it as an अवयवषष्ठी connected with *ikaḥ* meaning 'Guṇa comes in the place of *ik*[1] which is a part of the stem (*aṅgasya*)'. Since we have now assigned a definite relation -- part-whole relation making *ikaḥ* the qualified and *aṅgasya* the qualifier -- to the Genitive *aṅgasya*, it is no longer अनिर्धारितसंबन्धविशेषा (as the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī* says) and consequently no longer a स्थानषष्ठी. Bhar. states this position in अङ्गस्य विशेषणत्वात् ... ... सर्वावस्थस्य गुणवृद्धी प्राप्नुतः । Kaiy. puts it thus : ... यद्यङ्गस्येतीगपेक्षयावयवषष्ठी तदाऽलोऽन्त्यस्येत्यस्य निमित्ताभावादनुपस्थानम्, स्थानषष्ठी हि तस्योपस्थाने निमित्तम् । ततश्चाङ्गावयवस्यान्त्यस्यानन्त्यस्य चेको गुणः... ।

1 Thus, on this view, it is *ikaḥ* which represents the स्थानषष्ठी.

Now this result is welcome as far as cases like *mid* are concerned. We get in this way the desired Guṇa. But it is unwelcome in many other cases where Guṇa is not desired but where it forces itself because of the free admission given to it when the bar *alo'ntyasya* is removed. In the Imperf. 3. plu. Parasmai of *nij, viṣ* for example, the usual forms are *anenijuḥ, paryayeviṣuḥ*, i.e. without the Guṇa substitute for the penultimate *i*. But now if we accept *tadapavāda* view this *i* will have to be replaced by Guṇa. But that will result in false forms like **anenejuḥ, *paryaveveṣuḥ* which are not desired. Consequently, if at all the *tadapavāda* view is to be accepted, an additional rule prohibiting Guṇa substitution in cases like *jus* (the ending of Imperf. 3. plu. Parasmai) will have to be read (……सर्वत्रस्थस्य इको गुणवृद्धी प्राप्नुत इत्यनन्त्यस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः ।)

Kātyāyana gives the list of such cases where the Guṇa substitute for a non-final *ik* will have to be prohibited in the *Vār* : इङ्मात्रस्येति चेज्जुसिसार्वधातुकार्धधातुकह्रस्वाद्योर्गुणेष्वनन्त्यप्रतिषेधः । Bhar. quotes this Vār. only in the *pratīka* form : इङ्मात्रस्येति चेत्.

The cases listed by Kātyāyana are :

(1) जुसि-= जुसि च (P. 7. 3. 83). Guṇa desired in अजुहवुः, अबिभयुः etc. Not desired in अनेनिजुः, पर्यवेविषुः etc.

(2) सार्वधातुकार्धधातुक-=सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः (P. 7. 3. 84). Guṇa desired in कर्ता, हर्ता etc. Not desired in ईहिता, ईहितुम् etc.

(3) ह्रस्वादि-=

(i) ह्रस्वस्य गुणः (P. 7. 3. 108). Desired in the vocatives हे अग्ने, हे वायो. Not desired in हे अग्निचित्, हे सोमसुत्.

(ii) जसि च (P. 7. 3. 109). Desired in the Nom. pl. अग्नयः, वायवः. Not desired in अग्निचितः, सोमसुतः.

(iii) ऋतो ङिसर्वनामस्थानयोः (P. 7. 3. 110). Desired in Loc. sing. and the *sarvanāmasthāna* forms कर्तरि कर्तारौ etc. Not desired in सुकृति, सुकृतौ etc.

(iv) घेर्ङिति (P. 7. 3. 111). Desired in Dat. sing. अग्नये, वायवे etc. Not desired in अग्निचिते, सोमसुते etc.

(4) ओर्गुणः (P. 6. 4. 146). Desired in the Taddhita forms बाभ्रव्य, माण्डव्य etc. Not desired in सौश्रुत (a descendant of सुश्रुत्) etc.

The above examples of Guṇa substitute for non-final *ik* resulting in cases like अनेनिजुः, अग्निचित् etc. are taken from the *Mbh*. Bhar. has no objection to *Mbh*. examples for जुसि and सार्वधातुकार्धधातुक. He however thinks that the

examples given for the four ह्रस्वादि cases and for ओर्गुणः need an examination. It is possible that there could at be least a *prima faci* objection against them. (Whether it will finally stand is a different thing.) He quotes just one example (viz. हे अग्निचित्) from them and remarks that these are not proper examples (नैतान्युदाहरणानि संभवन्ति।). The clarification of this objection and examples which should be properly given according to the objector are contained in the passage : कथम्? एताभिर्ह्रस्वादि ... ... उपादेयानि, नाग्निचिदादीनि.

The line of argument is like this : In all these sūtras (P. 7. 3. 108–111 and 6. 4. 146) *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1) is valid by *anuvṛtti*. So the full form of 7. 3. 108, for example, will be ह्रस्वस्य अङ्गस्य गुणः. Here ह्रस्वस्य is naturally to be taken as qualifying अङ्गस्य. Further, by P. 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य[1] the qualification ह्रस्वस्य will mean ह्रस्वान्तस्य. Thus the sūtra 7. 3. 108 will mean : *ik* of a stem ending in a short vowel is replaced by Guṇa when an ending of the Vocative singular follows. A proper (*nyāyyam*) example of a false form resulting owing to the acceptance of the *tadapavāda* view is therefore *buddhe*, according to the objector. For here the stem ends in a short vowel and since there is no bar of *alo'ntyasya*, the *u*, although not final, should undergo Guṇa. Since the *Mbh* examples *agnicit* etc. do not end in a short vowel etc. they are not proper examples, and they should be replaced by *buddhe*, *śuddhaye* etc., claims the objector.

In the examples proposed by the objector,

हे बुद्धे is the example for ह्रस्वस्य गुणः (P. 7. 3. 108),
बुधाः " " " " जसि च (P. 7. 3. 109),
दुहितरि " " " " ऋतो ङि सर्वनामस्थानयोः (P. 7. 3. 110),
शुचये " " " " घेर्ङिति (P. 7. 3. 111), and
शु(?पि)चव्य " " " " ओर्गुणः (P. 6. 4. 146).

नैष दोषः। अङ्गस्येति ... ... एतान्येव संभवन्ति refutes the arguments of the objector and establishes अग्निचित् etc. as the proper examples. This is done by showing that *hrasvasya* etc. can only be connected with *ikaḥ* ('in the place of a short *ik*'); it cannot be made to qualify, through *tadantavidhi*, the word *aṅgasya*. The main reason for this is that *aṅgasya* is not a स्थानषष्ठी, on the *tadapavāda* view; and, as such, an *aṅga* is not the recipient (न कार्ययोगिनी) of the operation of Guṇa. It is therefore *ik* that is qualified by *hrasva*, it being recipient of Guṇa. तत्र=अङ्गे. Bhar. here also points out that ह्रस्वस्य इकः are co-ordinate Genitives. So you cannot say 'the *ik* of the short [vowel] (as one would say : 'the *ik* of the stem'), which is impossible (स च ह्रस्वस्यार्थतो न संभवति) but 'the *ik* [of the *aṅga*], (when) short'. स=इक्. अर्थतः=स्वभावात्.

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1 = विशेषणं तदन्तस्य संज्ञा स्यात्, स्वस्य च रूपस्य (SK).

The net result is that the rule ह्रस्वस्य गुणः [अङ्गस्य] is not to be interpreted as ह्रस्वस्य (= ह्रस्वान्तस्य) अङ्गस्य इकः गुणः but as अङ्गस्य ह्रस्वस्य इकः (=अङ्गस्य यः इक् ह्रस्वस्तस्य) गुणः.

Bhar. then looks at the principal-subordinate relation here in a different way and again arrives at the same result. Since Guṇa is here something predicated (*vidhīyamāna*) it has to be looked upon as principal. The *ik* and *aṅga,* on the other hand, are meant for it (*tādarthyāt*) and so must be regarded as subordinate (*guṇau*) to it. Since *hrsvasya* etc. cannot be connected with Guṇa (as the two are not co-ordinated), it has to be connected with either of the two subordinate elements, *aṅgasya* and *ikaḥ.* There *ikaḥ* is nearer (आसन्नम्) to it than *aṅgasya* which is distant (विप्रकृष्टस्य). It is therefore reasonable to connect *ikaḥ* with *hrsvasya* than with *aṅgasya.* So here also the same construction results viz. अङ्गस्य य इक् ह्रस्वः तस्य गुणः, thus justifying examples like *agnicit.* अङ्गे =गौणे, अप्रधाने. आसन्नमङ्गम् = इग्रूपम्. गुणस्य =गौणस्य, अप्रधानस्य (viz. '*aṅgasya*'). आसन्न which literally means 'near' has to be understood in the sense of 'directly connected' and विप्रकृष्ट which means 'distant' has to be understood in the sense of 'indirectly or distantly connected'. An *ik* can be *hrasva* in its own right while an *aṅga* can be so only through a part of it.

observation : Apart from being used in their respective technical senses, viz. *aeṅ* (P. 1. 1. 2) and *yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi pratyaye* (P. 1. 4. 13), the terms *guṇa* and *aṅga* are both used in this passage in the sense of 'subordinate, subservient' also. This is somewhat confusing, at least at the first sight.

अतोऽपि न्यायादेतान्येव संभवन्ति – This is meant to refute a possible suggestion, viz. that even on the interpretation now authoritatively given (viz. अङ्गस्य य इक् ह्रस्वः तस्य गुणः as against ह्रस्वस्य [= ह्रस्वान्तस्य] अङ्गस्य गुणः), हे बुद्धे etc. can be as good examples of false forms resulting from the *tadapavāda* view as हे अग्निचित् etc. They also possess an *ik* which is short (*hrasva*), belongs to the stem, and so demands the Guṇa substitute laid down by the rule : अङ्गस्य य इक् ह्रस्वः तस्य गुणः. Why not then accept हे बुद्धे etc. also as equally good examples, even if not the only correct ones, supporting the objector's view? — अतोपिन्यायात् contains the reply. उदाहरणमात्रं ... अन्त्यस्याचो वृद्धिः प्राप्नोति । The cases cited in the Vār are only illustrative (उदाहरणमात्रं), not exhaustive. There are other cases, not mentioned there, where also a similar prohibition will have to be taught. P. 7. 2. 115 : *aco ñṇiti* is a case in point, where Vṛddhi is taught as a substitute for an *ac* 'vowel' before a suffix having *ñ* or *ṇ* as a code-letter. Here also it will have to be understood that an *ac* is replaced by *Vṛddhi*, no matter what place that *ac* occupies (यत्रतत्रस्थस्य[1]) in the stem. But

[1] Incidentally, the expression यत्रतत्रस्थ occurs in the *Mbh.* on P. 7. 1. 1. and 7. 4. 55.

this is certainly not desired. It will creat a difficulty in forms like *daridrāyaka*[1] (*daridrā* + *yuk* + *vuñ* >*aka*). On the *tadapavāda* view, here Vṛddhi threatens to replace *i* which is not desired. The *Vār* applies to such cases also.

ननु च ओर्गुणा ... तद्धितकाम्योरिग्लक्षणादिति। A different point is raised here. Like any other Paribhāṣā, *iko guṇavṛddhī* also should intervene only where it is necessary (a Paribhāṣā is अनियमे नियमकारिणी), i. e. without whose application, things would remain undecided. Now in some rules mentioned in the Vār. there is no such uncertainty. The rule *or guṇaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 146) e.g. clearly mentions *u* as a substituend. As a result there is no occasion for the operation (अव्यापारः) of the Paribhāṣā rule P. 1. 1. 3. The implication of this statement is that since P. 1. 1. 3 will not apply here, there is no danger of the Guṇa operation falsely taking place with reference to a non-final *ik*. Since there is no such danger, the suggestion about *anantya-pratiṣedha* with reference to rules like P. 6. 4. 146 contained in the Vār. is unnecessary. The text सत्यम् ; एवमेतत् ... अनन्त्यस्य प्रसङ्गोऽस्ति replies this objection.

It is admitted that the objection is well taken. There is indeed no possibility of *ik* finding a place in the interpretation of rules like *or guṇaḥ* or *hrasvasya guṇaḥ* (P. 7. 3. 108). But even if the undesired possibility of a Guṇa replacing a non-final *ik* is not there, the same replacing a non-final *u* or a non-final short vowel is still there, which is equally undesired but which is ignored by the objector. The reason for the continued difficulty is that he takes *aṅgasya*, a general expression, as a qualification of *ikaḥ*, a particular expression. But by the same logic he will have to take *aṅgasya* as qualifying *hrasvasya* or *or* etc. This will mean that he cannot interpret *aṅgasya hrasvasya* or *or* as *hrasvāntasya* or *ukārāntasya aṅgasya* (making *hrasvasya* or *or* qualify *aṅgasya*) but he will have to understand the expression as meaning *aṅgasya yo hrasvaḥ* or *uḥ* (*yatratatrasthas*) *tasya*. Thus the threat of a *Guṇa* replacing nonfinal short vowel or *u* is still there. So the Vār is right in including these cases in the matter of *anantyapratiṣedhaḥ*, as long as one sticks to the *tadapavāda* view.

Notes : (1) A word like *kim tu* has to be understood after *vyavasthitā* and before *aṅgasya*. (2) *nāsti* of the MS (in ततश्चानन्त्यस्य प्रसङ्गो नास्ति) goes clearly against the whole argument. I have therefore emended it to *asti*. Cf. Kaiyaṭa for the argument 'ह्रस्वस्य गुण' इति समानन्यायत्वादेतदुक्तम्। अङ्गस्यावयवो यो ह्रस्वस्तस्य गुण इति। न त्वत्रेक्परिभाषोपतिष्ठते, निर्दिष्टस्थानिकत्वात्।

The *Dīp* एवं च सति ... ... इग्लक्षणत्वादिति refers to a *Mbh.* passage which can be understood only on the view that P. 1. 1. 3 does not apply in cases like

1 This expression occurs only once in the *Mbh* under P. 6. 4. 114 (III. p. 217).

hrasvasya guṇaḥ or *or guṇaḥ* or similar ones. Bhar is probably referring here to the Vār *taddhitakāmyor ikprakaraṇatvāt* under P. 1. 1. 5 and the *Mbh.* on it. A question is raised there as to what prevents P. 1. 1. 5 : *kṅiti ca* from prohibiting Vṛddhi in *laigavāyana* ' a descendant of *ligu* ' (*ligu* + *phak* = *āyana*, P. 4. 1. 99) and *kāmayate* ' desires ' (*kam*+*ṇiṅ*, P. 3. 1. 30). The reply given there is that P. 1. 1. 5 : *kṅiti ca* can prohibit a Guṇa or Vṛddhi only where *ik* is specifically mentioned as a substituend for the Guṇa or Vṛddhi. And it is not so in the present case. The substituend mentioned in the rule for Vṛddhi in *laigavāyana* is ' the first among vowels of the stem ' (*taddhiteṣv acām ādeḥ*, P. 7. 2. 117) and for that in *kāmayati* is ' a penultimate short *a* ' (*ata upadhāyāḥ*, P. 7. 2. 116). As in neither of the cases *ik* is specifically mentioned as undergoing Vṛddhi, P. 1. 1. 5 cannot proceed to bar the Vṛddhi operation. (Here it is taken for granted that since Pāṇini has placed the rules 1. 1. 5 : *kṅiti ca* in the context of 1. 1. 3 : *iko guṇavṛddhī*, he does not want P. 1. 1. 5 to operate where *ik* is not specifically mentioned as a substituend). — This incidentally indicates, remarks Bhar., that P. 1.1.3 is not operative in cases like *hrasvasya guṇaḥ* or *or guṇaḥ*.

अपरे वर्णयन्ति ... ... प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। Here Bhar. gives a view of others who admitted the operation of P. 1. 1. 3 even in cases like *or guṇaḥ*. The Sūtra then would read as *aṅgasya ikaḥ or guṇaḥ* ... etc. Here *ikaḥ or* would ultimately result into *or* itself (there will not be a Guṇa for an *ik* which is not *u*, say *i*). So any one will naturally ask : Why this superfluous admission of *ik* (किमर्थं पुनरिदमुपादानम्) ? The reply given by Bhar. is : **सर्वावस्थस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्**, i. e. with the purpose that *u* should be understood as the substituend no matter what position it occupies (सर्वावस्थस्य = अन्त्यस्य अनन्त्यस्य वा। प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् = गुणस्थानिकत्वेन प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्). How does this become possible ? The *modus operandi* is not given by Bhar. but we can know it from Kaiyaṭa. When *ikaḥ* is not there, *aṅgasya* becomes स्थानषष्ठी. As it is thus principal, *or* becomes subordinate and qualifies it. This relation of the qualifier and the qualified leads to तदन्तविधि (P. 1. 1. 72). So the rule becomes उकारान्तस्य अङ्गस्य गुणः. With the operation of *alo'ntyasya*, the rule finally means that the final (i.e. *u*) of a stem ending in *u* undergoes Guṇa. So here *u* can undergo Guṇa only if it is final. If, on the other hand, P. 1. 1. 3 is allowed to operate here (as is held by these *apare*), then *ikaḥ* becomes स्थानषष्ठी while *aṅgasya* becomes subordinate and is reduced to a mere अवयवषष्ठी. The rule then becomes : अङ्गस्य इकः ओर्गुणः meaning that an *ik* in the form of *u* belonging to a stem undergoes Guṇa. On this alternative an *u* undergoes Guṇa whatever position it may occupy, final or non-final. So Bhar. says : *sarvāvasthasya* (scil *or*) *pratipattyartham*.

Read : अन्ये त्वाहुः ... ... ओर्गुण इत्यत्राप्यस्या उपस्थानमनन्त्यस्याप्युकारस्य गुणार्थम्। असति ह्यस्या उपस्थानेऽङ्गस्येति स्थानषष्ठी स्यादङ्गं चोकारेण विशेष्येत इत्युकारान्तस्यैवाङ्गस्य गुणः स्यात् (Kaiyaṭa) ।

But then what about the *Mbh.* statement referred to above : *taddhitakāmyor iglakṣaṇāt*? Bhar. says that that statement is made only on the *taccheṣa* view (तच्छेषपक्षे=तच्छेषपक्षाङ्गीकारेण). It does not apply on the *tadapavāda* view. But then, one may still object, the Guṇa of the non-final *u* is not desired. Well, that is why the Vār advocates *anantyapratiṣedhaḥ*.

Readings and punctuation : (1) There is some confusion of punctuation. I put a *daṇḍa* after न भवति अङ्गस्येति (although it is not there in the MS and in eds.) because अङ्गस्य is syntactically connected with स्थानषष्ठी न भवति. The च (after स्थाने विज्ञाता) shows that a fresh sentence begins with स्थाने. (2) The passage इति इदं न्याय्यं etc. was entirely unintelligible and so ignored by AL. Sw first admitted it into the text although in a much corrupt form. I have tried to present as reasonably correct a text as possible, although शुचव्य still remains doubtful. I have suggested पिचव्य on the authority of Kaiyaṭa (although Nāgeśa remarks : क्वचित्तु कैयटपुस्तके पिचव्य इति न दृश्यत एव ।). (3) I think that a specific mention of इक् as an आसन्नमङ्गम् is necessary in view of अङ्गस्य which is specifically mentioned as विप्रकृष्टस्य गुणस्य. So all that is required is to suppose that a मि is somehow lost in the MS between संन्नमंगमि and ति. I similarly think that a दा is lost between य and संन्न in the MS. Incidentally, this य is so clear that it is difficult to see why it was ignored previously. Besides यद् forms a fitting correlative to तस्य. (4) अलोपिन्यायात् is unintelligible to me. अतोऽपि न्यायात् is only a provisional emendation. (5) Both the eds. read a *daṇḍa* (not there in the MŚ) after अङ्गस्य इतीदं सामान्यं विशेषस्येको विशेषणमिति । They thus make it a part of the argument of the other man (*bhavatā*). Actually the refutation of that argument begins with अङ्गस्य इतीदं सामान्यम्. So no expression like किं तु is understood before it. (6) The reading नास्ति (in ततश्चानन्त्यस्य प्रसङ्गो नास्ति) is most surprising as it is entirely contradictory with the argument pursued here. So I propose an emendation into अस्ति in spite of the MS and the eds.

[14]

The Vār. पुगन्तलघू° refutes the argument of the previous Vār. It tries to show that a fresh rule prohibiting Guṇa and Vṛddhi (of a non-final *ik* where it is not desired), which is urged by the previous Vār. is not at all necessary. The intended purpose is already served by the rule P. 7. 3. 86 : पुगन्तलघूपधस्य च. The *Dīp.* सिद्धो हि गुणः ... ... इकं विशेषयति इति explains the argument.

The argument is this : On the *tadapavāda* view, which we are now considering, *aṅgasya* is no more a स्थानषष्ठी. It is, as we saw, an अवयवषष्ठी going with *ikaḥ* which is the recipient of Guṇa. As it is *aṅgasya* which qualifies *ikaḥ* and not *ikaḥ* qualifying *aṅgasya*, there is no तदन्तविधि and *ikaḥ* need not be final. Even a non-final *ik* can undergo Guṇa (सिद्धो हि गुणो ऽनन्त्यस्य). Still P. phrases the rule *pugantalaghūpadhasya ca* where he teaches

the Guṇa for a short penultimate to justify cases like *bhettā* (from *bhid* + *tā*). Why this superfluous injunction ? According to the well-known maxim : पुनःश्रुतिर्नियमार्था (the re-injunction of something which is already achieved is meant for restriction) this has a restriction for its purpose. The *niyama* can be stated thus : सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः परतः यदि अनन्त्यस्य गुणः, तर्हि पुगन्तलघूपधस्यैव, नान्यस्य. In other words, the Guṇa which is already due for penultimate vowels by *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* is now restricted only to short vowels. This restriction serves to keep off Guṇa for a long penultimate. This means that the absence of the Guṇa substitute for a penultimate (as in the case of *īhitā* from *īh*) is already assured by P. 7. 3. 86 and so there is no force in the objection-Vārttika. The *tadapavāda* view can be accepted without such a prohibitive clause. Cf. Kaiyaṭa : भेत्तेत्यादौ गुणे सिद्धे पुनःश्रुतिर्नियमार्थेति गुरूपधस्येहितादौ न भविष्यति ।

ननु च विधेयस्य ... भेत्तेति दकारस्य. In this passage an objection is taken against the restrictive application of P. 7. 3. 86 shown above. The objection is like this : When a rule can be understood both as a *vidhi,* i.e. as laying down something new and also as a *niyama* i.e. as merely restricting what is already laid down by another rule, it is the usual practice to understand it as a *vidhi.* (This is formally stated in the Paribhāṣā 100 : विधिनियमसंभवे विधिरेव ज्यायान्.) In the present case also (*bhettā* etc.) such an injunctive function can be assigned to the rule P. 7. 3. 86 and so it cannot be regarded as having a restrictive capacity. But, is not this Guṇa substitution for *i* already laid down by P. 7. 3. 84 ? How can it be said to have been laid down for the first time by P. 7. 3. 86 ? The objector now comes out in the open. When he says that P. 7. 3. 86 can be injuntive, the substituend which he has in mind is not *i* but *d* (in forms from *bhid*) and *p* (in the causal stem *hrep*).

The process (not detailed in the *Dīp.*) is this : *aṅgasya* is to be taken as the स्थानषष्ठी and it therefore forms the qualified (विशेष्य). पुगन्त and लघूपध are its qualifiers. Also अलोऽन्त्यस्य comes in. So the rule means पुगन्तस्य अङ्गस्य यः अन्त्योऽल् (ह्रेपयतीत्यत्र पकारः) तस्य गुणः । तथा च लघूपधस्य अङ्गस्य यः अन्त्योऽल् (भेत्ता इत्यत्र दकारः) तस्य गुणः । But, if *d* in *bhid* was intended to be replaced by Guṇa by Pāṇini, what is the use of reading the root as *bhid* in the Dhātupāṭha ? Nāgeśa, who raises this question, answers that *d* still survives in the weak forms like *bhinna* (*d*>*n*) and *bhitta.* Read भिदो दकारोच्चारणं तु भिन्नो भित्तमित्यादौ चरितार्थम्. But, it may again be asked, how do you prevent the *ik*-Paribhāṣā (i.e. P. 1. 1. 3) from operating here ? And if it operates, *d* and *p* have no chance of undergoing Guṇa. As against this it is maintained that if P. 7. 3. 86 is understood as teaching the Guṇa substitution for the final *d* and *p*, then this very fact by itself will automatically imply that P. 1. 1. 3 does not apply here, for otherwise P. 7. 3. 86 would become meaningless. (सामर्थ्यादिक्-

परिभाषानुपस्थितिश्चेति भाव: as Nāgeśa says.) Since an injunctive character can be assigned to P. 7. 3. 86 it will be unreasonable to take it as a restrictive one (विधेयस्य भावान्नियमानुपपत्तिः). And since this proposed device is not available, the originial defect pointed in the previous Vār (अनन्त्यप्रतिषेधः [कर्तव्यः]) still stands.

उच्यते। पुकि ... ... इति वक्ष्यति. This text replies the objection, confirming the restrictive character of P. 7. 3. 86. It was taken for granted by the objector, while advocating the injunctive character of P. 7. 3. 86, that *puganta* and *laghūpadha* are *Bahuvrīhi* compounds. They were further taken as qualifying *aṅgasya* (supposed to be the qualified), which in its turn gave rise to *alo'ntyasya.* This created the illusion that the finals like *t* and *p* mentioned above may be intended to be replaced by Guṇa by Pāṇini in 7. 3. 86. But the basic assumption itself is wrong. पुगन्त and लघूपध are not Bahuvrīhi. They are Tatpuruṣa : पुगन्त = पुकि अन्तः 'what immediately precedes *p(uk)*' (e.g. *ī* in *hrī + puk*) and लघूपध = लघ्वी उपधा 'a light penultimate' (e.g. *i* in *bhid + tā*). When we say that P. 7. 3. 86 is restrictive, it is based on this interpretation of the compound पुगन्तलघूपध in P. 7. 3. 86. (This solution of the compound will be given in the *Mbh* itself further on.) Since the penultimate[1] is specifically mentioned as undergoing Guṇa (which is already achieved by P. 7. 3. 84), there is no chance for the Guṇa of the final consonants (which would have made P. 7. 3. 86 injunctive). So P. 7. 3. 86 is restrictive. Kaiyaṭa repeats practically verbatim this objection and reply : ननु च भेत्तेति दकारस्य ह्रेपयतीति पकारस्य च यथा स्यादिति विध्यर्थमेतत् स्यात्। नैतदस्ति। पुकि अन्तः पुगन्तो लघ्वी उपधा लघूपधा ततः समाहारद्वंद्वनिर्देश इत्यन्त्यस्य गुणेन न भाव्यम्। But, it may be asked, if both the solutions of the compound are equally legitimate, what compells us to accept this Tatpuruṣa solution alone? *Lāghava* (brevity, economy, simplicity), says Nāgeśa. He adds that once the Tatpuruṣa is decided as more acceptable, then the restrictiveness of the rule (as against injunctiveness) is not much of a blemish (लाघवात् तत्पुरुषे निर्णीते निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन नियमार्थत्वं न दोषायेत्यर्थः).

ननु चैवमपि दापयत्यर्थमेतत् स्यात् — The objector makes a last attempt to show that P. 7. 3. 86 may still be injunctive. Accepted that पुगन्त = पुकि अन्त. Still (एवमपि), when Pāṇini frames that rule his objective may not be to restrict the application of P. 7. 3. 84. His objective may be to lay down the Guṇa substitute for *ā* (in cases lika *dā* + *puk* + *ṇic* + *śap* + *tip*) which precedes the *puk*. Here this Guṇa is not available by P. 7. 3. 84 (*sārva ... yoḥ*) even on the *tadapavāda* view because *ā* (which is meant to be a substituend of Guṇa) is neither *ik* nor final. Since P. 7. 3. 86 can have an

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1 As part of the stem (*aṅgasya*, an *avayavaṣaṣṭhī*).

injunctive role to play in दापयति etc., it cannot play the restrictive role as claimed in the Vār पुगन्तलघूपधग्रहणमनन्त्यनियमार्थम् and consequently the defect अनन्त्य-प्रतिषेध: pointed out in the still previous Vār. still stands.

अस्त्वाकारस्य ... चेष्टतो व्यवस्था — Refutation of the above argument. No useful purpose will be served by understanding P. 7. 3. 86 as teaching a Guṇa substitute for *ā* in *dāpayati* etc. Even supposing that P. 7. 3. 86 is an injunctive rule and that as a result of it *ā* (in *dā*) is replaced by Guṇa, viz. *a*, still it is not stable. It will have again to be replaced by Vṛddhi, viz. *ā*, by the rule P. 7. 2. 116 : अत उपधाया:. So the *Dīp.* says : अस्त्वाकारस्य गुण: । वृद्धिं करिष्याम: । Since thus a Guṇa will be useless, we cannot accept that Pāṇini meant his rule 7. 3. 86 as an injunctive rule prescribing Guṇa for *ā* in *dā* etc. Kaiyaṭa does not mention this part of the argument but Nāgeśa does. Read : ननु पुगन्तग्रहणं दापयत्यादौ अनन्त्यस्यानिकोऽपि गुणार्थं स्यादिति कथं नियमार्थमिति चेन्न । गुणे उपधावृद्ध्या विशेषाभावात् ।

चक्रकेषु चेष्टतो व्यवस्था — The *ā* thus got by an application of P. 7. 2. 116 could again be replaced by the Guṇa *a* by P. 7. 3. 86. And this mutual replacement of *a* and *ā* would go on infinitely in an endless cycle (*cakraka*). Where to stop with the application of one rule and thus to prevent the application of the other depends upon what form one thinks is correct and so desirable (*iṣṭa*). If there is no agreement on this the grammatical procedure would remain inconclusive. A *cakraka* (the word already occurs in the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 3. 60, 6. 1. 35) is explained by Kaiyaṭa (on *Mbh*[1] on P. 6. 1. 35) thus : चक्रमिव विपरिवर्तनात् चक्रकम् । इवार्थे 'संज्ञायाम्' इति कन् प्रत्यय: ।

अयं पर: ... ... लघ्वी उपधेति — Bhar. now introduces discussion on the alleged restrictive nature of the second part of the rule, viz. *laghūpadha*. प्रकृतस्यैव नियम: — This is a *pratīka* of the *Mbh.* प्रकृतस्यैव नियम: स्यात् । किं च प्रकृतम्? 'सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयो:' इति । तेन भवेदिह नियमान्न स्यात् ईहिता ईहितुम् ईहितव्यम् इति । ह्रस्वाद्योर्गुणस्त्वनियत: सोऽनन्त्यस्यापि प्राप्नोति । Limitations of the restrictive character of the rule P. 7. 3. 86 are pointed out here. This rule is framed in the context (*prakṛtasya*) of P. 7. 3. 84 which lays down Guṇa when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātaka* suffix follows. The restrictive rule P. 7. 3. 86 will also therefore function only where a Guṇa is occasioned by a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix.[2] Where a Guṇa is due to other than these two kinds of suffixes, as in the case of the five rules *hrasvasya guṇaḥ* (P. 7. 3. 108) etc. mentioned

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[1] तथा चानवस्था (वा.) । पुन: सुट् पुनर्द्विवचनमिति चक्रकमव्यवस्था प्रसज्येत । नास्ति चक्रकप्रसङ्ग: । शास्त्रतो नाम हि व्यवस्था । तत्र सुटि कृते द्विर्वचनम्, द्विर्वचनेनावस्थानं भविष्यति । The two statements इष्टतो व्यवस्था and शास्त्रतो नाम व्यवस्था seem to represent two different views. चक्रकेष्विष्टतो व्यवस्था occurs in *Mbh*. under P. 1. 3. 60 (I. 287.2).

[2] Cf. the Paribhāṣā (61) : अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वेति ।

above, it is outside the jurisdiction of P. 7. 3. 86. It is unable to prevent the Guṇa substitution of the non-final (where it is not desired). The *niyama* can only say: सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः परतः यदि अङ्गस्य अनन्त्यस्य गुणः, तर्हि लघूपधस्यैव, नान्यस्य (ईहादेः गुरूपधस्य). It cannot at the same time say: अङ्गस्य अनन्त्यस्य लघूपधस्य यदि गुणः तर्हि सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरेव, नान्यस्मिन् (संबुद्ध्यादौ). You cannot have the twofold restriction at one and the same time, एकेन वाक्येन नियमद्वयस्यालाभात् (कै०). That is why the *Mbh.* says: ह्रस्वादिगुणस्त्वनियतः.

Observations: (1) In the *Dip.* here लघूपधस्य was expected instead of पुगन्तस्य. (2) The sentence अत्राङ्गस्येति विशेषणषष्ठ्यौ चेति is unintelligible.

अथाप्येवं नियमः स्यात् — Now the *Mbh.* takes up the other form of restriction (सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरेव पुगन्तलघूपधस्य). When stated fully the *niyama* reads: अङ्गस्य पुगन्तलघूपधस्य यदि गुणः तर्हि सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरेव, नान्यस्मिन् प्रत्यये. Here one sets aside the Paribhāṣā अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा etc. This takes care of forms like अग्निचित् by preventing Guṇa but then the Guṇa in forms like ईहिता remains unrestrained. One cannot have the *niyama* both ways, as said above.

अथाप्युभयतो नियमः स्यात् — If such a restriction is accepted it would ensure absence of Guṇa in both ईहिता and हे अग्निचित् etc. But an objection against such a procedure is immediately raised in the following *Dīp.* कथं पुनर् etc. The essential condition for a *niyama* 'restriction' is a fresh injunction (पुनः श्रुतिः) where something is being laid down which is already there. In the present case P. 7. 3. 84 represents the first injunction. When the Guṇa is again laid down in P. 7. 3. 86, then by reason of this very superfluousness it results into a restriction. But it can operate only once and thus can bring about only one kind of restriction at a time. Once one restriction is effected (तत्रैकस्मिन् नियमिते), its force is spent. Thus there is no more second injunction left, which would bring about another kind of restriction. उच्यते। सत्यम् ... ... अथापीति admits the force of this objection. It is not denied at all. In fact that is why the expression *athāpi* is used, which means, as is well known 'admitting something for the time being or for the sake of argument' (अभ्युपेत्यवादेनोच्यते[1] as Kaiyaṭa says). The point is that even accepting for the sake of argument that P. 7. 3. 86 offers a twofold restriction,[2] (उभयतो नियमार्थमेतत्सूत्रमिति) it does not solve all the problems. The problem posed by the rule *jusi ca* (P. 7. 3. 83) still remains unsolved. The penultimate of the stem (viz. *i* in *nij* etc.) in forms like *anenijuḥ* is light (*laghūpadha*) on the one hand and the following suffix (*us*) is technically *sārvadhātuka*. This case therefore

1 आवृत्त्यादिन्यायाश्रयणेन वा, adds Kaiyaṭa.

2 The *Mbh.* states it thus: पुगन्तलघूपधस्यैव सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः। सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरेव पुगन्तलघूपधस्य।

escapes both kinds of restriction and the Guṇa of the radical vowel now becomes inevitable.[1]

The defence पुगन्तलघूपधग्रहण has thus a limited application only.

Readings: (1) The reading अङ्गस्य इतीदं कार्ययोगि। तदिका विशेष्यते is retained in both the eds. But it definitely goes against the accepted position on the *tadapavāda* view. Cf. अङ्गस्येति षष्ठी तदपवादकल्पनापक्षे न कार्ययोगिनीत्येतद्वस्थितम्। इगेव कार्ययोगित्वात् विशेष्यते। How the dimetrically opposite text should be there in the MS is difficult to say. I have suggested in the bracket emended text. (2) It is surprising why Sw should suggest unnecessarily (अ)भावात् for the correct भावात् of the MS and why he should twice drop विधेयम् preserved by the MS.

[15]

Having shown that both the *tacchesa* and the *tadapavāda* view are defective, a third view is now taken up for discussion, viz. that P. 1. 1. 3 is an entirely independent Paribhāṣā, not connected with P. 1. 1. 52 either as its *śeṣa* or as its *apavāda*. The *Mbh.* adds (after ... नापि तदपवादः) अन्यदेवेदं परिभाषान्तरमसंबद्धमनया[2] परिभाषया. The view seems to have been held by the Kroṣṭrīya school of grammarians whose Vār (नियमादिको ... ...) follows soon.

यन्मन्यसे ... ... [स्थानित्वप्रतिपादने] explains this *asaṁbaddha*-Paribhāṣā view. This is the argument: The Paribhāṣās P. 1. 1. 3 and P 1. 1. 52 do not have a common field of operation and a common objective. P. 1. 1. 52 operates where Pāṇini teaches a substitute for an element that consists of more than one sound e.g. P. 4. 2. 140: राज्ञः क च, which says that in connection with the secondary suffix *cha*, the base *rājan* is replaced by *k*. Here P. 1. 1. 52 steps in and decides that it is the final (i.e. *n*) of *rājan* that is actually replaced by the substitute and not the whole word (तत्र अलोन्त्यपरिभाषा समुदायषष्ठ्या एकदेशस्थापने व्यापृता). P. 1. 1. 3 operates where a Guṇa is taught as a substitute. It decides that only an *ik* would be replaced by Guṇa; no non-*ik* can undergo Guṇa (अपरा हि गुणवृद्ध्योरिकः स्थानित्वप्रतिपादनेन). Secondly, neither of them depends on the other for its operation; both work independently of each other (परस्परानपेक्षया कार्यं प्रति प्रवृत्ता एका राज्ञः क च इत्यादिषु। अपरा हि ... ...). Now these two rules may happen to collide against each other in some particular individual case (एकविषयसंनिपातः). But this mere fact of a sporadic collision does not justify eternally linking them together either by the relation of opposition (विरोधेन) or of principal-and-subordinate (अङ्गाङ्गिभावेन). Such a thing happens in the case of other mutually independent rules also.

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[1] Kaiyaṭa adds: हे पिचव्य, हे बुद्धे, हे बुद्धयः इत्यादौ चालघूपधत्वादनन्त्यस्य गुणोऽपरिहृतः।

[2] असंबद्धमनयेति भाष्यस्य शेषशेषिभावानापन्नम् उत्सर्गापवादभावानापन्नं चेत्यर्थः। (Nāg.)

The P. 7. 3. 102 : *supi ca* (which teaches a long substitute for the final of the *a*-stems in declensional forms like रामाभ्याम् where an ending beginning with a *yañ* consonant follows) and P. 7. 3. 103 : *bahuvacane jhaly et* (which teaches the substitute *e* for the stem-final *a* itself if the ending is of the plural and begins with a *jhal* consonant e. g. the form रामेषु) work elsewhere freely and independently. But they come into conflict in the Dative pl. form रामेभ्यः or वृक्षेभ्यः where P. 7. 3. 102 claims it to be in its jurisdiction because the ending *bhyas* begigs with a *yañ* consonant and P. 7. 3. 103 equally claims it because the ending *bhyas* is plural and *bh-* also belongs to *jhal* class of consonants. But there are ways of resolving such conflicts (like P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्[1]). Nobody takes into his head to combine eternally P. 7. 3. 102 and 103 together by विरोध or अङ्गाङ्गिभाव. The same procedure be adopted here also, pleads the advocate of the *asaṁbaddha*-Paribhāṣā view. अपेक्षेते=अन्योन्यम् अपे°. यदि कथंचित् इकः एकत्र संनिपातो भवति — One woutd have liked to read उभयोः [परिभाषयोः] in the place of इकः. Or, we may supply नियमेन सह. दीर्घत्वैत्वयोः = the long substitute taught by P. 7. 3. 102 and *e* taught by P. 7. 3. 103. The समुदायषष्ठी refers to the substituend (in Genitive) which consists of more than one phoneme.

Kaiyaṭa practically repeats this argument of the *Dīp*. Read: परस्परानपेक्षयोः स्वस्वनिमित्तप्रयुक्तसंनिधानयोर्द्वयोः परिभाषयोः प्रदेशेषु स्वस्वकार्यप्रतिपादनम्। तत्र यदि कथंचिदेकविषये संनिपातो भवति, नैतावता परस्परापेक्षा भवतीत्यर्थः।

Observation : Although the MS shows no signs of a gap, some part of the text after ... एकदेशस्थापने व्यापृता, इयमपि is definitely lost in the MS. I tentatively complete the sentence as इयमपि गुणवृद्धिविधौ इकः स्थानित्वप्रतिपादने [व्यापृता]. It seems that this was followed by the Kroṣṭrīya Vār whose first part viz. नियमादिको is also lost.

नियमादिको गुणवृद्धी भवतो विप्रतिषेधेन is the Vār. of the Kroṣṭrīyas which says that in the case of conflict the Guṇa and the Vṛddhi taught for *ik* by P. 1. 1. 3 supersede the *alo'ntya* – Paribhāṣā. 'अलोन्त्यपरिभाषायाः पूर्वाचार्यसंज्ञा नियम इति' (Nāg). This is introduced by the *Mbh.* thus : परिभाषान्तरमिति च मत्वा क्रोष्ट्रीयाः पठन्ति 'नियमादिको ...' इति.

The Vār. says that in the case of a conflict P. 1. 1. 3 prevails and consequently Guṇa and Vṛddhi take place for *ik* alone. Now this rule, viz, *vipratiṣedhe paraṁ kāryam* says that in the case of a conflict of two equally powerful rules the *para*, i.e. the rule which is taught later in the order of

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1 Nāg. comments : जायमानोऽपि संनिपातः सावकाशत्वेन विप्रतिषेधोपयोग्येव, न तच्छेषत्वोपयोगी। अत एव नापवादत्वमपि।

the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or the operation taught therein is to prevail over the other.[1] Two rules are said to be equally powerful if each of them has an exclusive field of operation, where the other cannot intervene (तुल्यबलविरोधो विप्रतिषेधः *Kāś*. द्वयोः शास्त्रयोः क्वचिल्लब्धावकाशयोरेकत्र लक्ष्ये युगपत्संभवस्तुल्यबलविरोधः । कार्यस्य परत्वं परशास्त्रविहितत्वम् Bālm).

शेषत्वे ह्येकवाक्यत्वाद् ... अनया च इकोऽनन्त्यस्य स्यादिति । This *Dīp*. explains how the *vipratiṣedha* principle adopted by the Kroṣṭrīyas incidentally indicates that P. 1. 1. 3 and P. 1. 1. 52 are two entirely mutually independent Paribhāṣās, incapable of being related either by विरोध or by अङ्गाङ्गिभाव. The *Mbh.* which is explained here runs thus : यदि चायं तच्छेषः स्यात्, तेनैव तस्यायुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः । अथापि तदपवादः, उत्सर्गापवादयोरप्ययुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः । It is for the time being taken for granted that विप्रतिषेध (i.e. a conflict of equals) *is* there in the present case. Now in the *taccheṣa* view it is regarded that the two rules combine into a single one (*ekavākyatva-*), one subordinating itself to the other. As nothing can conflict with itself (and since a conflict *is* here) we cannot accept the *taccheṣa* view in the present case. Similarly, a conflict (*vipratiṣedha*) is impossible between a general rule (*utsarga*) and an *apavāda* because an *apavāda* will always prevail over a general rule (otherwise it will be meaningless). The fact of the conflict (between P. 1. 1. 3 and 1. 1. 52) thus rules out their being related by शेषशेषिभाव (the *taccheṣa* view) or उत्सर्गापवाद (the *tadapavāda* view).

The passage beginning with नियमस्यावकाशो ... shows why we have to accept that there is a conflict of equals (*vipratiṣedha*), by pointing out the exclusive fields of both the rules. P. 4. 2. 140 : राज्ञः क च is an exclusive field of *niyama* (i.e. P. 1. 1. 52); P. 1. 1. 3 does not interfere there because P. 4. 2. 140 does not teach the Guṇa or the Vṛddhi operation.

Observation : Although the MS. does not give any indication of it, and the previous editions do not suspect it, some text of the *Dīp*. must have been lost between यत्र इको गुणवृद्धी and इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारनिमित्तः. The reason for such a supposition is, firstly, that the words to the effect ' does not operate ' are missing after ' इको गुणवृद्धी '. It is to be noted that the *Dīp* इत्येतत् परिभाषाव्यापारनिमित्तः etc. does not refer to इको गुणवृद्धी but to अलोन्त्यस्य. See below. Secondly, equally missing is the text illustrating the exclusive field of P. 1. 1. 3 (where P. 1. 1. 52 would not interfere). To judge from the *Mbh.* some such text as ' इको गुणवृद्धी ' इत्यस्यावकाशः चयनं चायको लवनं लावक इति is required. This must then logically be followed by the statment that P. 1. 1. 52 does not operate in cases like *cayana* and then by a reasoning for such a statement. The

1 For a different meaning attached to *para* by Pat here, see below.

Dip. यदि चेक इत्ये° – can then well be taken as explaining why P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य does not interfere in cases like *cayana* formed with a Guṇa from *ci* by P. 7. 3. 8 and *cāyaka* with a Vṛddhi by P. 7. 2. 115. The whole text then to be restored after यत्र 'इको गुणवृद्धी' is : इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारो नास्ति । 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इत्यस्यावकाशः चयनं चायको लवनं लावक इति । 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य'. This is then followed by इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारनिमित्तः etc. The omission thus is hapl. (इत्येतत्परिभाषा... इत्येतत्परिभाषा).

The most important point to be noted is that इत्येतत्परिभाषा° refers to अलोऽन्त्यस्य and *not* to इको गुणवृद्धी. The previous editions, which failed to note this and thought that इत्येतत्परिभाषा° refers to इको गुणवृद्धी had simply to drop यत्र of the MS between उपलभ्यते and तत्र, because they could not explain the 2nd occurrence of यत्र which they evidently thought superfluous.

Even if P. 1. 1. 52 were applied in *cayana* etc., it won't do anything new, so its application there is useless. यत्र and तत्र=चयनादिषु. तस्याः – अलोऽन्त्यपरिभाषायाः.

यदि चेक ... नियमस्य प्रतिपद्यामहे — This is meant to be a reply to an unexpressed objection. The objection is like this : Why do you say that *cayana* etc. is an exclusive field of P. 1. 1. 3 ? It is wrong. It is equally a field of P. 1. 1. 52 because a substituend (viz. *aṅgasya*) is mentioned there in genitive.[1] Bhar. does not deny this. But he points out that P. 1. 1. 52, even if allowed to operate here, would not do anything new. Even according to P. 1. 1. 52 the Guṇa will have to be substituted in the place of *i*, the final of the stem *ci* — a superfluous statement since this is already laid down by P. 1. 1. 3. So, Bhar. adds, P. 1. 1. 52 will not be interested in cases like *cayana* (यदि चेक इत्येतयैवान्त्यस्य गुणे प्रतिपादिते नियमोऽपि तस्यैव विदध्यात्, न किंचित् कृतं स्यात् इत्यत औदासीन्यं नियमस्य प्रतिपद्यामहे). इकः = 'इको गुणवृद्धी'. एतया=एतया परिभाषया. The whole idea is thus briefly expressed by Kaiy : चयनमिति । अलोन्त्यपरिभाषायाः प्रयोजनाभावादत्रानुपस्थानमित्याशयः ।

Observation : A न required by the context between विदध्यात् and किंचित् is missing. I have supplied it. Or, alternatively, किंचित् कृतं स्यात् (with *kāku*) may be taken as a rhetorical question.

Kaiy. here raises a question : The Paribhāṣā 1. 1. 3 operates only where the substituend is not expressly mentioned. In the formation of *cāyaka* (and *lāvaka*), the sūtra 7. 2. 115 : *aco ñṇiti* laying down Vṛddhi expressly

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[1] नन्वङ्गस्येति स्थानषष्ठीदर्शनात् 'सार्वधातुक-' इत्यादावप्यलोऽन्त्यपरिभाषाप्रवृत्त्या कथमिक्परिभाषायाश्रयनमित्यवकाशः । (Nāg.). His solution is to take इकः as the स्थानषष्ठी qualified by अङ्गस्य.

mentions *acaḥ* as the substituend. How then can this be a sphere of P. 1. 1. 3 (कथमिक्परिभाषात्रोपतिष्ठते, यावताऽच इति स्थानी निर्दिष्टः)? His explanation of course is that *acaḥ* is not to be taken as the स्थानषष्ठी but as a word qualifying *aṅgasya*, which latter is the स्थानषष्ठी (अत्राहुः। अच इत्यस्याङ्गविशेषणतयोपयोगादचः स्थानित्वाभावाद् वृद्धिग्रहणेन लिङ्गेनेक्-परिभाषात्राप्युपतिष्ठत एव।)

इहोभयं प्राप्नोति ... ऽनन्त्यस्य स्यादिति — Having shown how P. 1. 1. 3 and P. 1. 1. 52 have their own exclusive spheres the *Mbh.* now quotes instances where they collide, each having its justification for coming in. The *niyama* (P. 1. 1. 52) would require a Guṇa substitute (by P. 7. 3. 82 : *mider guṇaḥ*) for the final *d* of *mid*, while P. 1. 1. 3 for the *i* (which is non-final). Similarly the *niyama* would demand a Vṛddhi substitute (by P. 7. 2. 114 : *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ*) for the final *j* of *mṛj*, while P. 1. 1. 3 for *ṛ* (which is non-final).

The result of this clash as stated in the *Mbh* (not quoted by Bhar) is : 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इत्येतद् भवति विप्रतिषेधेन। P. 1. 1. 3 prevails over the other by the *vipratiṣedha* rule P. 1. 4. 2.

नैष युक्तो विप्रतिषेधः ... .. परो नियम इति। The opponent is immediately on his feet. The later rule in the order of the *Aṣṭ.* is clearly *alo'ntyasya* (1. 1. 52) and not *iko guṇavṛddhī* (1. 1. 3). What sort of a *vipratiṣedha* is the other man talking about? Does he know the proper order of rules (सूत्रसंनिवेशः)? तैः = क्रोष्ट्रीयैः.

एवमपीष्टवाचिना ... ... इष्टवाची परशब्द इति — The MS here is considersbly corrupt. The main argument however can be fairly understood on the basis of the *Mbh* : इष्टवाची परशब्दः। विप्रतिषेधे परं यदिष्टं तद् भवतीति। In the *Dīp*, व्यवहारः = linguistic usage. व्यवस्थितत्ववाचिना = expressive of a definite place in the sequence (here, the later). पूर्वप्राप्तप्रतिषेधादनारभमाण is obscure. If पूर्वविप्रतिषेधाद्वारभ(भ्य)माण was the older reading, it may refer to the पूर्वविप्रतिषेध 'setting aside of a later rule by an earlier one in the case of a conflict' as an alternative solution. But I am not sure. Such a पूर्वविप्रतिषेध, though elsewhere advocated by Pat., has not been brought in here in the *Mbh.*

एवमप्ययुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः ... एवं विप्रतिषेधशब्दस्यापि — Another attack on the *vipratiṣedha* theory. This time the attack is directed from a different point. It is claimed that the conflict (*vipratiṣedha*) consists in one element (*sthānin*) being required to undergo two operations simultaneously (विप्रतिषेध = द्विकार्ययोग). And in the present case there is no such contingency (न चात्रैको द्विकार्ययुक्तः, as the *Mbh.* adds). It is rather the other way round. Here two *sthānin*-s claim one and the same operation. So there is no place for *vipratiṣedha.*

The compound द्विकार्ययोग is dissolved in two different ways by Bhar. : (i) as a त्रिपद बहुव्रीहि i.e. द्वाभ्यां कार्याभ्यां योगो यत्र एकस्य स्थानिनः. The substantive

qualified by this *bahuvrīhi* is not mentioned by Bhar. Some such word as meaning 'a situation' is to be understood. Then, an element standing in such a situation (*tatstha*) is secondarily conveyed by this expression by Lakṣaṇā because the element is subject to the connection with two operations (द्विकार्ययोगविषयत्वात्). (The ताद्रूप्यं in the text should rather have been ताच्छब्द्यं.) Kaiyaṭa gives almost this very explanation : द्वाभ्यां कार्याभ्यां योगो यस्य स्थानिनः स विप्रतिषेधविषयत्वाद्विप्रतिषेधः. (ii) Alternatively, Bhar. dissolves the compound as द्विकार्येण योगः (i. e. technically as a कर्मधारयपूर्वपद तत्पुरुष). Here the expression simply means 'connection with, or the contingency of having to undergo, two operations'. This is a simple and natural explanation. It is not given by Kaiyaṭa probably because of the technical difficulties involved. Read Nāg : कर्मधारयपूर्वपदकोऽपि न, 'दिक्-संख्ये...' इति नियमेन तस्य दुर्लभत्वाद् .... ।

नावश्यं द्विकार्ययोग. ... The advocate of the *vipratiṣedha* view tries to refute the objection. The opponent's concept of विप्रतिषेध as द्विकार्ययोग is too narrow. There is also another kind of विप्रतिषेध viz. असंभव 'impossibility'. And a kind of impossibility, he claims, is surely here. योऽयं विप्रतिषेधो ... तत्राप्यसंभव एव — The advocate of the *vipratiṣedha* view in fact maintains that it is *asaṁbhava* which forms the real essence of *vipratiṣedha*. So wherever *asaṁbhava* in some form exists, *vipratiṣedha* has to be accepted as being there whether द्विकार्ययोग is there or not (द्विकार्ययोगोऽपि यस्मिन्न संभवति, तस्मिन्नपि विप्रतिषेध इति तत्राप्यसंभव एव). The sentence यस्मिन् असंभवे न च कार्यं द्विकार्ययोगोऽस्ति is not quite clear. Sw reads it as यस्मिन् असंभवे नैवं द्विकार्ययोगोऽस्ति. This makes the things easy. It means 'Even that *asaṁbhava*, where there is no *dvikāryayoga*, has to be accepted as *vipratiṣedha*'. There is nothing objectionable in reconstructing नैवं from न च, but I do not know how we can simply drop कार्यं which is clearly there in the MS.

After किं तर्हि ? असंभवः the *Mbh.* reads स चास्त्यत्रासंभवः । कोऽसावसंभवः ? which is then followed by इह तावद् वृक्षेभ्यः etc. Bhar. says that there is one kind of impossibility involved in the forms like वृक्षेभ्यः where there is a द्विकार्ययोग, and another kind of impossibility in cases like मेद्यति where there is no द्विकार्ययोग[1] — and so it is a case of *vipratiṣedha* all right.

ननु चैकस्य स्थाने ... ... कस्मान्न भवतः ? The alleged impossibility of two substitutes for one substituend is challenged here. A precedent is pointed out. Where reduplication is taught, as e. g. in the formation of the Perfect (P. 6. 1. 1 : एकाचो द्वे प्रथमस्य, 8 लिटि धातोरनभ्यासस्य) two (द्वे) substitutes replace the original. Thus the first stage in the formation of the perfect 3. sing. from √पच् is पच्-पच्-अ. (The dropping of *c* of the reduplication and the lengthening

[1] but द्वयोः स्थानिनोरेकादेशयोगः, if we could so put it.

of the radical *a* follow afterwards.) Just as there are two simultaneous substitutes (पच्-पच्) for the single original पच्, so there can be two simultaneous substitutes (*e* and *ā*) in forms like *vṛkṣebhyaḥ*, claims the objector.

Observations : (1) There are two views of looking at the grammatical reduplication : (i) The reduplication is equivalent to two substitutes in the place of the original item for which reduplication is taught. (ii) It is just the original item repeated, i. e. two occurrences of the same item; there is no original-substitute relation. Read : अथ यस्य द्विर्वचनमारभ्यते, किं तस्य स्थाने भवत्याहोस्विद् द्विःप्रयोग इति (*Mbh* under P. 6. 1. 1 Vā 15). In the present case when पच्-पच्-अ is cited as a case of two substitutes for one, the first view is taken for granted, which Bhar names as the *ekapakṣa.* I am at a loss to see the significance of this name. It is possible, as Pandit V. B. Bhagavat Shastri suggests, that एकपक्ष is to be taken as the opposite of द्विःप्रयोगपक्ष, i. e. the same as the स्थाने द्विर्वचनपक्ष. The द्विःप्रयोग view invests duality to the substitute while in the स्थाने द्विर्वचन view the substitute retains the original oneness, — hence एकपक्ष, another name for स्थाने द्विर्वचनपक्ष. Since the एकपक्ष accepts original substitute relation in the matter of reduplication, one can say that on this view there are two simultaneous substitutes (*pac-pac*) in the place of one (*pac*). It is also noteworthy that the root *pac* is mentioned in the *Mbh* (III. 364.1) in the discussion of reduplication taught in P. 6. 1. 1. In the place of एकपक्ष, AL read एकशेषे (which hardly serves any purpose) while Sw simply drops it. (2) Following Sw, I read एकस्य पच्छब्दस्य द्वौ पच्छब्दौ. The MS however reads यच्छब्दस्य and यच्छब्दौ (which may refer to such reduplication as *Gītā* 8. 6 : यं यं वापि स्मरन् भावं or 7. 21 : यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः etc.). I am however inclined to accept *pacchabda*— because it is a typically grammatical expression. It is used in the *Mbh.* in इह पचतीत्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दः श्रूयते, पच्शब्दश्चकारान्तोऽतिशब्दश्च (under P. 1. 3. 1 Vār. 6; Vol. I. 255. 14).

उच्यते । न ब्रूमः ... ... योऽयं प्रस्तुतः । — The advocate of the *asaṁbhava* view says that he has been misunderstood. He never said that two simultaneous substitutes were absolutely impossible. Sometimes they may be possible (as e.g. in reduplication, as the opponent has pointed out). All that he wants to say is that they are impossible in the case of *vṛkṣebhyaḥ* etc. which are under discussion (*prastuta-*). तत्र हि दीर्घत्वं ... ... नानन्तर्यं स्यादिति. — This illustrates the impossibility. Not that the two substitutes are physically impossible. You can have such forms, but one of them alone will have to be regarded as correct, as it will satisfy the environmental condition while the other will have to be discarded as incorrect, because the environmental condition will not be satisfied. To explain : starting from the position वृक्ष + भ्यस्, you can have *वृक्षाएभ्यः if you apply P. 7. 3. 102 first and 103 afterwards. Alternately you can apply P. 7. 3. 103 first and 102 afterwards and arrive at *वृक्षेआभ्यः. But in both

these forms, one of the substitutes will be correct, and the other incorrect. In *वृक्षाएभ्यः the substitute *ā* will be incorrect because it is taught (and will be therefore correct) only when a case-ending beginning with a *yañ* consonant follows (while in the present case it is followed by *e*); *e* alone will be correct here. In *वृक्षेआभ्यः, *e* will be incorrect because it is taught only when a plu. case-ending beginning with a *jhal* consonant follows (while in the present case it is followed by *ā*); *ā* alone will be correct (तत्र हि दीर्घत्वं यञ्यनन्तरे साधुत्वेनाख्यातम्, एत्वमपि झलि). In the *Dīp*, उभयोः =उभयोः आदेशयोः (or, कार्ययोः)। That is why, the *Dīp*. continues, it is said in the *Mbh.* : न चास्ति संभवः आदेशौ स्यातामिति.

Kaiyaṭa practically repeats the important sentence. Read : दीर्घत्वं यञ्यनन्तरे विधीयते, एत्वं च झल्यनन्तरे. On this Nāg. : ननु आए इति एआ इति वादेशसंभवो ऽस्त्येवेत्यत आह, — न चेति । द्वयोरिति । कार्ययोरित्यर्थः । अनन्तरे यञि दीर्घः साधुरनन्तरे झलि एत्वं साधुरि(? साध्वि)त्यर्थः ।

इहेदानीं ... न चास्ति संभवः इति — After having shown that there is one kind of *asaṁbhava* in forms like *vṛkṣebhyaḥ*, the *Dīp*. now quotes this *Mbh*. where, it is claimed, another kind of *asaṁbhava* (viz. one substitute for two originals) is met with, which consequently gives rise to *vipratiṣedha*. अत्रापि दृष्टः ... ... अन्यतरस्यामिति च । This kind of *asaṁbhava* also is equally challenged by the opponent. He says that there is nothing unusual in a single substitute replacing two originals simultaneously. Pāṇini has taught a number of such operations in sūtras beginning with *ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ* (P. 6. 1. 84) which expressly says that the substitute taught in the following rules comes in the place of the two original elements, one preceding and the other following. Similarly he teaches in 6.4.47 that *r* replaces *r* and the penultimate (together) of *bhrasj*- when forms like *bharṣṭā* are made. What is wrong then if Guṇa replaces simultaneously both *i* and *d* of *mid*? इह संभवो नास्ति ... उपसंहारासंभवात् — Granting such a द्वौ स्थानिनौ एक आदेशः possibility elsewhere, the protagonist of the *asaṁbhava* view maintains that it is not possible in the present case. The reason of the *asaṁbhava* is this : you have to take मिदेरङ्गस्य either as स्थानषष्ठी or as अवयवषष्ठी. If you take it as स्थानषष्ठी, *alo 'ntyasya* will operate, making Guṇa a substitute of *d*. *i* is not a substituend for Guṇa (मिदेरिति स्थानषष्ठ्यां सत्यामुपसंहारेण भवितव्यम्। उपसंहारे चेकोऽप्रतिपत्तिः।) If you take it as अवयवषष्ठी, then *alo'ntyasya* cannot come in. There will be no Guṇa for *d*, but only for *i* (अङ्गस्येति विशेषणषष्ठ्यामुपसंहारासंभवः). Thus there is a Guṇa either for *i* or for *d*, but not for both at a time. This is the impossibility.

Kaiy. expresses the same idea : मिदेरित्येका षष्ठी । सा यद्यवयवसंबन्धे तदेकारस्य गुणेन भाव्यम् । अथ स्थानषष्ठी, तदालोऽन्त्यस्येति वचनाद्दकारस्य । न चास्ति संभवो युगपदुभयोर्गुणस्येत्यर्थः । On this last sentence Nag. comments : युगपद् वाक्यार्थद्वयबोधाभावादिति भावः ।

The *Mbh* then concludes the pleading of the *vipratiṣedha* : सत्येतस्मिन्नसंभवे युक्तो विप्रतिषेधः. Then follows the final argument — and the most important one — of the opponent against it. The *Mbh* runs thus : एवमप्ययुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः । द्वयोर्हि सावकाशयोः समवस्थितयोर्विप्रतिषेधो भवति । अनवकाशश्चायं योगः ' Even then the (alleged) conflict-of-equals is improper (here). Conflict-of-equals is there where both (rules) have found a scope (in their exclusive fields). And here this rule (P. 1. 1. 3) has not found a scope (in some exclusive field).' The advocate of the *vipratiṣedha* view then reminds the opponent : ननु च इदानीमेवास्यावकाशः प्रक्लृप्तः, चयनं चायको लवनं लावक इति ' But, scope for this rule was just shortly back pointed out (by me) viz. *cayanam cāyakaḥ lavanam lāvakaḥ* '. It will be remembered that this argument of the *vipratiṣedhavādin* was thus explained in the *Dīp.* above : ' इको गुणवृद्धी ' इत्यस्यावकाशः चयनं ...... इति । ' अलोऽन्त्यस्य ' इत्येतत्परिभाषाव्यापारनिमित्तः न कश्चिद्विशेष उपलभ्यते यत्र, तत्र तस्याः प्रवृत्तिरनर्थिका । यदि चेक इत्येतयैवान्त्यस्य गुणे प्रतिपादिते नियमोऽपि तस्यैव विदध्यात्, न किंचित् कृतं स्यात् इत्यत औदासीन्यं नियमस्य प्रतिपद्यामहे इति । Now the *Mbh* refutes this view. Its argument is that *cayana* etc. are not exclusive field for P. 1. 1. 3, for P. 1. 1. 52 can legitimately claim it equally to be in its province. The full text of the *Mbh* here is : अत्रापि नियमः प्राप्नोति[1] । नाप्राप्ते नियमेऽयं योग आरभ्यते । यावता च नाप्राप्ते नियमेऽयं योग आरभ्यते, ततस्तस्यापवादोऽयं योगो भवति । उत्सर्गापवादयोश्चायुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः । of which only the first sentence is quoted in the *Dīp.* by Bhar.

अयमभिप्रायः ...... अनया परिभाषयेति — It is shown here that the argument of the *vipratiṣedhavādin* that P. 1. 1. 52 is indifferent to forms like *cayana* (चयनादिषु नियमस्त्वौदासीन्यं करोति) on the ground that even if applied it would not make any difference (न कश्चिदस्ति विशेषः) is wrong. True, there would be no difference in the form; but there would certainly be a technical difference. Once P. 1. 1. 52 presents itself in the formation of *cayana* etc. (which it has to, because a substitute - viz. Guṇa - is taught there with the substituend mentioned in the Genitive), it is set aside by P. 1. 1. 3. The reason is that P. 1. 1. 52 is a general rule (*utsarga*) and P. 1. 1. 3 a special rule (*apavāda*). That P. 1. 1. 52 is an *utsarga* is thus brought home : Supposing Pāṇini had not framed his rule 1. 1. 3 (यावच्चेदं नारभ्यते ' इक ' इति), what would happen ? The *vipratiṣedhavādin* has to admit that P. 1. 1. 52 (*niyama*) has to operate there. This thus proves clearly, says the opponent (we may now call him the *siddhāntin*), that not only in cases like *cayana*, but everywhere where Guṇa is taught, the presence of P. 1. 1. 52 is unavoidable. This means the relation between P. 1. 1. 52 and 3 is that of an *utsarga* and *apavāda* (तस्मादस्त्येतयोर्विरोधित्वेनापेक्षा), where the *apavāda* is bound to supersede always the *utsarga* (for otherwise it will be meaningless). There is no *vipratiṣedha* -

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1 अफलत्वेऽपि पर्जन्यन्यायेनेति भावः (छाया) ।

conflict of equals– between the two. Since this particular relation between the two, viz. of *utsarga* and *apavāda* is thus established, the view of the Kroṣṭrīyas that the two are mutually independent rules having ordinarily no connection whatsoever also falls to the ground.

Kaiy. expresses the idea in more or less the same words : यदीदं नारभ्येत, गुणवृद्धी कस्य स्याताम्? अलोऽन्त्यस्येति चेत्, येन नाप्राप्तिन्यायेन तद्बाधापवादत्वाद् विप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । एवं च क्रोष्ट्रीयमतमसंबद्धपरिभाषान्तरपक्षश्च नोपपद्यते।

अथापि कथंचित् — This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh* : अथापि कथंचिद् 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इत्यस्यावकाशः स्यात्, एवमपि यथेह विप्रतिषेधादिको गुणो भवति, मेद्यति मेद्यतः मेद्यन्तीति, एवमिहापि स्यात्, अनेनिजुः पर्यवेविषुरिति ।

The *Mbh* here points out that even if it were accepted for the sake of argument that there is *vipratiṣedha*[1] between P. 1. 1. 3 and 52, that will hardly solve all the difficulties. It may be convenient in the case of *cayana* etc. but it will be inconvenient in cases like *anenijuḥ* because it will entail a Guṇa substitute for the radical *i* (which is not desired).

The word अभ्यारुह्य in the *Dīp.* seems to mean : taking it for granted for the time being, or for the sake of argument. It is used in किमिदं भवानभ्यारुह्य तस्य ग्रहणस्यैव प्रयोजनमाह न पुनः सर्वस्यैव योगस्य (under P. 4. 1. 92 [Vol. II, p. 245, lines 11–12] and P. 4. 3. 134 [p. 321, line 13]), in a somewhat different sense.

Variants : (1) The MS reading एकविशेषणसंनिपाताद् (for एकविषय°) — retained in the older editions — does not give the intended meaning. I have therefore emended it to °विषय°. Cf. एकविषये संनिपातो from Kaiyaṭa. (2) यद्दीर्घत्वैत्वयोः does not make a satisfactory sense. तथा requires a यथा. Hence the emendation : यथा दीर्घे°. (3) For the provisional filling of a hidden gap after °स्थापने व्यापृता, इयमपि, see *Notes* above. (4) The MS विप्रतिषेधोविरोधे is split up by Sw as विप्रतिषेधः, अविरोधे. This अकारप्रश्लेष resorted to by the editor clearly defeats the purpose of the *Mbh* which is arguing that since conflict-of-equals (विरोध) is there, there cannot be an *utsargāpavāda* relation. अविरोधे goes exactly against the intended idea. (5) For the provisional filling of a hidden gap after यत्र 'इको गुणवृद्धी°, see *Notes* above. (6) I have added a न before किंचित् कृतं स्यात्, as it is clearly required by the context. (6a) Mbh. Ed. पूर्वश्चायं योगः (Bhar. reads पूर्वोऽयं योगः). (7) The MS reading स्वतादिषु is inexplicable. Relying on the first syllable, AL reconstruct it as स्वरान्तादिषु while relying on the second, Sw as यातादिषु. But since forms like चयन are the bone of

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1. It should be borne in mind that the *vipratiṣedha* has been used in this section rather in the sense of *pūrvavipratiṣedha* because *para* (in P. 1. 4. 2) has been taken as equivalent to *iṣṭa*.

contention (as expressly mentioned in the *Mbh*), I have reconstructed चयनादिषु as the text. (8) The MS reading खव्रप्राप्ते (constituted text स[र्वे]त्र प्राप्ते) is apparently read as खल्वप्राप्ते by Sw and is given by him as खलु अप्राप्ते (this second word अप्राप्ते as a part of the *Mbh pratīka*). This is positively wrong. The नियम is definitely प्राप्त, when P. 1. 1. 3 presents itself in the formation as *cayana* etc. Read : यावता नाप्राप्ते नियमेऽयं योग आरभ्यतेऽतस्तदपवादोऽयं योगो भवति. Secondly, the *Dīp*, एवं सर्वत्र प्राप्ते नियम इदमारभ्यते is evidently Bhar's paraphrase of the *Mbh*. नाप्राप्ते नियमेऽयं योग आरभ्यते and so it should not be given as the *Mbh*. citation.

[16]

एवं तर्हि वृद्धिर्भवति गुणो भवति इति — Here the *Mbh*. presents the fourth and the last alternative explanation — an explanation which is traditionally regarded as the *siddhānta*[1] of the *Mbh* — about the relation between P. 1. 1. 3 and 52. The full text of *Mbh*. represented by this *pratīka* runs as follows :

एवं तर्हि वृद्धिर्भवति गुणो भवतीति यत्र ब्रूयाद्, 'इकः' इत्येतत् तत्रोपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यम् । किं कृतं भवति ? द्वितीया षष्ठी प्रादुर्भाव्यते । तत्र कामचारः, गृह्यमाणेन वेकं विशेषयितुम्, इका वा गृह्यमाणम् । यावता कामचारः, इह तावन्मिदिमृंजिपुगन्तलघूपधर्च्छिदृशिक्षिप्रक्षुद्रेषु गृह्यमाणेनेकं विशेषयिष्यामः— एतेषां य इगिति । इहेदानीं जुसिसार्वधातुकार्धधातुकह्रस्वाद्योर्गुणेष्विका गृह्यमाणं विशेषयिष्यामः — एतेषां गुणो भवति 'इकः' = इगन्तानामिति ।

Pat. makes two statements here : (1) *ikaḥ* in P. 1. 1. 3 is not to be understood in the ordinary sense of 'of *ik*' or 'in the place of *ik*'. It is what is called a स्वरूपनिर्देश. Pāṇini has only *mentioned* that form here, not *used* it. So all that P. 1. 1. 3 says is that wherever Guṇa or Vṛddhi is predicated, the expression *ikaḥ* presents itself there.[2] (2) It is only when this expression *ikaḥ* has presented itself in a particular rule that we think about its relation to *aṅgasya*, not before that. And here too we take a practical view. We do not bind ourselves to either the *taccheṣapakṣa* or the *tadapavādapakṣa* exclusively. We follow this or that view according as it suits a particular case. That means, we decide the role of the Genitive *aṅgasya* according to convenience. In the case of the roots like *mid*, *mṛj* etc. we take *mider* (*aṅgasya*) as an अवयवषष्ठी, making it qualify *ikaḥ*, the स्थानषष्ठी. (This then takes care of the defect pointed out in the Vār : *Vṛddhiguṇāv* .. ... *ig-grahaṇam*). In the case of *jus*, *sārvadhātuka* etc. on the other hand, we take *aṅgasya* as the स्थानषष्ठी and make *ikaḥ* (= *igantasya*) qualify it. (This assures the

[1] अथ सिद्धान्ती निर्दुष्टं पक्षमाह—एवं तर्हीति । (छाया)

[2] Cf. *Sid. Kau*'s explanation of P. 1.1. 3 : गुणवृद्धिशब्दाभ्यां यत्र गुणवृद्धी विधीयेते तत्र 'इकः' इति षष्ठ्यन्तं पदमुपतिष्ठते ।

absence of the unwanted Guṇa in forms like *anenijuḥ*, see Vār *iṅmātrasya* ... ... *anantyapratiṣedhaḥ*). Thus we can account for all the forms without making any amendments in Pāṇini's rules. — The whole of *Dīp.* 16 explains these points.

एतद् कथं निपतति ? — The verb *ni-pat* is usually used in grammar to denote simultaneous occurrence of two things. The point is : If you choose to take अङ्गस्य as the स्थानषष्ठी (so as to be qualified by *ikaḥ*), you must do so in *all* cases. Similarly if you choose to take it as अवयवषष्ठी (so as to make it qualify *ikaḥ*, now *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*), you must stick to it in *all* cases. You can't take one in some cases, and the other in others. How do both present themselves simultaneously to be at your diposal ? That is the question. तत्र इक इत्येष षष्ठ्यर्थोऽपि संनिहितो भवति — Actually Pat. has only said 'इकः' इत्येतत् तत्रोपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यम् । Bhar. has reproduced this idea also in the immediately following sentence : अथ वा इक इत्येषा श्रुतिः संनिहिता भवति. I see neither the authority (in the *Mbh*) nor the purpose for Bhar's additional alternative : षष्ठ्यर्थोऽपि संनिहितो भवति. क्रियाप्रतिलम्भस्तु ... ... षष्ठीमन्ति क्रियन्ते — The expression *ikaḥ* does not participate in any activity (either in the capacity of a स्थानषष्ठी or an अवयवषष्ठी) as long as it is still in P. 1. 1. 3. It becomes involved in the Guṇa-Vṛddhi operations only when it has presented itself in the concrete rules (*pradeśa*) which lay down Guṇa and Vṛddhi. The purpose of P. 1. 1. 3 is merely to supply an expression *ikaḥ* to such rules. Bhar's गुणवृद्धिश्रुत्युपसंगृहीतानि (= गुण-वृद्धिविधायकगुणवृद्धिश्रुतियुक्तानि) is a paraphrase of the *Mbh* वृद्धिर्भवति गुणो भवतीति यत्र ब्रूयात्.

अयमेव न्यायो ...... प्रतिपद्यते इति— Bhar. justifies the procedure of deciding the character of the Genitive *ikaḥ* and the role it is going to play only after its physical presence in the particular injunctive rule as logical. After all a Paribhāṣā is subordinate to and meant for (*parārthya*) the injunctive rule which is the principal (*pradhāna*). अनारभ्य किंचित् ... ... परिगृह्णीमः — Bhar. supports his statement by citing a similar procedure from ritual. There *ārabhya* means something which is taught in a particular context or situation only, while *anārabhya* means something which is taught in a general way, but it is liable to be modified in a particular way according to the context or situation. In the Mīmāṁsā आरभ्याधीत refers to Dharma taught in particular contexts, while अनारभ्याधीत refers to the *mānavadharama*. Pat. has once used an expression अनारभ्यापवाद under P. 7. 2. 8 (Kiel. III. 282. 11) meaning a prohibition of the augment *iṭ* applicable to the *iṭ* taught in any context. -भिन्नम्-- modified, as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) or qualified (*viśeṣya*). उत्सृज्यते — The agent of this activity of 'releasing' is of course Pāṇini. Cf. for a similar use of the verb the *Mbh* : संस्कृत्य संस्कृत्य पदान्युत्सृज्यन्ते तेषां यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति तद्यथा 'आहर पात्रम्' 'पात्रमाहर' इति (under P. 1. 1. 1; Kiel. I. 39. 18–19). —

सर्वत्र प्रदेशेषु ... इकः विशेष्यत्वेन — This explains the *Mbh* : मिदि मृजि — इकं विशेषयिष्यामः. As said above, P. 1. 1. 3 merely supplies an expression *ikaḥ* (without any commitment as to its exact meaning) into the rules laying down Guṇa and Vṛddhi. When this *ikaḥ* is added, the rule P. 7. 3· 82 now becomes (प्रधानवाक्यमेवंभूतं संपन्नं) complete as मिदेरिको गुणो [भवति]. With the full rule thus formed, we have now to think about how to organize the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव between मिदेः and इकः. Unless and until a definite role and activity is assigned to *ikaḥ*, one cannot speak of the interdependence of P. 1. 1. 3 and 52 either as being of the nature of Principal-and-Subordinate (*aṅgatvena*) or of conflict (*virodhitvena*). What role is to be assigned depends upon which one is feasible (and leads to the desired result). Thus there is scope for the grammarian's choice (*kāmacāraḥ*). The grammarian tests both the alternatives in each single case, sees which one is workable (and conduces to the desired form) and then — and not before then — decides the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव. This is the व्यापारविशेष (specific activity) of the grammarian. (Scil वैयाकरणः as the substantive of असमाश्रितव्यापारविशेषः). As a result of this mental activity he decides that in the case of *mid* etc. *ikaḥ* should be विशेष्य (i.e. स्थानषष्ठी) and अङ्गस्य should be विशेषण (i. e. अवयवषष्ठी) i. e. मिदेर् (अङ्गस्य) इकः (स्थाने) गुणो भवति. He decides it this way because he cannot say इगन्तस्य मिदः (or मिदः अन्त्यस्य इकः) गुणो भवति since this is impossible; *mid* can never have final *ik*. Here it should be noted that Bhar. gives the first preference to making मिदः (अङ्गस्य) the विशेष्य and इकः the विशेषण; only when this fails, he turns to the other alternative of making इकः the विशेष्य, and मिदः (अङ्गस्य) its विशेषण. Bhar. cites as an example the case of P. 6. 4. 89 : ऊदुपधाया गोहः ' where the (Guṇa form) *goh* is expected, there is instead *ū* in the place of the penultimate (of *guh*)', where *goh* is regarded as an अवयवषष्ठी qualifying *upadhā* ' penultimate '. In the case of *jus*, etc., however, the opposite procedure is accepted, i. e. *ikaḥ* is made to qualify *aṅga* : इगन्तस्य अङ्गस्य जुसि गुणः, which is regarded as a natural and logical interpretation (see below).

Observation - Although there is no indication of it in the MS, some words have been evidently lost. Since the opposite case (जुसादिषु तु) is here introduced, some such words as इकोऽन्त्यस्य संभवाद् अङ्गं विशेष्यत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते, इकश्च विशेषणत्वेन have to be understood after जुसादिषु तु. As Bhar. says, this type of opposite विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is to be chosen here because here there is the possibility of a final *ik*, as e. g. when we form words like *cayana, cetā* from *ci* and *stavana, stotā* from *stu*. We can therefore legitimately make अङ्गस्य as the विशेष्य, qualified by the विशेषण *ikaḥ*. It will be thus seen that in principle Bhar. is in favour of making अङ्गस्य as the स्थानषष्ठी, hence the विशेष्य (to be qualified) and *ikaḥ* its विशेषण (qualifier); only where this is impossible

(where a stem does not have a final *ik*) then, as the next best, he would reverse the relationship between अङ्गस्य and इकः.

भूयसामनुग्रहाद् ...... अङ्गस्य य इगिति ? — An objection against the interpretation इगन्तस्य अङ्गस्य जुसि गुणः suggested above. It is made on the strength of भूयसामनुग्रहः 'helpfulness in many cases.' It is contended that even if one says जुसादिषु अङ्गस्य य इक् तस्य गुणः (just as one says मिदादीनाम् इको गुणः), it would still help in arriving at a number of desired forms (like अबिभयुः, अजुहवुः). (That it would not work in cases like अनेनिजुः, पर्यवेविषुः is a different thing; some special rule could be made for such cases.) Since that would also be a general rule yielding a number of desired forms, what harm is there in saying जुसादिष्वङ्गस्य य इक् तस्य गुणः ? — says the objector. As a reply, Bhar. simply points to the option (*kāmacāra*) available to the grammarian who interprets Pāṇini's rules. And if *ik* is made to qualify the *aṅga* that too does help[1] many a formation. Now, the question is : Neither of the interpretations is wholly satisfactory. Neither explains all the forms. One explains some, the other the others. If then भूयसामनुग्रहः is equally common to both interpretations, why does Bhar. give preference to that view which makes अङ्गस्य the विशेष्य and इकः its विशेषण ? Thus cornered, Bhar. has now to offer a logical justification (*upapattiḥ*) for his preference.

उपपत्तिरप्यत्र वर्ण्यते ...... सा कल्पना आश्रयितव्या contains this logical justification. The argument is briefly like this : (1) The Guṇa, which is the predicate, is the principal element (*pradhāna–*). The *aṅga* and the *ik*, which are to undergo this operation, are subordinate towards it. (2) It is desired that both these subordinate elements should be connected with the principal one (*pradhānasaṁyoga* or °*saṁnikarṣa*). (3) Of these two, *ik* is always connected actually (*arthena*) with Guṇa, because the Guṇa is to come in the place of *ik*. So there is no problem about it. (4) But there is some problem with *aṅga*. It is never going to have actual connection with Guṇa, the way *ik* will have it. (5) Now in those cases where both interpretations are possible if, as the objector proposes, we take *ikaḥ* as the स्थानषष्ठी and *aṅgasya* as the अवयवषष्ठी, thus making *aṅgasya* qualify *ikaḥ* (अङ्गस्य य इक् तस्य गुणः), then all connection between *aṅgasya* and *guṇaḥ* is severed. The expectation (*arthitvam*) about the substituend created by the predication of Guṇa is satisfied by *ikaḥ*. This expectation being thus fully satisfied and thus consumed (*upayukta–*) by the qualified *ikaḥ*, the qualifier *aṅgasya* remains unconnected with Guṇa. As said above, it will never have an actual connection with it; with the present proposed interpretation, even the verbal (*śabdena*)

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[1] The MS नास्त्येव (retained in older editions) goes against the intended meaning. I have therefore tentatively proposed चास्त्येव in the place of नास्त्येव.

connection is denied to it. (6) If, on the other hand, we take *aṅgasya* as the स्थानषष्ठी (qualified by *ikaḥ* = *igantasya*), then the *aṅga* has at least a verbal connection with Guṇa. (It does not matter if *ikaḥ* does not have a verbal connection with Guṇa because actual connection will always be there.).

So, Bhar. concludes, we should accept that particular interpretation, which allows connection of both *ik* and *aṅga* with Guṇa (तस्माद्यस्यां कल्पनायां इगंगयोः प्रधानेन संस्पर्शः सा कल्पना आश्रयितव्या).

अनिवारितरूपेषु अङ्गग्रहणेषु, in those cases where the form of *aṅgasya* is not restricted, i.e. where *aṅgasya* can be taken either as स्थानषष्ठी (hence विशेष्य) or as अवयवषष्ठी (hence विशेषण), as e.g. in the formation of *cayana, cetā* etc. from *ci* etc. It is not improbable that अनिर्धारित was the original reading. But अनिवारित does equally well.— The adj. विशेषणवत्ता qualifies a substantive इका understood (AL actually supply it in the text).

इयं तु क्वचित् ...... शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिरेव ग्रहीतव्या — Bhar. here admits that the logically desired alternative in this matter is not always practical. Sometimes we have no option but to accept the interpretation where there is not even verbal connection between *aṅga* and Guṇa. But we can't help it. We have to allow the śāstra to take its own course although it may not be at times logical and consistent. As Pat. would say : नात्रैकः पन्थाः शक्य आश्रयितुम्। (Though I have thus given what I think to be the tenor of *Dīp*, I confess the text is not quite clear to me.)

Kaiy. puts the whole idea briefly thus : प्रदेशार्थत्वादनयोः परिभाषयोर्गुणत्वात् परस्परेण संबन्धाभावात् प्रदेशवाक्यपर्यालोचनया वाक्यार्थस्यावस्थानमित्यर्थः। Commenting on this, Nāg. brings in the *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* element. He says that the presence of the predicate *guṇaḥ* in the injunctive rules gives the occasion to P. 1. 1. 3 to present itself first. In the case of मिद् etc. there is no possibility of syntactic connection based on सामानाधिकरण्य. And once the connection in the form मिदादेः (अङ्गस्य) य इक् तस्य गुणः is established, there is no scope for P. 1. 1. 52. In the case of the rules like सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः, however, there *is* a possibility to connect them in such a way so as to make them coreferential. Read प्रदेशार्थत्वादिति। परस्परेण संबन्धाभावादित्यन्तेन तच्छेषत्वासंभव उक्तः। पदोपस्थितिपक्षे च विधेयसमर्पकत्वेन गृहीतगुणादिश्रुतिरस्या लिङ्गमित्येषान्तरङ्गा। तत्त्वेन ग्रहश्च प्रथमाया विधेयविभक्तित्वेन तदन्तत्वेन पदज्ञानकाल एव। ... ... नियमस्तु स्थानषष्ठीलिङ्गक इति अवान्तरवाक्यार्थबोधोत्तरकालिकत्वेन बहिरङ्गः। एवं च मिदादावुपस्थितेक्परिभाषायाः सामान्याधिकरण्यासंभवाद् वैयधिकरण्यान्वये वृत्ते निमित्ताभावादेवालोन्त्यस्येत्यस्यानुपस्थितिः। सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरित्यादौ सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयेऽलोन्त्यस्येत्यनेनान्त्यस्यादेशव्यवस्था। एतेनैकस्या अप्रवृत्तौ अपरापि न प्रवर्तेतेत्यपास्तम्। पर्यालोचनयेति। प्रदेशे सति संभवे परिभाषाद्वयैकवाक्यतया (= 'परिभाषाद्वयस्य विधिवाक्येन सह वाक्यैकवाक्यतया पदैकवाक्यतया वा' छाया) वाक्यार्थः। अन्यथा त्विक्परिभाषागर्भ एव, अस्या अन्तरङ्गत्वादित्यर्थः।

Readings : (1) Sw's conjectural emendation निपातेनेदं (for निपतति नेदं) is not useful. Besides it misses the import of the text. (2) The grammatically correct form is षष्ठीमन्ति. Hence the emendation. (3) The corruption of an original क्रियंते into क्रिथेल is not impossible. (4) The MS often writes त for भ. So तिन्न is to be certainly read as भिन्न. Besides it fits in admirably well with the syntactically connected expression प्रधानभेदात्. (5) °वादोऽयं परिगृहीतः will do equally well. But since the last letter is clearly मः, I am inclined to read परिगृ(ही) मः. (6) While the MS सत्रप्रदेशेषु makes no sense, the सूत्रप्र° of the older editions only reads a word (viz. सूत्र) which is by itself meaningful but the whole expression does not yield any satisfactory sense. I think that a letter र्व is somehow lost between स and त्र. Alternately सर्वप्रदेशेषु is also possible. (7) An emendation असमीक्षित will also do well, but पौरुषेयो व्यापार आश्रीयते of the text favours असमाश्रित. (8) Thinking that सा is corrupt for स्या (in साद्), ALSw reconstruct the word as स्याद्. But it is the question of direct relationship (between *aṅga* and Guṇa) that is considered here. (Also, a finite verb is not quite necessary.) So I think that a letter क्षा is dropped in the MS after सा. (9) Following AL, I read विशेषताव as विशेषवता (going with इका understood), taking that there is a metathesis of letters, — only that I insert a ण after विशेष (*viśeṣaṇavat* = having a qualification, qualified). But I think that Sw's reconstruction विशेष-भाव (understanding it in the sense of विशेषणभाव as above) = विशेषणभावे (in Saṁdhi) is equally good. Firstly, the writing of त in the place of भ is not rare in this MS (See remark No. 4 above). Secondly it makes a good sense also. It would mean : Once *aṅgasya* is connected with *ikaḥ* by the part-and-whole relation (expressed by अवयवषष्ठी), its syntactical connection in the sentence is utilised and exhausted. It is no more capable of being connected again with Guṇa as substituend of the latter (expressed by स्थान-षष्ठी). — Actually both interpretations are only two sides of a coin, and together make one complete interpretation. The interpretation given earlier above says that *ik* and Guṇa get connected, while *aṅga* remains outside; the present one says that *aṅga*, having once been connected with *ik*, cannot again be connected with Guṇa. The difficulty pointed out in the text, viz. that no direct connection is established between *aṅga* and Guṇa is common to both. (10) The tenor of the *Dīp.* here being that both *ik* and *aṅga* should be directly connected with Guṇa, I supply ग between गं and यो (restored to योः), taking that it was dropped by a scribal error.

[17]

The *pratīka* अथ वा सर्वत्रैवात्र स्थानी निर्दिश्यते represents the following *Mbh:*

अथ वा सर्वत्रैवात्र स्थानी निर्दिश्यते । इह तावन् मिदेरित्यविभक्तिको निर्देशः । मिद् एः

मिदेरिति । अथ वा, षष्ठीसमासो भविष्यति, मिद इः मिदिः मिदेरिति ॥

पुगन्तलघूपधस्येति । नैवं विज्ञायते — पुगन्ताङ्गस्य लघूपधस्य चेति । कथं तर्हि ? पुकि अन्तः पुगन्तः, लघ्वी उपधा लघूपधा, पुगन्तश्च लघूपधा च पुगन्तलघूपधं पुगन्तलघूपधस्येति । अवश्यं चैतदेवं विज्ञेयम् । अङ्गविशेषणे सतीह प्रसज्येत, भिनत्ति, छिनत्तीति ।

ऋच्छेरपि । प्रश्लिष्टनिर्देशोऽयम् । ऋच्छति ऋ ऋ ऋताम् = ऋच्छत्यृतामिति ।

दृशेरपि । योगविभागः करिष्यते । 'उरङि गुणः' उः अङि गुणो भवति । ततो दृशे । दृशेश्चाङि गुणो भवति । उरित्येव ।

क्षिप्रक्षुद्रयोरपि । 'यणादिपरं गुणः' इतीयता सिद्धम् । सोऽयमेवं सिद्धे सति यत् पूर्वग्रहणं करोति, तस्यैतत् प्रयोजनम् — इको यथा स्याद्, अनिको मा भूदिति ॥

Here Pat. is making an attempt to meet the objection taken against the *taccheṣa* view in the Vār वृद्धिगुणावलोऽन्त्यस्येति चेन् ...... इग्ग्रहणम् । It was maintained there that if the *taccheṣa* view is to be accepted, an additional word *ikaḥ* will have to be read in the rules *mider guṇaḥ* etc., so as to mention the specific substituend, since *ik* in these cases being not final could not otherwise undergo Guṇa on account of the rule *alo' ntyasya.* Now Pat. tries to show, by resorting to different tricks of interpretation, that it could be regarded that a substituend *i* (in some cases *ṛ*) has been already read by Pāṇini in all these cases. (1) In the expression *mider* (Genitive sing. of *midi*), the stem final *i* is not a metalinguistic element added to *mid* to form a name of the verbal root *mid.*[1] It is a mention of the radical vowel itself, the whole expression being either a compound of *mid* + *i* or an uncompounded expression with the Genitive dropped after *mid.* (2) The expression पुगन्तलघूपधस्य is not adjectival Bahuvrīhi qualifiying अङ्गस्य. It is a substantival Tatpuruṣa, where the phoneme preceding *puk* and a short penultimate are specifically mentioned as the substituend. (3) By resorting to a प्रश्लिष्टनिर्देश, it can be shown that the substituend *ṛ* is expressly mentioned in *ṛcchatyṛtām.* (4) By a *yogavibhāga,* a *ṛ* (in the Genitive *uḥ*) can be brought down to supply the substituend. The upshot of this text is that it is not necessary to read *ikaḥ* in the Sūtras *mider guṇaḥ* etc. as was maintained by the opponent. The *taccheṣa* view can stand without any such emendation in the rules. So Bhar. says : तच्छेषमाश्रित्य स्थानिनो निर्दिष्टत्वादिग्ग्रहणं प्रदेशेषु न कर्तव्यमित्येतदाचष्टे ।

क्षिप्रक्षुद्रयोरपि ...... तेषामोर्गुण एव भवतीति । Of the Sūtras mentioned in the Vār, Bhar. takes up only the one regarding क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र, the basic stems from which the derivatives like क्षेपिष्ठ and क्षोदिष्ठ respectively are to be derived. Pāṇini's rule in this case is : स्थूलदूरयुवह्रस्वक्षिप्रक्षुद्राणां यणादिपरं पूर्वस्य च गुणः

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[1] According to the Vār : *ik-śtipau dhātunirdeśe.*

(6. 4. 156). The rule roughly says that the part[1] of the six words beginning with a semivowel (*yaṇ*) (i. e.) *-la* of *sthūla*, *-va* of *yuva* and *hrasva*, and *-ra* (of others) is dropped and the preceding phoneme is replaced by Guṇa when suffixes like *iṣṭha* follow. Bhar. raises a problem here. It concerns the interpretation of the word यणादि. The compound can be solved in both the ways *i* as Tatpuruṣa i. e. यण आदिः ' what precedes the *yaṇ* ' and also as Bahuvrīhi i. e. यण् आदिरस्य ' what begins with *yaṇ* '. Both these interpretations, Bhar. points out, while they are useful in some cases, make for difficulty in others. Thus the solution यण आदिः is useful in deriving the forms क्षेपिष्ठ and क्षोदिष्ठ. To explain : In क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र, the phoneme *r* constitutes the *yaṇ*. The sound preceding this *yaṇ* (i. e. यणादि) is *p* in *kṣipra* and *d* in *kṣudra*. So (1) यणादेः परं लुप्यते means the portion *-ra* (in both stems) is dropped. (2) Secondly, पूर्वस्य गुणः means what precedes the *yaṇādi*, i. e. what precedes *p* and *d* (= *i* and *u* respectively) undergoes Guṇa. So we get the desired forms क्षेपिष्ठ and क्षोदिष्ठ. So far so good. But this way of solving the compound यणादि is inconvenient when we seek to derive यविष्ठ. In the word युवन्, the sound *v* constitutes the यण् (i. e. on the assumption that here the later *yaṇ* — यणादिपरं— is meant, and not the first one). The vowel *u* is therefore the यणादि. Now the bit *van* will be dropped all right, it being यणादेः परम्. But यणादेः (उकारस्य) पूर्वम् here is *y*, which will have to be replaced by Guṇa (by *e* ?), resulting into a wrong form.

So we try the other explanation : यण् आदिरस्य. In the word युवन्, the *-van* forms the यणादि part, which is therefore dropped. Also what precedes this *yaṇādi* viz. *u* undergoes Guṇa, and the desired form यविष्ठ is had. True. But we cannot apply this interpretation to क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र. After the यणादि portion (i.e. *-ra*) is dropped, what precedes is *p* and *d*. If they are to be replaced by a Guṇa (which ?), awkward forms would result. So neither of the interpretations can derive all the forms satisfactorily. This objection is stated in the *Dīp*. यदि तावत् यण आदिः ... ... क्षेपिष्ठे तु पकारस्य गुणः प्राप्नोति ।

Observation : Though the MS gives no sign of it, some portion of the text is clearly lost after अत्र हि यणादिः पकारो दकारश्चेति तयोर्गुणः and before प्राप्नोति. There are two reasons for such an assumption. (1) The verb प्राप्नोति goes ill with the Guṇa of *i* and *u* in क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र respectively. प्राप्नोति indicates something which becomes due, with the further suggestion that what becomes due is not desired : it is something like a प्रसङ्ग, an undesired contingency. Here, on the

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[1] The परं seems to be intended to contrast with पूर्वस्य in the rule. Traditionally it is also taken to qualify यण् (though rather irregularly) so as to preclude the dropping of the part beginning with the earlier *yaṇ* — i. e. of the whole *yuvan* and of *-rasva* (in *hrasva*). Yet another interpretation is there in the text itself.

other hand the above mentioned Guṇa is not only desired, but is also achieved (cf. सिद्धं क्षेपिष्ठः क्षोदिष्ठः in the *Dīp.*). So the predicate सिध्यति seems to fit eminently for तयोर्गुणः । (2) If तयोर्गुणः is not the subject of प्राप्नोति, then what is? This Guṇa must be something which is not desired. And what else could it be if not the Guṇa for *y* (in *yuvan*) as we saw above? So the Guṇa substitute for *y* thus becomes a fitting subject for प्राप्नोति. This thus fulfils what otherwise would remain a desideratum. So I supply सिध्यति । यविष्ठ इत्यत्र तु यकारस्य गुणः as the lost portion. Further the omission seems to be hapl. (caused by the two occurrences of गुणः). — It should be noted that तयोर् (in तयोर्गुणः प्राप्नोति) 'in the two forms' refers to क्षेपिष्ठ and क्षोदिष्ठ, and not to *p* and *d* which happen to be mentioned immediately before.

Sw supplies पूर्वस्य between तयोर् and गुणः to avoid this possible misunderstanding — viz. that *p* and *d* are mentioned as the possible substituend for Guṇa. As regards the possible gap in the MS, however, he too seems to be unaware of it.

एवं तर्हि स्थूलादिषु ... ... यणादेः पूर्वस्य गुणो भविष्यति. This contains Bhar's way out of the dilemma mentioned above. Of the two interpretations, he apparently accepts यण आदिः यणादिः (though he does not say so specifically). Then, as we saw above, this interpretation leads to the undesired Guṇa-substitution in the place of *y* in *yuvan*. So what he suggests is to dispense with the use of this sūtra for securing Guṇa as far as the first four stems (*sthūla, dūra, yuvan* and *hrasva*) are concerned. Bhar. says that P. 6. 4. 146: *or guṇḥ* (= *uvarṇāntasya bhasya guṇo bhavati taddhite parataḥ*) can take care of it. So the present rule (P. 6.4.156) is responsible, as far as these four stems are concerned, only for the dropping of the elements *-la, -ra* and *-va,* after which Guṇa is effected by P. 6. 4. 156. The teaching of Guṇa in our rule P. 6. 4. 156 is meant only for क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र ('इदं तु गुणविधानं क्षिप्रक्षुद्रार्थमेव'). (And the dropping of *-ra*, in both these words, is also of course effected by the same rule.) Thus the Guṇa in यविष्ठ being now effected by ओर्गुणः and not by the troublesome rule पूर्वस्य च गुणः the difficulty pointed out above viz. यविष्ठ इत्यत्र तु यकारस्य गुणः प्राप्नोति is successfully tided over.

But all is not well yet. There are two possible objections against such a procedure.

Objection I: Both the rules: *sthūla-dūra* ...(P. 6. 4. 156) and *or guṇaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 146) come under the jurisdiction of P. 6. 4. 22: *asiddhavad atrā bhāt.* Now when *-la* of *sthūla* or *-ra* of *dūra* is dropped by P. 6. 4. 156 and the stems *sthū-, dū-* etc. remain, you cannot apply *or guṇaḥ* and have *sthaviṣṭha, daviṣṭha* etc. The reason is that dropping of *-la, -ra,* etc.

is *asiddhavat* 'as good as non-existent'. So, for all practical purposes the stems are *sthūla, dūra* etc. themselves (and not *sthū-*, *dū-* etc.) when *or guṇaḥ* is to be applied. Since the stems do not end in *ū*, you cannot apply *or guṇaḥ*. The suggestion, therefore, that the Guṇa in *sthaviṣṭha* etc. be accounted for by *or guṇaḥ* cannot be accepted.

This anticipated objection is waved summarily by Bhar. on the ground that the असिद्धत्व taught in P. 6. 4. 22 is not obligatory or universal (अनित्यम्). Sometimes it can be ignored. So the change *sthūla*>*sthū-* stands when *or guṇaḥ* is to be applied.

No reason is given for the non-obligatoriness of P. 6. 4. 22.

Observation : I have supplied here the words त्वनित्यम्, because the sense required it, and also because there is the authority of Kaiy. for it. I do not know how they were dropped in the MS.

Objection II : ननु चोकारान्तानां ... ... चानिष्टं क्रियेत.

The objector says that it is true that the Guṇa forms स्थविष्ठ etc. can be had by applying P. 6. 4. 146 : *or guṇaḥ,* still this cannot severe the connection of स्थूल etc. with पूर्वस्य च गुणः, since both items are read in one and the same rule. The result of this continued association will be that even after *sthū-* etc. have become *stho-* etc. by *or guṇaḥ*, the rule *pūrvasya ca guṇaḥ,* which is still unsatisfied as far as the Guṇa of *sthū* etc. in concerned, can still claim the previous sound (e.g. *th* in *sthūla*) as the substituend for the Guṇa taught by it. This will result into undesired forms (अनिष्टम्).

तस्माद्योगविभागः ... ... तेषामोर्गुण एव भवतीति. Bhar. admits the force of the argument. Something has to be done to avoid this undesired situation by severing the connection of स्थूल etc. with पूर्वस्य च गुणः. So he suggests that the rule P. 6. 4. 156 be split into two (योगविभागः कर्तव्यः) like this :

1 स्थूलदूरयुवह्रस्वक्षिप्रक्षुद्राणां यणादिपरं (लुप्यते)।

2 पूर्वस्य गुणः । (After the योगविभाग *ca* is not necessary.)

The first rule teaches the dropping of *-la* etc. of all the six stems. Then from this rule, only क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र are allowed to be present in the succeeding rule (क्षिप्रक्षुद्रावेव स्वरितत्वादनुवर्तेते ।). So पूर्वस्य गुणः refers only to क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र. As a result of this योगविभाग, the rule पूर्वस्य गुणः is no more connected with स्थूल etc. So there is no danger of any false form resulting.

स्वरितत्वात् = स्वरितत्वप्रतिज्ञानात्. This, too, does not mean that the word क्षिप्र and क्षुद्र 'have been declared to be read with a *svarita* accent', but rather 'should be declared ...' because Bhar. is the first to suggest this योगविभाग and so there could not be a tradition of *svarita* in this case before him. (Pāṇini's

rule 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः declares that what is read with a *svarita* has a validity in the following rules. The termination of its jurisdiction is known from the *vyākhyāna* 'authoritative explanation'. Actually, the subject of this *svarita* is quite controvertial).

Read कैयट : क्षिप्रक्षुद्रयोरपीति। अत्र च योगविभागः क्रियते — 'स्थूलादीनां यणादिपरं लुप्यते', ततः 'पूर्वस्य च गुण' इति। अत्र च स्वरितत्वात् क्षिप्रक्षुद्रशब्दावेवानुवर्तेते। स्थूलादयो निवृत्ताः, तेषां तु यणादिलोपे सत्योर्गुण इति गुणो भवतीति। 'असिद्धवदत्रा भाद्' इत्यसिद्धत्वमनित्यत्वान्न भवति। तत्र क्षिप्रक्षुद्रयोर्यण आदिः पकारो दकारश्च, तस्माद् यणादेः परं लुप्यते, तस्मादेव च यणादेः पूर्वस्य गुण इति सिद्धं क्षेपिष्ठः क्षोदिष्ठ इति। यणादिपरमिति पञ्चमी-समासः।

यद्येवमनिग्लक्षणो .... This remaining part of the *Dīp*. 17 discusses another aspect of the problem. This is the point : The *Mbh* here has tried to show that it is not necessary to read *ikaḥ* in the sūtras like *mider guṇaḥ* or *pugantalaghūpadhasya ca* (as was urged by the opponent), since it can be shown that the substituend has been actually mentioned in each case, and so it does not matter even if the rule P. 1. 1. 3 is not available here. Thus the rule *pugantalaghūpadhasya ca*, as interpreted now, specifically mentions the vowel immediately preceding the *puk*, and a short penultimate, as the substituend. Accepting this interpretation, it is now pointed out here that this will make it difficult to account for the absence of Guṇa in forms like *bhinna* 'broken' on the basis of P. 1. 1. 5 as it is usually done. To explain : P. 1. 1. 5 prohibits Guṇa if the suffix (*ārdhadhātuka* or *sārvadhātuka*) which causes it (by P. 7. 3. 84 etc.) is furnished with a code-letter *k* or *ṅ*. The original ppl.-suffix *ta* (of which *na* is a substitute, P. 8. 2. 42), is read with a code-letter *k*, i. e. as *kta*. This explains the absence of Guṇa in *bhinna* taught by P. 7. 3. 86. Now a condition for the efficatious operation of this prohibitve rule is that the Guṇa must have been taught with a specific utterance of the word *ikaḥ* (it must be *ig-lakṣaṇa*, i. e. taught specifically for *ik* : गित्कित्ङिन्निमित्ते इग्लक्षणे गुणवृद्धी न स्तः। सिकौ). Now if we accept the above interpretation and instead of making *laghūpadha* qualify the *aṅga*, take *laghūpadha* = *laghvī upadhā*, as specifically mentioning the substitutend then the Guṇa taught by P. 7. 3. 86 : *puganta* ...... ceases to be *ig-lakṣaṇa*; it becomes *laghūpadhalakṣaṇa*. As the Guṇa enjoined is not *ig-lakṣaṇa*, P. 1. 1. 5 is unable to prohibit the Guṇa when forms like *bhinna* are to be formed. This objection is stated in यद्येवमनिग्लक्षणोऽयं भवति, निर्दिष्टस्थानिकत्वात्। तत्र भिन्नः भिन्नवान् इत्यत्र प्राप्नोति (scil गुणः)।

उच्यते। यथैवात्रेग्लक्षणत्वे ... इक्स्थानिकत्वे इति। This contains a reply to the above objection. The reply is that on the strength of अनवकाशता (which is the same thing as सामर्थ्य), P. 1. 1. 5 could prohibit the threatened Guṇa in *bhinna* etc. The idea is this : The rule P. 1. 1. 5 is meant to prohibit

all cases of Guṇa and Vṛddhi where the suffix (causing Guṇa or Vṛddhi) is furnished with either *k* or *ṅ* as a code-letter. Now there is no difficulty in cases like *cita, stuta* etc., because the Guṇa taught by P. 7. 3. 84 is *ig-lakṣaṇa* (cf. the *Kāśikā* on P. 7. 3. 84: सार्वधातुके आर्धधातुके च प्रत्यये परत इगन्ताङ्गस्य गुणो भवति।). Although the prohibitory rule P. 1. 1. 5 is thus satisfied as far as the injunctive rule P. 7. 3. 84 is concerned, it is not satisfied as far as P. 7. 3. 86 is concerned, since the Guṇa taught in the latter rule is now not *ig-lakṣaṇa.* We cannot say that since P. 1. 1. 5 is satisfied as far as P. 7. 3. 84, it does not matter if it remains unsatisfied with reference to P. 7. 3. 86. For it is claimed, on the basis of the doctrine of *upaplava,* that there are as many P. 1. 1. 5 rules as there are Guṇa-enjoining rules. So P. 1. 1. 5 as prohibiting P. 7. 3. 86 has a rightful claim to be satisfied. As a result of this it will successfully prohibit the Guṇa in *bhinna* etc. even if the latter be not *ig-lakṣaṇa.* As Bhar. says : एवमिहाप्यसति इक्स्थानिकत्वे [अनवकाशमिति प्रतिषेधो भवति]।

A parallel is cited from the *Mbh* to support this argument. The example is again the same, viz. the Guṇa in cases like *bhinna.* Also there is no problem about *ig-lakṣaṇatva* and *aniglakṣaṇatva.* (The पदोपस्थिति view• which states that the word *ikaḥ* presents itself in all the rules which lay down Guṇa and Vṛddhi, is the official view of the *Mbh* according to the tradition, as stated above.) There is altogether a different problem in the *Mbh* under P. 1. 1. 5.

The problem there is this : *kṅiti* (in P. 1. 1. 5) is a locative. Now when it prohibits Guṇa, it will apparently prohibit the Guṇa substitute for *ik* ony when it immediately precedes the *kit* or *ṅit* suffix because of the rule : *tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya* (P. 1. 1. 66). So the absence of Guṇa in forms like *cita* or *stuta* will be accounted for. The absence of Guṇa in forms like *bhinna* remains unaccounted for, since P. 1. 1. 5 cannot prohibit the Guṇa there as *i* of the stem does not immediately precede the participle suffix• To get over this difficulty, it is suggested in the Vār (1) that the locative *kṅiti* should be interpreted as a *nimitta-saptamī* 'locative of cause'. The rule 1. 1. 5 will then mean : 'A Guṇa due to a *kit* or *ṅit* suffix does not take place'. Since the locative is thus interpreted as a *nimittasaptamī* (and not as a *parasaptamī*), P. 1. 1. 66 has no occasion to step in. It is no more necessary that the substituend should immediately precede the suffix. The Vār therefore pleads for the तन्निमित्तग्रहण in P. 1. 1. 5. Read the *Mbh* for this initial position :

'क्ङिति प्रतिषेधे तन्निमित्तग्रहणम्' (वार्त्तिक १)

क्ङिति प्रतिषेधे तन्निमित्तग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । क्ङिन्निमित्ते ये गुणवृद्धी प्राप्नुतस्ते न भवत इति वक्तव्यम्। किं प्रयोजनम् ?

'उपधारोरवीत्यर्थम्' (वार्त्तिक २)

उपधार्थं रोरवीत्यर्थं च । उपधार्थं तावत् — भिन्नः भिन्नवानिति । किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति ? क्ङितीत्युच्यते । यत्र क्ङित्यनन्तरो गुणभाव्यस्ति तत्रैव स्यात् चितम्, स्तुतम् । इह तु न स्यात्, भिन्नः भिन्नवानिति ।

As usual with him, Pat. then tries to refute this suggestion by resorting to a series of different devices of interpretation. One of them is based on the अनवकाशत्व. Here also the doctrine of *upaplava* is said to be in the background.[1] That occurrence of P. 1. 1. 5 which corresponds to the *laghūpadha* portion of the injunctive rule P. 7. 3. 86 is otherwise always going to remain unsatisfied. By its very nature the *upadhā* ' penultimate ' will always be separated from the suffix by the final phoneme of the stem. If then the absence of immediacy is going to prevent P. 1. 1. 5 from operating in cases like *bhinna,* that aspect of P. 1. 1. 5 which is meant for cases like this will remain eternally unsaisfied. As this is not desired, it is to be presumed that P. 1. 1. 5 is effective towards cases like *bhinna* inspite of the absence of immediate contact between *ik* and the suffix. Read the *Mbh.* :

उपधार्थेन तावन्नार्थः । ...... अथ वा, यदेतस्मिन्योगे क्ङिद्ग्रहणं तदनवकाशम् । तस्यानवकाशत्वाद् गुणवृद्धी न भविष्यतः । Bhar. has quoted only a part of this passage viz., यदेतस्मिन् योगे क्ङिद्ग्रहणं तदनवकाशम्. He says that just as व्यवधान is ignored on the strength of अनवकाशत्व, similarly here अनिग्लक्षणत्व will be ignored for the same reason.

Kaiyaṭa has expressed the same idea. But instead of resorting to the अनवकाशत्व (apparently because Bhar. himself is going to refute it), he takes his stand on the suggestive nature (*jñāpaka-*) of the suffixes *knu* (P. 3. 2. 140) and *san* (the first of which is actually made *kit* and the second declared to be so in certain environments[2]). The fact that they successfully prohibit Guṇa in forms like *gṛdhnu, dhṛṣṇu* and *rurudiṣati, vividiṣati* respectively shows that immediate precedence of *ik* is not necessary. Read : यदि तर्हि 'पुगन्तलघूपधस्य' इति स्थानी निर्दिश्यते तच्छेषपक्षाश्रयणान्नात्रेक्परिभाषा नोपतिष्ठते, तदास्य गुणस्यानिग्लक्षणत्वात् भिन्नमित्यादौ 'क्ङिति च' इति निषेधो न प्राप्नोति । यथा लैगवायन इति । नैष दोषः । क्नुसनोः कित्त्वविधानात् ज्ञापकादनिग्लक्षणत्वेऽपि लघूपधगुणस्य प्रतिषेधो भविष्यति । This argument based upon the *kittva* of *knu* etc. is taken from the *Mbh.* itself which adduces this alternative argument immediately after the one based on the अनवकाशत्व given above. Read : अथ वाचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयति, भवत्युपधालक्षणस्य गुणस्य प्रतिषेध इति,

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1 Cf. प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यापेक्षायां यावन्तो यादृशाः प्रतिषेद्धव्यास्तावन्ति निषेधसूत्राणीति पुगन्तलघूपधगुणे प्रतिषेध्येऽनवकाशः प्रतिषेधो व्यवहितेऽपि प्रवर्तते । (कै.)

2 e. g. P. 1. 2. 8.

यद्यं 'त्रसिगृधिधृषिक्षिपेः क्नुः (P. 3. 2. 140)' इको झल्, हलन्ताच्च' (P. 3. 2. 9, 10)' इति क्नुसनौ कितौ करोति। कथं कृत्वा ज्ञापकम्? कित्करण एतत् प्रयोजनम्, गुणः कथं न स्यादिति। यदि चात्र गुणप्रतिषेधो न स्यात्, कित्करणमनर्थकं स्यात्। पश्यति त्वाचार्यः, भवत्युपधालक्षणस्य प्रतिषेध इति, ततः क्नुसनौ कितौ करोति।

ओर्गुणे तर्हि ...... इग्लक्षणत्वं कार्यम्. An objection against the अनवकाशत्व argument and a suggestion to remedy the defect. The opponent means to say that this argument based on अनवकाशत्व is a two-edged weapon. If it is useful for preventing Guṇa in cases like *bhinna*, it will also equally prevent Guṇa taught for the stem-final *u* by the rule *or guṇaḥ*. The forms like *laigavāyana* (formed with the suffix *-phak*) will not be available. Similarly in forms like *kāmayate* the Vṛddhi substitute will be prohibited by *ṅ* in the suffix *ṇiṅ* with which the stem *kami* is formed.

The *prakriyā* of these two words is as follows: *ligu* > *laigu* (P. 7. 2. 118) > *laigo* (P. 6. 4. 146), > *laigav* (P. 6. 1. 78) + *phak* (P. 4. 1. 99) > *āyana* (P. 7. 1. 2) = *laigavāyana*.

kam > *kām* (P. 7. 2. 116) + *i* [*ṇiṅ*] (P. 3. 1. 30) > *e* (P. 7. 3. 84) > *ay* (P. 6. 1. 78) + *śap* + *te* = *kāmayate*.

It will thus be seen that if one waves the condition of इग्लक्षणत्व and counts on अनवकाशत्व to account for the absence of Guṇa in *bhinna* etc., it also logically leads to an absence of Guṇa in *laigavāyana* etc., where however the absence of Guṇa is not desired. The opponent therefore concludes that if at all one wants to stick to the interpretation of *laghūpadha* as *laghvī upadhā*, then a word *ikaḥ* should be inserted in the rule.[1] when Guṇa is thus made *iglakṣaṇa*, P. 1. 1. 5 can prohibit it legitimately in cases like *bhinna*, but it cannot prohibit the Guṇa in *laigavāyana* etc., since the Guṇa there is not *iglakṣaṇa*, being taught specifically for *u*. Hence the *Dīp*: तस्मात् लघ्वी उपधा इग् इति इग्लक्षणत्वं कार्यम्. — It should be noted that the word *tasmāt* does nor here mark the conclusion of the *siddhānta* as usual, but that of the *pūrvapakṣa*. यत् = यस्मात् (in यदनवकाशं किङ्द्ग्रहणम्).

ननु चात्र ... पूर्वं भविष्यति. This is apparently a reply of the Siddhāntin (although it begins with *nanu*!). The passage is not clear.

[18]

The topic discussed in this section of the *Mbh* is the necessity or otherwise of reading the word *vṛddhiḥ* in P. 1. 1. 3.

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1 Confirmation of the original objection in the Vār: वृद्धिगुणावलोऽन्त्यस्य. ... इग्ग्रहणम्।

इदमनुमीयते, वृद्धिग्रहणं चोदितमिति— This apparently refers to the absence of a *pūrvapakṣa* Vārttika. For, as far as the *Mbh* is considered, it clearly opens the discussion with the question : अथ वृद्धिग्रहणं किमर्थम् ?

Vākyakāra means Vārttikakāra. असौ = वार्त्तिककार.

It is conceded that reading the word *guṇaḥ* in P. 1. 1. 3 was necessary, because in some cases where Guṇa is laid down the *sthānin* is not mentioned. But such is not the case with Vṛddhi where the exact *sthānin* is mentioned every time. Bhar. incidentally points out that the *Mbh* sentence गुणविधौ न क्वचित् स्थानी निर्दिश्यते is likely to cause some misunderstanding. As it is, it would mean '*sthānin* is nowhere mentioned where Guṇa is laid down.' Actually the word *na* has been separated (व्यवहितो नञत्र प्रयुक्तः), but it should be read along with निर्दिश्यते so as to give intended meaning : 'sometimes where Guṇa is taught, *sthānin* is not mentioned '. Cf. क्वचिन्न निर्दिश्यत इति नञो व्यवहितेन संबन्धः। क्वचिन्निर्दिश्यत एव 'ओर्गुण' इत्यादौ (कै.)।

वृद्धिग्रहणमुत्तरार्थम्। ...... इदमेवोपन्यस्यति — The words इहार्थम् and उत्तरार्थम् occur frequently in this section. इहार्थम् means for the present rule (P. 1. 1. 3) i. e. in order to indicate the substituend of Guṇa and Vṛddhi. उत्तरार्थम् means for the subsequent rule which prohibits Guṇa and Vṛddhi (P. 1. 1. 4–6), i. e. so as to enable the prohibitory rule concerned to effectively prohibit them. Now the author of the Vārttikas merely says उत्तरार्थम्. He does not say precisely which of the three rules P. 1. 1. 4–6 he has in mind. Pat. identifies *kṅiti ca* (P. 1. 1. 5) as being intended : उत्तरार्थम्। : 'क्ङिति' इति प्रतिषेधं वक्ष्यति स वृद्धेरपि यथा स्यात्। In the *Dīp.* पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसूत्रं ... ... पन्यस्यति Bhar. explains how Pat. hits upon this correct identification. The first of these three prohibitory sūtras (पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसूत्रम्, i. e. P. 1. 1. 4 : न धातुलोप आर्धधातुके) is refuted by the Vārttikakāra as being superfluous, its purpose being served by स्थानिवद्भाव (cf. अनारम्भो वा, Vār. 7 on P. 1. 1. 4 and the Bhāṣya thereon). The sūtra which follows (परमपि) the rule क्ङिति च viz. दीधीवेवीटाम् (P. 1. 1. 6) has a very restricted scope, viz. the two chāndasa roots *dīdhī* and *vevī* and so that too is out of question. So the Bhāṣyakāra quite properly brings in this sūtra (i. e. क्ङिति च) only.

The point is that the rule *kṅiti ca* can prohibit only those cases of Guṇa and Vṛddhi which are taught expressly for *ik* as such. So if that rule is to prohibit Vṛddhi, say in forms like *mṛṣṭa, mṛṣṭavat* from the root *mṛj* where it is not desired (as will be shown in the text), the original Vṛddhi must be taught for *ik* as such, i. e. the sūtra must read as *mṛjer vṛddhir ikaḥ*, which further means that the word *vṛddhi* cannot be dropped from P. 1. 1. 3.

After this the *Mbh* urges that P. 1. 1. 3 aught to contain, even *ihārtham*, the word *vṛddhi*, so as to prevent the Vṛddhi from substituting the

final *j* (instead of *ṛ*) by *alo'ntyasya.* This is for the purpose of introducing the Vār मृज्यर्थमिति चेद्योगविभागात् सिद्धम्, which proposes a *yogavibhāga* (of P. 7. 2. 114, 115) which would make the *ihārtha* suggestion superfluous. The *Mbh* thus explains the Vār : मृज्यर्थमिति चेद्योगविभागः करिष्यते । 'मृजेर्वृद्धिरचः।' ततः 'ञ्णिति'। ञिति णिति च वृद्धिर्भवति। 'अचः' इत्येव। As shown, the Vṛddhi will then substitute the *ac* (viz. *ṛ*) only (and not *j*).

This suggestion of the *yogavibhāga* is now refuted in the *Mbh* 'यद्यचो वृद्धि ...... प्राप्नोति' quoted in the *Dīp.*

The defect pointed out here is that even the augment *a*(*ṭ*) will have to undergo Vṛddhi (along with that of *ṛ*). It is well known that augments form an integral part of those word-elements to which they are affixed ('यदागमास्तद्गुणीभूतास्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते' परि. 11). Since *aṭ* has the code letter *ṭ* it becomes the initial part of *mṛj* (by *ādyantau ṭakitau*, P. 1. 1. 46) and is so liable to undergo Vṛddhi by *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ.* This is what comes out of resorting to the *yogavibhāga* method.

The Vār. *aṭi coktam* is a reply to this objection. It says that the objection is answered elsewhere by which it means under ष्यङः संप्रसारणं... (P. 6. 1. 13). The *Mbh* quotes the reply for the sake of ready reference which is अनन्त्यविकारे अन्त्यसदेशस्य कार्यं भवति. This is later on accepted as a Paribhāṣā (No. 95 in the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*) and means that when a change 'would in one and the same form have to affect both something which immediately precedes the final letter and also something which is separated from the final ... it is allowed to affect only that which immediately precedes the final' (Kielhorn). In consequence of this dictum *mṛj* will have only *ṛ* replaced by Vṛddhi; the augment *a* will remain unaffected. The *yogavibhāga* can stand.

This is the position taken by the Vārttikakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra. Bhar., however, does not seem to be satisfied with it. He apparently thinks that both the objection and the reply stand on a somewhat superficial level. Neither of them will stand if one goes deeper. This view is expressed in the *Dīp.* कथं पुनरत्राटो ...... अटः पूर्वत्वमिदमुच्यते । (Incidentally, the sentence जतमंग भवति — evidently a corruption – remains a puzzle to me.)

It ts'evidently presupposed, both in the *Vār.* and in the *Mbh.* in the objection and its reply, that in the case of an augmented past form, say *laṅ*, (Imperfect) an augment *aṭ* will already be there when the rule *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* presents itself. (This is technically called *lāvasthāyām aṭ* i. e. *aṭ* comes in even before *ti* etc. are substituted in the place of *l.*) In other words the position is *a-mṛj-l(aṅ)*, with the result that, according to the objector, the rule *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* would affect both *a* and *ṛ*, which is not desired. The reply also is given on the same supposition, pointing to Pari. 95 which restricts the operation,

in simultaneous possibilities, to the penultimate phoneme. The *Dīp.* now maintains that this basic position itself is not tenable. When *laṅ* is to be affixed to *mṛj,* immediately two operations present themselves simultaneously: one, the Vṛddhi, taught by *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* (P. 7. 2. 114) and the other, the augment *aṭ,* taught by *luṅlaṅlṛṅkṣv aḍ udāttaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 71). Here is a case of *vipratiṣedha* where by the usual rule (P. 1. 4. 2) *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* being later will prevail and we will have *mārj-l(aṅ)* first (... ... परत्वात् वृद्ध्या भवितव्यम्). At this time *aṭ* is simply not there in the field and so there is no question of its Vṛddhi. Nor can it be said that *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* will apply a second time after we have got the form *a-mārj°* with the prefixion of *aṭ,* where *a* will be faced with a *Vṛddhi* substitute. This is not possible because a rule applies to a particular case only once.[1] Since the *Vṛddhi* is once effected, it cannot take place again (कार्यकृतत्वात् पुनर्न भविष्यति).

The *Dīp.* here anticipates an objection (स्यान्मतम्) to this last-mentioned statement. When the Vṛddhi is due for the first time, the word-form to which it applies is *mṛj.* When it applies a second time, the word-form which it affects is quite different (शब्दान्तर-), viz. *amārj°.* So it cannot be said that *mṛjer vṛddhi* is applying for the second time to the same word-form. Thus there being nothing to prevent its second application, the threat of a Vṛddhi substituting *aṭ* is still there.

There is apparently no reply to this objction in the *Dīp.* as it is. For immediately after this we find the next part of the original argument, viz. the Pari. *anantyavikāre* etc. introduced and its criticism begins. So there is room to suspect that some part of the text is lost here. This suspicion seems to be supported by the way in which the *Dīp* begins the criticism of *anantyavikāre* etc. The word *hi* (in *na hy atra ...*) indicates that a particular reason is being furnished here to support something which was merely mentioned in a general way before. I am therefore inclined to think that some portion of the text (probably one line) which contained a reply to the anticipated objection followed by a general enunciation of the unacceptability of *anantyavikāre* etc. in the present context (something like किं च । इदमपि नोपपद्यते) is lost.

न ह्यत्र वृद्धौ ...... अनन्त्यस्यैवाचः explains this unacceptability. That dictum requires the simultaneous possibility of two elements being affected by a phenomenon like substitution. In the present case there is no possibility of two simultaneous Vṛddhis, one having already taken place. Only one Vṛddhi viz. of *aṭ* (the *Dīp.* clumsily says *anantyasyaivācaḥ*) being now due, there is no scope for the dictum *anantyavikāre.* — अथापि कल्प्यते ... केन प्रतिषिद्धा — I

[1] लक्ष्ये लक्षणं सकृदेव प्रवर्तते ।

have already mentioned above that the basic assumption of the *Vār.* and the *Mbh.* is *lāvasthāyām aṭ*. This is not subscribed to by the *Dīp.* It apparently believes in *lādeśeṣu kṛteṣv aṭ*. At this stage, however, it accepts for the sake of argument the *lāvasthāyām aṭ* view, only to point out that it would be of no use. For, as it asks dramatically, what is there to prevent the Vṛddhi (for *ṛ*) from taking place in the *l*-stage itself? The implication is that when *aṭ* and *ṛ*-Vṛddhi are simultaneously present in the *l*- stage, *ṛ*-Vṛddhi will alone take place first (by reason of the *vipratiṣedha* mentioned above), so that no scope is left for the dictum *anantyavikāre*. The *Dīp.* therefore concludes that the discussion in the *Mbh* just takes it for granted (*abhyupetya*) for the time being that *aṭ* can be there in the initial stage without prejudice to the possibility of Vṛddhi taking place first.

Kaiyaṭa also remarks in a similar vein : नन्वडागमात् पूर्वमेव परत्वाद् वृद्धिर्भविष्यति, लक्षणस्य च प्रवृत्तत्वादटि कृते पुनर्लक्षणं न प्रवर्तिष्यते। एवं तर्हि विप्रतिषेधानपेक्षयैवात्र चोद्यपरिहारावुक्तौ। Nāg. however differs from both. He thinks, that there is no scope for the *vipratiṣedha* rule because there is no possibility of Vṛddhi and the *aḍāgama* presenting themselves simultaneously : परत्वादित्यपि चिन्त्यम्। द्वयोर्यौगपद्यासंभवात्।

इहान्ये वैयाकरणाः — After the above discussion the *Mbh* considers the question whether it is necessary to read the word *vṛddhi* in P. 1. 1. 3 so as to make it an *iglakṣaṇā* Vṛddhi which could then be prohibited by P. 1. 1. 5 where it is not desired (but where it will force itself because of the general injunction viz. *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ*) in forms like *mṛṣṭaḥ*. The proponent of the *yogavibhāga* again finds here an opportunity to press his point. He points out that followers of some other school of grammar (*anye vaiyākaraṇāḥ*) recognize optional Vṛddhi forms like *mārjanti* side by side with *mṛjanti*. These optional forms will have to be recognized in the Pāṇinīya system also (apparently because they were current in the language of the Śiṣṭas). If the particular kind of *yogavibhāga* he is proposing is accepted, it will serve two purposes : provision will be made in the Pāṇinīya system for the optional forms like *mārjanti* (which is a desideratum) and the absence of Vṛddhi in forms like *mṛṣṭaḥ* will be accounted for without reading the word Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3.

Bhar. is not so much interested in the technical aspect of the *yogavibhāga* as in the propriety of following the lead given by other schools of grammar. He therefore launches a discussion on this point. अन्वाख्याताः — analysed, explained grammatically. यत्रैव स्मृत्योर्विरोधस्तत्रैव विकल्पः is based on the maxim : तुल्यबलविरोधे विकल्पः (See, e. g. गौधसू. 1. 6). To this Bhar. adds a proviso : न चेदन्यतरा दृष्टार्था भवति. A Smṛti which serves a seen purpose is stronger than a Smṛti which serves an unseen purpose. In the conflict of a

dṛṣṭārtha Smṛti with an *adṛṣṭārtha* one, the former prevails. Bhar. adds that in the present case, however, there is no conflict. एकत्र=पाणिनीये. विशिष्टविषये, in a particular context, viz. when a vocalic suffix, which ordinarily prevents Guṇa and Vṛddhi, follows (अजादौ संक्रमे, in the words of the *Mbh*). अस्याः स्मृतेः = वैयाकरणस्मृतेः । तस्याः = पाणिनीयायाः. कृतवृद्धिः and अकृतवृद्धिः imply शब्दः (like मार्जन्ति and मृजन्ति respectively) for their substantive. Bhar. says that there is no conflict, *mṛjanti* etc. being sanctioned by Pāṇini, and *mārjanti* (and also *mṛjanti*) etc. by others. Both forms are thus sanctioned, and one can use the form one wants. (It must, however, be said that Bhar's statement, that there is no conflict between the two is not quite correct. Forms like *mārjanti* are correct — although optionally — according to some, but not so according to Pāṇini. To that extent, theoretically, there *is* a conflict).

न्यङ्कोर्नैति ... अन्ये तु दोषाय — Here Bhar. discusses the relative authority of Smṛtis — and Vyākaraṇa is a Smṛti — belonging to different times. He takes a particular instance of a word as an example in this matter. When a derivative from *nyaṅku* ' a deer ' is to be formed (with a proper *taddhita* suffix) in the sense of ' coming from (or product of) a *nyaṅku* ', such as a hide, Āpiśali prohibits insertion of *ai*(*c*) (and sanctions Vṛddhi), which results into *nyāṅkava-* ' (hide) of a deer ' by his rule *nyaṅkor na*. There is no such prohibitory rule in the *Aṣṭ*, so that, by the usual rule (P. 7. 3. 3) the form would be *naiyaṅkava*. Now the question is : should the followers of Pāṇini accept the form *nyāṅkava-* or not ? Bhar's view is something like this : Smṛtis are valid only in certain definite periods of time (नियतकालाः). Certain things sanctioned by them may become ' not done ' in course of time. (Certain *kalivarja* things are well known.) Later Smṛtis take care of such things and prohibit those practices, although sanctioned by older Smṛtis. The sacrifice of a cow (*gavālambha*) and liquor-drinking are a case in point. If somebody were now to do such things, simply because either they are sanctioned in the older Smṛtis or because Śukra also had indulged in drinking, he would be incurring sin (*pratyavāya, pāpa*). The same thing applies to the use of words, for the use of correct words brings merit while that of incorrect words leads to sin.

In the case of the words *nyāṅkava : naiyaṅkava*, however, there is this additional particular thing. Although *nyāṅkava* was taught only by the older grammarian Āpiśali, and has no sanction in Pāṇini, apparently it continued to be used by the Śiṣṭas. (Bhar. does not say so explicitly, but it has to be assumed.) For this reason it has to be accepted in the Pāṇinian system also. And luckily, there is a technicality which could be invoked to sanction this form. It is that the basic word *nyaṅku-* is formed with a suffix, which belongs to the class of suffixes called *uṇādi*. The word is derived from the verbal root *añc* preceded by the preverb *ni* by means of the suffix *u* in the *uṇādi* sūtra ; *nāv añceḥ* (17).

Now, as is well known, there are two views about the words formed with *uṇādi* suffixes. According to one view the analysis given in the Uṇādi is to be accepted, so that these words can be regarded as regularly formed and therefore derivable (*vyutpanna*). According to the other view the words are not derivable (*avyutpanna*); their analysis is not acceptable. (This latter view is accepted in the Paribhaṣā 23 : *uṇādayo 'vyutpannāni prātipadikāni*). The fortunes of the words *nyāṅkava* : *naiyaṅkava* depend on what view one accepts. If one accepts the *vyutpanna* view, then *nyaṅku* is to be analysed as *ny*(< *ni*)--*aṅk-u*, in which case *y* is a *pada*-final, so P. 7. 3. 3 operates, laying down an insertion of *ai* before *y*, and prohibiting the Vṛddhi of *a*, thus ultimately giving the form *naiyaṅkava-*. If, however, *avyutpanna* view is accepted, then *y* is not a *pada-* final. P. 7. 3. 3 being thus not operating, there is neither the insertion of *ai* nor the prohibition of Vṛddhi. The ultimately resulting form in this case, therefore, is *nyāṅkava–*. Bhar. adds that the association (?) of the Śiṣṭas has admitted that *nyāṅkava* is admissible on the *avyutpanna* veiw.

Observations : (1) Bhar. merely refers to *smṛtyantara* ' another school of grammar ' in connection with *nyāṅkava*. It is Ujjvaladatta who specifically mentions (*Uṇādivṛtti* p. 11) the name of Āpiśali as prohibiting the insertion of *ai*. Read : आपिशलिस्तु न्यङ्कोनैंच्भावं शास्ति, न्याङ्कवं चर्म.

(2) What Bhar. says here about the form *nyāṅkava* seems to contradict with what he has said earlier in the *Dīpikā* where he is unwilling to accept the authenticity of this form. Read : यो ह्युत्सूत्रं कथयेन्नादो गृह्येत। न तद् गृह्यते। किमर्थं पुनरुत्सूत्रं न गृह्यते ? उच्यते। स्मृतिशास्त्रमिदं तत्र यदा कश्चिदेवमेव ब्रूयात् अयं शब्द इति सोऽवश्यं पृच्छयेत कथमस्माभिः प्रत्येतव्यमिति। यदि स्मृतिसूत्रमाह संधीयतेऽथाप्रलापस्तस्य गृह्यते। यथा। पाणिनीयसूत्र इदं नास्ति न्यङ्क्वोः प्रतिषेध इति। तत्रैवं विप्रतिप्रत्तिः। नैयङ्कवमिति भवितव्यमिति। यस्त्वेवं प्रयुञ्जीत न्याङ्कवमिति तं वयमपशब्द इति प्रतिपन्नाः। यदि ह्यसौ स्मृत्यन्तरं प्रदर्शयति तस्य हि प्रतिषेधः स्मृत्यन्तरे। (*Dīpikā* AL pp. 41–42). It must be pointed out, however, that Sw reads न वयमपशब्द इति प्रतिपन्नाः (and not तं वयमपशब्द etc.).

इदं च शब्दरूपम्......चादिशिष्टः— Bhar. now returns to the matter in hand. इदं शब्दरूपम् = मार्जन्ति etc. The *yogavibhāga* is to be thus :

मृजेर्वृद्धिरचः।
अचि विङति।
वा।
ञ्णिति।

The first sūtra accounts for forms like *mārṣṭi* (where the suffix is consonantal), the second for *mārjanti* etc. (Here the suffix is vocalic). The real purpose of this sūtra is to prohibit forms like *mṛṣṭaḥ*, which it does by

its restrictive character (which, in turn, is due to the fact that forms like *mārjanti* are arrived at by *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* itself). It thus here suggests that the prohibition of Vṛddhi being thus achieved by *yogavibhāga*, it is not necessary to read the word *vṛddhi* in P. 1. 1. 3. Finally, the sūtra *vā* accounts for the optional forms *mṛianti* etc.

There is apparently some corruption in the MS. अचि क्ङिति and वा are Patañjali's additions. So I have shifted the words अस्य च स्मर्ता after अचि क्ङिति वा भवतीति। Since Patañjali is the foremost of the Śiṣṭas (आदिशिष्टः), his authority cannot be challenged.

अचिकीर्षीत् — When it is thus shown that the optional forms like *mārjanti* and those which have never any Vṛddhi like *mṛṣṭaḥ* can be accounted for by *yogavibhāga* without the word *vṛddhi* being necessary in P. 1. 1. 3, Pat. brings in another issue. He says that no *sthānin* is mentioned in P. 7. 2. 1 : *sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu.* He claims that in order that only *ik* be replaced by that *Vṛddhi*, and that no *anik* be affected by it, one must read the word *vṛddhi* in P. 1. 1. 3 (इहार्थमेव तर्हि सिजर्थं वृद्धिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। सिचि वृद्धिरविशेषेणोच्यते, सेको यथा स्याद्, अनिको मा भूदिति।) A discussion then ensues in which one party brings forward one instance after another where an *anik* will be threatened with a Vṛddhi substitute and the other tries to show that no such contingency will arise if Pāṇini's rules are properly interpreted, in other words P. 1. 1. 3 can simply afford to be framed as *iko guṇaḥ*. In this discussion *acikīrṣīt* is the first of the series of cases discussed. It is Aorist 3. sing. PP. of *cikīrṣa-* ' desire to do ', the desid. of *kṛ*. It is got from *a-cikīrṣa-iṣ-īt* by dropping of the stem-final *a* by P. 6. 4. 48 : *ato lopaḥ* and of the Aor. sign *s* by P. 8. 2. 28 : *iṭa īṭi.* When we are in the stage *a-cikīrṣa-iṣ-īt*, it is maintained that the Vṛddhi will claim *a* (कस्य पुनरनिकः प्राप्नोति ? अकारस्य। अचिकीर्षीत्, अजिहीर्षीत् as the *Mbh* says).

लोपोऽत्र बाधको भविष्यति— This is the reply where it is pointed out that the dropping of *a* will prevent the Vṛddhi. अकृतायां ......भवितव्यमिति Bhar. points out that this will be realised in either of the two ways. If one resorts to *pūrvavipratiṣedha* (i. e. an earlier sūtra prevailing over a later one, contrary to P. 1. 4. 1) then P. 6. 4. 48 will delete *a*, which then is not available for the Vṛddhi (taught by P. 7. 2. 1.). If however one applies 7. 2. 1 first, even then *a* (lengthened to *ā*) will be subsequently dropped by P. 6. 4. 64. In either case no wrong form with *ā* will result.

उदवोढामित्यत्र ढलोपस्यासिद्धत्वात् — After some examples discussed in the *Mbh* (on which Bhar. does not comment) comes the case of forms like उदवोढाम् (Aor. Indic. 3. du. PP. of *ud + vah-*). This is brought forward as a possible case where a *saṁdhyakṣara* (*e-ai-o-au*) will have to be replaced by

Vṛddhi. The starting position is *ud-a-vah-s-tām*. Here it is claimed that after the dropping of *s* (P. 8. 2. 26), *h* > *ḍha* (P. 8. 2. 31), *t* > *dh* (P. 8. 2. 40) > *ḍh* (P. 8. 4. 41) we will arrive at *ud-a-vaḍhḍhām*; at this stage the first *ḍh* will be dropped (P. 8. 3. 13) after which the preceding *a*[1] will be replaced by *o* (P. 6. 3. 112). When we thus arrive at *ud-a-voḍhām*, the Aor. sign *s*, though dropped, will require (P. 1. 1. 62) *o* to be replaced by Vṛddhi.

ढलोपस्यासिद्धत्वात् is the reply which says that the threat of Vṛddhi replacing *o* will not materialize because the dropping of *ḍh* is *asiddha*. *ḍha-lopa* is taught by P. 8. 3. 13 which is in the *asiddhakāṇḍa* i. e. under the jurisdiction of P. 8. 2. 1 : *pūrvatrāsiddham*. The result is that *ḍh* is as good as present when P. 7. 2. 1 seeks to operate. Thus there is, for all practical purposes, *-aḍh-* and no *-o-*, which would have undergone *Vṛddhi*. The upshot is that P. 1. 1. 3 need not contain a word *vṛddhi* to prevent Vṛddhi of an *anik* viz. *o* in such cases.

पूर्वं वृद्धौ ...... न भविष्यति — This is apparently the *Dīp.* on the *Mbh* उदवोढामित्यत्र ढलोपस्यासिद्धत्वात् but, it must be pointed out, it differs from the *Mbh* in its explanation as to why *o* does not undergo the Vṛddhi. According to this *Dīp.*, when we start from *ud-a-vah-s-tām*, two operations present themselves simultaneously: (1) Vṛddhi substitute for the radical *a* by P. 7. 2. 3 and *h* > *ḍh* by P. 8. 2. 31. Since the latter is *asiddha* (see above), the radical Vṛddhi takes place first, resulting into *vah* > *vāh* (ultimately *vāḍh*). When subsequently *ḍh* is dropped and *ā* > *o*, we arrive at *ud-a-vo-ḍhām*. At this stage P. 7. 2. 3 : *vadavrajahalantasyācaḥ* does not again apply, because one Vṛddhi operation by the same rule has already taken place.

The difference between the explanation given by the *Mbh* and that by Bhar. is quite obvious. The *Mbh* anticipates the Vṛddhi of *o* by P. 7. 2. 1 : *sici vṛddhiḥ*... and explains its absence on the ground that *o* does not immediately precede *sic*, the intervening *ḍh* though theoretically dropped, being practically present there ('तस्यासिद्धत्वान्नैतद्[2] अन्त्यं भवति' *Mbh*). Bhar., on the other hand, anticipates Vṛddhi by P. 7. 2. 3 : *vadavraj... acaḥ* and explains its absence on the ground that P. 7. 2. 3 having once operated will not operate again. What Bhar. has really done is to give an *additional* possibility of Vṛddhi and the way how it is to be averted. It is *not* an explanation of the *Mbh.* itself. That there should be no indication of this in the *Dīp.* is somewhat strange. Kaiyaṭa, however, here faithfully follows the *Mbh*, ignoring the explanation of Bhar : ढलोपादीनामसिद्धत्वात् पूर्वं हलन्तलक्षणा वृद्धिः, ततो ढलोपादिषु कृतेषु

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1 Or ā, if P. 7. 2. 3 operates first. See below.

2 एतद् = ओवर्णम्.

ढलोपस्यासिद्धत्वादोकारस्य न भविष्यति. Nāg. makes it clear that the *Mbh* anticipates the Vṛddhi of *o* by P. 7. 2. 1. He says : पूर्वं हलन्तलक्षणाया वृद्धेर्जातत्वेनेदानीं सिचि वृद्धिरित्यस्य प्राप्त्या लक्ष्ये लक्षणस्येत्यस्याप्रवृत्तिरिति भावः ।

Lastly, it has to be noted that all the three commentators, Bhar., Kaiy. and Nāg, maintain that *vah* > *vāh* by P. 7. 2. 3 though this is not expressly mentioned in the *Mbh* here. They are probably right because in spite of his silence here Pat. has expressly said so under P. 6. 3. 112 : *sahivahor od avarṇasya.* Read : वर्णग्रहणं किमर्थम्, न 'सहिवहोरोदस्य' इत्येवोच्येत ? वृद्धावपि कृतायामोत्त्वं यथा स्यात् । उदवोढाम्, उदवोढम्, उदवोढेति । So when Pat. speaks in our passage of *o*, he may in fact be speaking of *o* that has come from *ā*, this latter in turn having come from *a*. Anyway, there is nothing in our *Mbh* against it.

सिचि वृद्धेरप्येष ... ... मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते — Another possibility, viz. that the Vṛddhi will threaten to replace a consonant in forms like *abhaitsīt* (व्यञ्जनस्य तर्हि प्राप्नोति । अभैत्सीत् ... ... *Mbh.*), is rejected here. On being told that the Vṛddhi taught for an *ac* in P. 7. 2. 3 वदव्रजहलन्तस्याचः (teaching the vowel i.e. *i* as the substituend in *bhid*) will supersede the alleged Vṛddhi of the final *d*, the objector wants to know 'but what where this हलन्तलक्षणा वृद्धि,[1] i. e. the Vṛddhi taught by P. 7. 2. 3 is prohibited, as e.g. in the case of *seṭ* roots, by the very next rule, P. 7. 2. 4 : *neṭi* ?' The present passage (सिचि वृद्धे... प्रतिषेधः) contains a reply to such a question.

The argument here is that *neṭi* prohibits not only the Vṛddhi due for an *ac* (i.e. *i* in *bhid*) by P. 7. 2. 3, but also that due for what precedes the *sic* (i.e. *d* in *bhid*) by P. 7. 2. 1. Since P. 7. 2. 1 is also barred, there is no danger of Vṛddhi replacing the consonant (and consequently it is not necessary to read a word Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3). The reason (rather a naive one) given to justify how the prohibitory rule P. 7. 2. 4 can simultaneously prohibit the operation of both 7. 2. 1 and 3 is explained in the rather funny sentence, लक्षणं हि नाम ... ... नावतिष्ठते. The explanations of the significance behind the three different characteristics of a sūtra, viz. ध्वनति, भ्रमति and नावतिष्ठते given by Bhar. (and, following him, by Kaiy.) are as amusing as clever. अस्य and अन्यस्य require a substantive like वृद्धिविधेः which is evidently understood.

Bhar. gives two interpretations[2] of ध्वनति. (1) According to the first one, *dhvan* means to make a general or vague statement. P. 7. 2. 4 prohibits Vṛddhi in general, without mentioning any specific Vṛddhi laid down in a particular rule which it wants to prohibit. Here the vagueness belongs to statement itself. (Kaity. who uses the word *aviśeṣeṇa*, apparently follows

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1 i.e. Vṛddhi in place of *ac* 'vowel' of roots ending in a consonant.

2 A third interpretation, attributed to others, also follows.

this interpretation.) The expression कटकटायसे is not met with elsewhere. (2) According to the second interpretation, *dhvan* refers to the indistinct physical utterance. Speech sounds have a capacity to form infinite meaningful words (ध्वनिः सर्वशब्दविषयः). When because of an indistinct utterance (or because of the distance between the speaker and the hearer) only a noise is heard (— where no words can be made out), the possibilities of the intended words are infinite. Similarly, लक्षणं ध्वनति here means the possibilities of the Vṛddhi prohibited by P. 7. 2. 4 are infinite (सर्वविषयः प्रतिषेधः ... सामान्यात् ध्वनतीत्युच्यते). Kaiy. does not mention this second interpretation.

विशेषार्था, meant for all individual cases. The idea is that *neṭi* will not be कृतार्थ with having prohibited हलन्तलक्षणा वृद्धि only. भ्रमति =सर्वत्र व्याप्रियते (कै). मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते—This replies the objection contained in यावत् तद्विशेषान्तरे ... प्रतिषेध्दुम्. It is explained by Kaiy. simply with उभयत्रापि व्यापारान्नैकत्र विश्राम्यतीत्यर्थः । Bhar. however apparently thinks it necessary to give a serious interpretation of the *Mbh.* statement. He suggests that it is not to be supposed that a prohibitory rule like *neṭi* runs physically after this and that rule whose operation is to be prohibited. What is meant is that a prohibitory rule is not a single affair. It multiplies itself[1] into as many rules as there are rules to be prohibited (प्रतिषेधान्तराणि तानि भिन्नान्येव प्रतिषेध्यलक्षणानि). The result is that for every original rule there is a prohibitory rule by its side (नास्ति लक्षणशून्यः कश्चित् प्रतिषेध्यः). So no wonder if P. 7. 2. 4 can prohibit simultaneously P. 7. 2. 1 and 3.

Why is it then that Pat. speaks of a sūtra as भ्रमति मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते ? Bhar. suggests that it is said from the common man's point of view. The common man is deceived by external resemblance of words (वाग् बहीरूपसामान्या). He therefore thinks that *neṭi* prohibiting P. 7. 2.1 and *neṭi* prohibiting 7. 2. 3 are one and the same. He therefore is likely to attribute a swift mobility to it. But both these features viz. *unity* and quick movement are actually absent in a rule. So Bhar. says the statement मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते is to be taken in a figurative sense, as indicated above.

अन्ये वर्णयन्ति ... ... प्रतिषेधेन व्यवस्था भविष्यति इति— Here Bhar. cites another interpretation of the *Mbh* passage : ध्वनति भ्रमति मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते. Whereas the previous interpretation attributed simultaneous movements in various directions to a sūtra, the one which is now being reported assings a repeated activity to it. There is no such thing as an application only once of a sūtra to an example (सकृत् प्रवृत्तिरित्येतन्नास्ति). It turns round and round like a water wheel (घटीयन्त्रवत्).

1 The same as *upaplava*.

Here ध्वनति is taken to mean पुनः पुनः प्रवर्तते on the analogy of a bell which, it is claimed, is spoken of as घण्टा ध्वनति when it tolls repeatedly. It is further explained that the three sūtras concerned here, viz. P. 7. 2. 1, 3 and 4 follow one another in an endless cycle (thus refuting a maxim सकृत् लक्ष्ये लक्षणं प्रवर्तते 'a rule proceeds towards an example only once').[1] The result is that in cases like *a-kuṣ-iṣ-it* first P. 7. 2. 1 seeks to operate, trying to substitute Vṛddhi in the place of the root-final *ṣ*. But its operation is prohibited by its *apavāda*, P. 7. 2. 3 which seeks to substitute Vṛddhi in the place of *u*. But even P. 7. 2. 3 is prohibited, in its turn by P. 7. 2. 4. Now, Bhar. goes on, the same cycle will repeat itself, P. 7. 2. 1 seeking to operate, prohibited by P. 7. 2. 3, itself prohibited by P. 7. 2. 4.

If there is no end to the Vṛddhi-enjoining rules on the one hand and the Vṛddhi-prohibiting rules on the other, there will ultimately neither be an injunction nor a prohibition in the present case. — अप्रवृत्त्यैव लक्षणस्य भवितव्यम् primarily applies to P. 7. 2. 1 : *sici vṛdahiḥ parasmaipadeṣu* and secondorily also to P. 7. 2. 4 : *neṭi*. No *vidhi*, no *pratiṣedha*. So no danger of Vṛddhi in forms like *akuṣīt*.

अथाव्यवस्था चक्रकेषु ... ... प्रतिषेधेन व्यवस्था भविष्यति, इति — This contains an objection and a reply to it. The objection is that there must be some finality (*vyavasthā*) in the working of rules. Grammar cannot afford endless cycles of rules (*cakraka*), There must be a terminus somewhere. इष्टतो व्यवस्था is the reply. In case of a *cakraka* we have the option to stop at a point where the desired form comes into being. (For *cakraka*, see above *Dīp*. 14.). We will stop the cycle at the point of prohibition.

Observation : The लक्षणस्य अप्रवृत्ति view, implied in the alternative explanation of लक्षणं हि नाम ध्वनति भ्रमति मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते is apparently based on the बाध्यविशेषचिन्ता which is taken for granted in the *Mbh* which immediately follows : अथ वा 'सिचि वृद्धिः परस्मैपदेषु' इति सिचि वृद्धिः प्राप्नोति । तस्या हलन्तलक्षणा वृद्धिर्बाधिका । तस्या अपि 'नेटि' इति प्रतिषेधः ।

This is followed in the *Mbh* by the question अस्ति पुनः क्वचिदन्यत्रापि अपवादे प्रतिषिद्धे उत्सर्गोऽपि न भवति (quoted and commented upon by Bhar.) and a reply to it : अस्तीत्याह । सुजाते अश्वसूनृते, अध्वर्यो अद्रिभिः सुतम्, शुक्रं ते अन्यद् — इति पूर्वरूपत्वे प्रतिषिद्धेऽयादयोपि न भवन्ति ।

अस्ति पुनः क्वचिद् ... ... न भवति — The questioner wants to know whether there is any example where a general rule (say A), blocked by a special rule (B), is not revived even when B is negatived by a prohibitory rule (C). Is there any other example of this what is called अद्यावसरन्याय ? सामान्यमुपादीयत

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1 Read, e.g. in the *Kāśikā* under the Śiva-sūtra *hayavaraṭ*, *Dīpikā* AL 80.3 etc.

इत्येतत् पृच्छ्यते — Bhar. is justifying the question. The questioner is surprised at the बाध्यविशेषचिन्ता stand taken, while he himself is an advocate of बाध्यसामान्यचिन्ता.

सुजाते अश्वसूनृते (*RV* 5. 79. 1), अध्वर्यो अद्रिभिः सुतम् (*RV*. 9. 51. 1) and शुक्रं ते अन्यत् (*RV*. 6. 58. 1) (the last two found in the *Mbh*. but not quoted by Bhar.) furnish another triad of sūtras, where, it is claimed, that a general rule once superseded by a special rule, does not become again effective, even when that special rule is prohibited by a prohibitory rule. The rules are :

(1) P. 6. 1. 78 : एचोऽयवायावः (which teaches substitution of *ay av āy āv* in the place of *e o ai au* respectively when a vowel follows).

(2) P. 6. 1. 109 : एङः पदान्तादति (which teaches a *pūrvarūpa* in the position : a *pada*-final *e/o+a*).

(3) P. 6. 1. 115 : प्रकृत्यान्तःपादमव्यपरे (v. l. नान्तःपाद°[1]) (which teaches that the *pūrvarūpa* does not take place if *e/o + a* occur in one and the same *pāda*, unless *a* is followed by *v* or *y*).

Here the result is stated in the *Mbh* thus : पूर्वरूपत्वे प्रतिषिद्धेऽयादयोऽपि न भवन्ति. On this analogy, it is to be understood, when P. 7. 2. 3 is prohibited, P. 7. 2. 1 also, which is already superseded, does not become effective. अत्रापि अव्यक्तं......लक्षणानामप्रवृत्तिरेवेति — Bhar., however, gives *both* explanations for the inactivity of P. 7. 2. 1 based upon the two interpretations of भ्रमति ... नावतिष्ठते seen above. Either (1) P. 6. 1. 115 : *nāntaḥpādam avyapare* prohibits indistinctly (*avyaktam*) or in a general way (*sāmānyaviṣayam*) all operations which become due in the position : a *pada*-final *e/o + a*, or (2) rules laying down *ay* etc. do not proceed (i. e. become effective) at all owing to their constant mobility. (The order of words in the *Dīp*. अथ वा लक्षणानामयादीनामनवस्थानाद् is rather clumsy. लक्षणानाम् is connected with अनवस्थानात् (cf. लक्षणं... मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते). अयादीनां लक्षणानाम् = अयादीनां विधायकानाम् 'एचोऽयवायावः' इत्यादीनां लक्षणानाम्.

अथ वृक्षावित्यत्र ...... न वृद्धिरेचि' इति — The *Mbh*. does not pursue this subject further but Bhar. points out a difficulty if the logic of भ्रमति... नावतिष्ठते (whichever way interpreted) were accepted universally. The difficulty will come up e. g. in the form *vṛkṣau*, Nom. du. of *vṛkṣa-*. The triad of rules here concerned is :

(1) P. 6. 1. 88 : वृद्धिरेचि ।

(2) P. 6. 1. 102 : प्रथमयोः पूर्वसवर्णः ।

(3) P. 6. 1. 104 : नादिचि ।

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[1] This is the reading in the *Mbh*. The *Kāś* & the *SK* however read प्रकृत्यान्तः°.

Here in the position वृक्ष + औ, a single Vṛddhi substitute is first due by P. 6. 1. 88. It is superseded by a long *pūrvasavarṇa* by P. 6. 1. 102. The latter, in its turn, is prohibited by P. 6. 1. 104. If the above logic (used in the case of P. 7. 2. 1, 3 and 4) were applied here, P. 6. 1. 88 will be permanently barred and the desired form *vṛkṣau* will not be available. Hence the question : अथ वृक्षावित्यत्र कथम् ? The *Dīp*. अथ मन्यसे ...... इहापि तथैव tries to see if some difference can be made between the two cases on the basis of *prakaraṇa* but ultimately decides that there is none. It is not clear to me in what sense Bhar. here used the word *prakaraṇa*. Ordinarily it means ' topic ' ' context ' etc. In both the cases the *utsarga* and the *apavāda* (P. 6.1.78 and 109 in one, P. 6.1.88 and 102 in the other) belong to the same *prakaraṇa* viz. saṁdhi coming under the jurisdiction of P. 6. 1. 72 : *saṁhitāyām* and so it cannot be seen, even *prima facie*, what *prakaraṇabheda* there is between P. 6. 1. 88 and 102, which is alleged to be absent between P. 6. 1. 78 and 109 by the *pūrvapakṣin*. I may just make a suggestion : it is possible that Bhar. says that P. 6. 1. 88 is concerned with a purely phonological formation while 6. 1. 102 involves morpho-phonemic operations, since it concerns a saṁdhi in the formation of a *pada* from a nominal stem. If so, then we can understand the *pratibandī* : P. 6. 1. 78 also concerns a purely phonetic operation while P. 6. 1. 109 involves a *pada*-final. So there is no difference. The *pūrvapakṣin* then tries to claim that inspite of this *prakaraṇabheda* there is a unity of *prakaraṇa* from the point of view of meaning between P. 6. 1. 78 and 109; to which the *siddhāntin* retorts by saying that such a unity of meaning could be found between P. 6. 1. 88 and P. 6. 1. 102 also. Here again I confess I do not understand how the factor of meaning comes in. — Bhar. therefore concludes that in the case of *vṛkṣau*, P. 6. 1. 104 has to be understood as prohibiting a definite operation, viz. *pūrvasavarṇadīrgha* (तस्मादत्र व्यक्तस्य विशेषस्याश्रयणम् । प्रथमयोः पूर्वसवर्णदीर्घत्वस्यैव निषेधः); it does not prohibit in addition, P. 6. 1. 88 also (न वृद्धिरेचि इत्यस्य). ध्वनति etc. is not to be accepted here.

Kaiy. also raises this problem. His solution, however, is different. Instead of rejecting the भ्रमति view, he invokes the *nipātana* संघोद्घौ in P. 3. 3. 86. Read : यद्येवं वृक्षावित्यत्र नादिचीत्यनेन पूर्वसवर्णदीर्घवद् वृद्धेरपि निषेधप्रसङ्गः । नैष दोषः, संघोद्घावित्यादेर्ज्ञापकादनन्तरस्यैव नादिचीच्चि निषेधात् ।

अन्तरङ्गत्वादुवङादेश :— The *Mbh* now considers the question whether it is necessary to read the word Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3 *uttarārtham*. P. 7. 2. 1 lays down Vṛddhi when *sic* follows in a general way. If it is to be prohibited in some particular case to prevent a wrong formation, P. 1. 1. 5 can be invoked, but this latter rule requires, as said above, that the Vṛddhi should be *iglakṣaṇā*. This means that the word *ikaḥ* should be there in P. 7. 2. 1, which further means that it should be already there in P. 1. 1. 3. The form *nyanuvīt* (Aor. Ind. 3. sing. *pp*. from *nu-*) is a case in point.

The starting position is *nī-a-nu-iṣ-īt*. The root *nu* is read in the *kuṭādi* subclass (included in the *tudādi* class). This makes *sic* a *ṅit* suffix (P. 1. 2. 1) which can prevent (P. 1. 1. 5) a Vṛddhi substituting the radical vowel. When Vṛddhi is thus prohibited, P. 6. 4. 77 comes into force substituting *uv*(*aṅ*) in the place of *u*. The prevention of Vṛddhi requires *ik* to be read in P. 1. 1. 3. That is the prima facie view.[1] अन्तरङ्गत्वादुवङादेशः is a reply to it which refutes the suggestion on the ground that when Vṛddhi and *uvaṅ* present themselves simultaneously, *uvaṅ* will automatically take precedence as it is an *antaraṅga* operation (on the basis of the Paribhāṣā 50 : *asiddhaṁ bahiraṅgam antaraṇge*). Once *uv* comes in, the stem no longer ends in *u*, and so there is no threat of Vṛddhi. It is unnecessary to include Vṛddhi in P. 1.1.3. — It may be mentioned that Bhar. quotes only a part of the *Mbh* sentence which runs as : अन्तरङ्गत्वादत्रोवङादेशे कृतेऽनन्त्यत्वाद् वृद्धिर्न भविष्यति ।

The *Dīp.* सिच्परस्मैपदे आश्रित्य वृद्धिः shows how Vṛddhi is *bahiraṅga* here. A corresponding sentence, such as *इडागममाश्रित्य उवङ्, explaining how *uvaṅ* is *antaraṅga* is missing (cf. Kaiy : उवङादेशः सिचमेवापेक्षते, वृद्धिस्तु सिच्-परस्मैपदे।). The *uvaṅ* substitution is *antaraṅga* because its cause, viz. *i* is nearer to *nu*- than the cause of Vṛddhi viz. *sic* followed by a *parasmaipada* ending which lies outside.

लुप्तनिर्दिष्टो वकारः— The *Mbh* now probes into the *antaraṅga* argument, trying to ascertain how far it can go in explaining all the desired forms. In the course of this investigation it is seen that the *antaraṅga* argument does not come into the way of arriving at forms like *akārṣīt* (where, after the *antaraṅga* Guṇa, *kar* > *kār* by P. 7. 2. 3), *nyastārīt* (*stṝ* > *star* > *stār* by P. 7. 1. 2 : *ato lrāntasya*). Then comes the form *alāvīt* which causes some difficulty. After *lū* > *lav*, none of the three rules P. 7. 2. 1–3 can bring about the Vṛddhi. After all, the *antaraṅga* principle does not seem to be sufficient to take care of all cases. At this stage comes what appears to be a strange statement, viz. that Vṛddhi can take place here according to P. 7. 1. 2 : *ato lrāntasya*. Since our stem (*lav*) ends neither in *l* nor in *r*, a remark, made in rightous indignation, follows : 'ल्रान्तस्य' इत्युच्यते, न चेदं ल्रान्तम्. The reply is 'ल्रान्तस्य' इत्यत्र वकारोऽपि निर्दिश्यते. As to the question, why is it then not heard ? the reply given is लुप्तनिर्दिष्टो वकारः. The idea is that *v* is actually uttered (or meant to be uttered) along with *l* and *r* in the sūtra but it is dropped by P. 6. 1. 66 : *lopo vyor vali*. In other words, the *lrāntasya* is meant to stand either for* *vlrāntasya* or **lvrāntaya*.

केचिदत्र वर्णयन्ति ... प्रतिपत्स्यामह इति । The compound *luptanirdiṣṭa* has given some headache to the commentators. It cannot evidently be resolved

[1] This is finally confirmed in the Siddhānta.

as *pūrvaṁ luptaḥ paścād nirdiṣṭaḥ* (by P. 2. 1. 49) because what is already dropped cannot be uttered. Nāg. therefore proposes to resolve it as *pūrvaṁ nirdiṣṭaḥ paścāl luptaḥ* invoking *mayūravyaṁsakāditva* for the interchange of the places of the members of the compound. Bhar. quotes a view of 'some', according to whom, the compound is to be dissolved as : *nirdiṣṭaś cāsau luptaś ca.* He thinks that although dropped a sound *v* could be understood when the sūtra was explained (to the student), just as from *y* which is actually read in P. 6. 4. 148, we understand *i* (which latter undergoes the operation taught in that sūtra).

अविमव्योर्नेति वक्ष्यामि — Pat. pursues the question of *vakārapraśleṣa* in P. 7. 2. 2 : *ato lrāntasya* further and points out that it will entail Vṛddhi in *avīt* (Aor. Injun. 3. sing. of *av-*) and *mavīt* (similar form from *mav-*) in the sentences मा भवान् अवीत् and मा भवान् मवीत्. Actually Vṛddhi is not desired in *avīt* while it is only optionally desired in *mavīt.* So the *luptanirdiṣṭa v* cannot be accepted in P. 7. 2. 2 (and consequently the *antaraṅga* principle also cannot be admitted here). The *Mbh* अविमव्योर्नेति वक्ष्यामि is a reply to this. It means to say that the difficulty pointed out is not by any means grave. All that you have to do is to add a prohibitory rule : *avimavyor na* 'No Vṛddhi in the case of *av-* and *mav-*'.

स्यादेतद् गुरु भवति...तौ निमातव्यौ इति— The suggestion of adding a new sūtra is normally repugnant as it violates the principle of *lāghava.* The *Mbh* वक्तव्यम् is really equivalent to गुरु भवति as paraphrased by Bhar. The *Mbh* णिश्विभ्यां तौ निमातव्यौ shows how this defect of *gaurava* can be compensated for. This is what is meant : The rule P. 7. 2. 5 : ह्म्यन्तक्षणश्वसजागृणिश्व्येदिताम् prohibits Vṛddhi (in the case of roots ending in *y* and others listed here) due by P. 7. 2. 1 and 7. We can shorten this list by deleting two items from it, provided we subscribe to the *antaraṅga* principle with reference to *sic.* Roots ending in *ṇi* (i. e. roots of the *cur-* class and also causative stems) ordinarily form their *luṅ* (Aorist) with *caṅ.* But this *caṅ* is prohibited in the case of roots like *ūn*(*i*), *dhvan*(*i*) etc. (P. 3. 1. 51) in the chandas. When *caṅ* is thus barred, *sic* (substitute of *cli*) will come in. Now when *sic* follows, say, *ūni,* or *śvi,* Vṛddhi (by P. 7. 2. 1) is not desired, to prevent which *ṇi* and *śvi* are included in P. 7. 2. 5. The advocate of the *antaraṅga* principle now points out that this could be dispensed with if *antaraṅga* principle is accepted with reference to *sic.* For, in that case, with Guṇa taking precedence and the following *-ay* saṁdhi, we would arrive at *ūnay* and *śvay.* Since the roots now end in *y,* the prohibition of Vṛddhi is thus already achieved by P. 7. 2. 5 itself. The two items thus spared will compensate the addition of two items in the proposed rule **avimavyor na.* Kaiy. explains णिश्विभ्यां etc. thus : णिश्विग्रहणमकृत्वा अविमवी प्रतिषेधार्थं कर्तव्यौ । एवं सति गौरवाभावः । निमातव्याविति । मेङ्गे रूपम् । परिवर्तनीयावित्यर्थः ।

आचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयति — This short *pratīka* quoted by Bhar. stands for the following *Mbh*: एवं तर्ह्याचार्यप्रवृत्तिर्ज्ञापयति. न सिच्यन्तरङ्गं भवति इति यदयम् 'अतो हलादेर्लघोः' इत्यकारग्रहणं करोति । ...यत्तर्हि णिश्व्योः प्रतिषेधं शास्ति तेन नेहान्तरङ्गमस्ति इति दर्शयति । On the basis of (1) the word *ato* read in P. 7. 2. 7 and (2) the reading of *ṇi* and *śvi* in P. 7. 2. 5 it is shown in the *Mbh* that Pāṇini does not want the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā to be effective in the matter of *sic*. For if he had intended it, he would not have read *ato* and *ṇi* and *śvi* in those particular rules. This apparent superfluousness gives a clue to Pāṇini's mind. — किं वृद्धिग्रहणं करिष्यामीति ... ... यान्तत्वात् प्रतिषेधः स्यात् — This *Dīp*. explains why Pāṇini follows this particular procedure. As we have seen, there are two possible ways of preventing Vṛddhi in forms like *nyanuvīt*. One is making Vṛddhi *iglakṣaṇā* by reading the word Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3 so that P. 1. 1. 5 can then successfully prohibit the Vṛddhi. Here the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā is not accepted in this context. Or, without reading Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3 the other way is to permit the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā to operate here, so that the substitute *uv*(*aṅ*) takes precedence because of its being an internal operation, thus successfully prohibiting Vṛddhi (P. 7. 2. 1) as the root no longer ends in *u*. Now a question is put in the *Dīp*. enquiring whether the sole reason for Pāṇini rejecting the application of the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā is that he wants to read the word Vṛddhi in P. 1.1.3 ? (वृद्धिग्रहणं करिष्यामि = 'इको गुणवृद्धी 'सूत्रे वृद्धिग्रहणं करिष्यामि ।). This suggestion is denied in the following *Dīp*. There is an additional reason. Although the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā would be as effective as reading Vṛddhi in P. 1. 1. 3 in the matter of prohibiting Vṛddhi in *nyanuvīt* etc., still if we were to drop Vṛddhi from P. 1. 1. 3 and were to give a free hand to the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā, it would obstruct the formation of forms like *anenāyīt*, *acirāyīt* etc. (*Anenāyīt* and *acecāyīt* are Aor. Indic. 3. sing. *PP* from the Intensive stems *nenī*(*ya*)- and *cecī*(*ya*)- from *nī* and *ci* respectively. *Acirāyīt* and *ajirāyīt* are similar simple forms from *ciri* and *jiri* read in the fith class.) For, with Guṇa taking precedence because of its *antaraṅga* character, we will have *nenī* >*nene* >*nenay* (*ay* because of the following *iṭ*). As the roots now end in *y*, Vṛddhi will be barred by P. 7. 2. 5. As the desired forms with Vṛddhi (*anenāyīt* etc.) cannot be obtained, we do not allow the operation of the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā in the matter of *sic*. And since we have to set aside this *Paribhāṣā* here, we rely on reading the word *vṛddhi* in P. 1. 1. 3 to prohibit Vṛddhi in forms like *nyannuvīt*. प्रवृत्त्यर्थम् = 'सिचि वृद्धिः –' इत्यस्य प्रवृत्त्यर्थम् । नेष्यते = सिचि अन्तरङ्गं नेष्यते ।

A point which is not made clear in the *Dīp*. is that once the functioning of the *antaraṅga* Paribhāṣā is banned here, *uv*(*aṅ*), though *antaraṅga*, is superseded by Vṛddhi to prohibit which the word Vṛddhi is *imperative* in P. 1. 1. 3.

So the concluding Vārttika : तस्मादिग्लक्षणा वृद्धिः which is explained by

Nāg. thus: एवं च न्यनुवीदित्यादौ उवङं बाधित्वा प्राप्ताया वृद्धेर्निषेधायेग्लक्षणा सिचि वृद्धिरास्थेयेत्युपसंहरति सिद्धान्ती—तस्मादिति। Nāg. further adds that both बाध्यसामान्यचिन्ता and the अष्टावसरन्याय are statements of an *ekadeśin* only.

Readings : (1) The MS पवत is reconstructed as पठत[:] by Sw. Though it looks natural enough, वाक्यकारस्य ... ... इति पठत इदमनुमीयते is not a regular construction in Sanskrit. I follow AL and read वच(ना)त्. (2) Sw drops पूर्वम्. (3) AL वृद्ध्यर्थं नानेन चार्थः and Sw °र्थमनेन नार्थः give the same meaning as our वृद्ध्यर्थेनैतेन नार्थः, but our reading is closer to the MS. (4) MS पूर्वविप्रतिषेधे सूत्रं ...... वरमपि is corrupt. Sw has correctly hit upon पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसूत्रं... परमपि as the original reading which I follow. (5) MS आदि ... दित्यतो is reconstructed as आदिभूतादित्यटो by AL, as आदि(ष्टि)दित्यटो by Sw. The latter is more preferable (the MS shows a gap of only one letter). (6) AL reconstruct the जतमंग भवति of the MS as जान्तमङ्गं भवति, Sw as (मृ)जन्तमङ्गं भवति. Neither gives a satisfactory sense. (7) AL's भविता also gives a good sense, but यात्वता (which is equally possible orthographically) is more idiomatic. (8) Sw does not read न but it has to be read there. (9) The MS कृतेतादं requires only a minor emendation into कृतेतीदं (= कृता+इति+इदम्). AL स्यात् तदिदं, Sw भवतीदं unnecessarily change too much. (10) MS कल्प्येते admits equally being emended into कल्प्यते (AL) and कल्प्येत (Sw). (11) AL emend यत्र of the MS into तत्र. Though this gives a good meaning, अत्र (Sw) is more desirable orthographically. (12) MS स्मृतिरत्रिवस्रन्यो is evidently corrupt. AL read स्मृतिः। अत्रायमन्यो विशेषः। तत्र च ... . Sw reads स्मृतिर्यत्र च स्मत्यो(:) विरोधस्तत्रैव .... I accept the latter except that I read यत्रैव instead of यत्र च. (13) By an अकारप्रश्लेष Sw reads अदृष्टार्था, but from the meaning's point of view, it is inferior to दृष्टार्था. A दृष्टार्था स्मृति always prevails over an अदृष्टार्था one. (14) AL correctly hit upon सर्यते as the original text. (15) MS श्य ... ... was read as न्याङ्क्वमिति by AL, simply as यो by Sw. न्यङ्क्नोनैंति is reconstructed here. (16) I accept AL's शिष्टपर्षदा which is an emendation of the MS सिथद्द(?)षदा. Sw makes no attempt at reconstruction in this section of the text. (17) The MS वाख्यानंससांघोति यतकाजा is corrupt. AL reconstruct: अन्वाख्यानं स साधुः। नियतकाला. I reconstruct अयं व्याख्यानं संसाध्नोति, which, though not absolutely satisfactory, at least makes some sense. (18) The तच्श्रुतयश्च of the MS is better read as तथा श्रु°. (19) Sw retains the meaningless शवामालेभो, which is evidently गवामालंभो. (20) Although the MS clearly reads प्रतिक्रियमाणम्, for meaning's sake I emend it into इति क्रि°. (21) The highly corrupt शवटही (retained by Sw) of the MS is a riddle. I follow AL in reconstructing गवालम्भे. (22) The emendation of MS एतपाये into एतयान्ये (Sw) is not of much use. AL's एतत्पापं is accepted here. (23) MS clearly reads चादिशिष्ट which gives an excellent meaning also. So I do not see any purpose in reading it as चात्रिशिष्ट as Sw does. (24) *Mbh* Ed. has लोपोऽत्र. (25) MS त्वमौत्वे is emended as अस्य ओत्वे by AL, simply as औत्वे (but should it not be ओत्वे ?) by Sw. What is really meant is आकारस्यौत्वे.

(26) किमस्य प्रतिषेधो यः प्रतिषेध is obscure. AL simply read कस्य प्रतिषेधः । यः प्रतिषिद्ध. Sw's emendation of यः as ऽन्यस्य (though rather bold) makes some sense and so I follow it. (27) The कस्मिन् of the MS has evidently to be read as एकस्मिन्. (28) The MS यावत् तद्विशेषांतरे प्रतिषेधो प्रवर्तते is quite clear and correct. It is not at all necessary to emend it into यावत् विशेषान्तरे प्रतिषेधः प्र° as Sw does (29) AL प्रतिबन्द्धुम् seems to be nearer to the MS प्रतिवद्धुम्. Only the technical character of प्रतिषेद्धुम् weighed with me. (30) MS वात्र (? भ्र) ह्रिरूपसामान्यात्त(?त)देरव is obscure. AL Sw read it as वाचो (Sw वा...) हि रूपसामान्यात् तदेव etc. I rather think that this is a complete sentence and so वाग् बह्वीरूपसामान्या. (31) Sw घण्टायां. Whether a *visarga* is to be added or an *anusvāra*, that is the question. Apart from that, घण्टायाः is more idiomatic. (32) AL ध्वनन्तीति. But singular can be justified as एकैकाभिप्रायेण. Besides the *Mbh.* text also has ध्वनति (of course with लक्षणं as the subject). (33) It appears to me that the MS reads ह्येव, not चैव as thought earlier. (34) The MS clearly reads अप्रवृत्त्या. Although भवितेति (भविता Fut. passive, 3. sing. *ĀP*) is not grammatically impossible, good Sanskrit requires भवितव्यम्. So Sw's emendation is accepted here. Or, one can emend in the other direction : अप्रवृत्तिरेव लक्षणस्य भवतीति as AL do. (35) The emendation उपादीयते (Sw) understands लक्षणं in the technical sense : 'a rule'. But with this emendation the syntax of the sentence cannot be easily explained. (36) The MS seems to read अत्राभादिति इति (the last letter is illegible) (retained in AL), but the context required नादिचि इति. (37) MS पूर्वसवर्णदीर्घत्वस्येन्य (read °त्य) स्यैव (retained in Sw) is corrupt. Ignoring the superfluous अस्यैव I simply read with AL : पूर्वसवर्णदीर्घत्वस्यैव. (38) The MS प्रतिपश्यामह is undoubtedly प्रतिपत्स्यामहे as inferred by Sw.

[19]

In this section the *Mbh* examines the possibility or otherwise of looking upon P. 1. 1. 3 as an independent injunctive rule (and not as a Paribhāṣā). Kaiy. puts it as : स्वतन्त्रमिदं गुणवृद्ध्योर्विधायकमिति पूर्वः पक्षः । Two other rules viz. P. 1. 1. 45 : *ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam* and P. 1. 1. 51 : *ur aṇ raparaḥ* are also introduced as analogous cases. The proposed possibility is, of course, finally rejected.

षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगत्वादिग्निवृत्तिः is a Vārt. which is explained in the *Mbh* thus : षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगत्वात् सर्वेषामिकां निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति । अस्यापि प्राप्नोति, दधि, मधु । The fantastic claim made here is that since *ikaḥ* in P. 1. 1. 3 is a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, every *ik*, one and all, will have to be replaced by Guṇa (इङ्निवृत्तिः = गुणवृद्धिरूपादेशेन निवृत्तिः). So you cannot use the words like दधि and मधु. *दधे and *मधो or *दधै and *मधौ would be the correct forms ! Or, Bhar. adds, you should no more regard (उपगन्तव्यम् = अभ्युपगन्तव्यम्) *ikaḥ* as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*.

अन्यतरार्थं पुनर्वचनम् — This answers a very natural question (asked in

Mbh) : पुनर्वचनमिदानीं किमर्थं स्यात् ? If P. 1. 1. 3 were an injunctive rule, why should Pāṇini again frame rules enjoining Guṇa like 7. 3. 84 : *sārvadhātukā-rdhadhātukayoḥ* ? The reply, given very cleverly, is that *punarvacana* is for the sake of restriction : when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows, there should be Guṇa alone; when a *ñit* or *ṇit* suffix follows, there should be Vṛddhi alone (P. 7. 2. 115) and so on.

ननु चानिगन्तार्थं[1] ... तत्रोपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यमिति — Here Bhar. raises a possibility that rules in the *aṅgādhikāra* like P. 7. 2. 115 and 7. 3. 84 may not be necessarily restrictive; they may still be injunctive, laying down Guṇa and Vṛddhi for *anik* sounds (while P. 1. 1. 3 does the same for *ik* ones). This possibility is finally rejected, अनेन = 'इको गुणवृध्दी' इत्यनेन. 'विधिनियमयोर्विधिर्बलवान्' appears as 'विधिनियमसंभवे विधिरेव ज्यायान्' (Pari. 100) which says that when a rule admits of being taken both as injunctive and also as restrictive, it is to be accepted as injunctive. तत्रायमभिप्राय: ... द्रष्टव्यमिति explains why injunctive character cannot be assigned to P. 7. 2. 115 etc. Whereas P. 1. 1. 3. is allegedly injunctive, it is already made clear above (*Dīp*. 3–10) on the basis of the *anuvṛtti* of Guṇa and Vṛddhi from P. 1. 1. 1 and 1. 1. 2 into 1. 1. 3, that where Guṇa and Vṛddhi are taught in so many words, they affect *ik* only. So the question of Guṇa and Vṛddhi for *anik* does not simply arise. लक्षणत्वेन = (गुण-वृद्ध्योर्) विधायकत्वेन. पराङ्गत्वम् : being subordinate to some other (rule); here to P. 7. 2. 115 etc. Kaiy. concludes his clear exposition thus : ... द्वितीयं गुणवृद्धि-ग्रहणमनुवर्तते, तेन गुणवृद्धिप्रदेशेषु इक इत्यस्योपस्थानान्नास्त्यनिकः प्रसङ्गः।

संप्रसारणे च — The rule defining *samprasāraṇa* (P. 1. 1. 45 : इग्यण: संप्रसारणम्) is introduced as being a similar case (तुल्यन्यायत्वादुपन्यास: Kaiy.). The arguments for and against are the same. The *Mbh* adds अस्यापि प्राप्नोति before याता वातेति। On the basis of Kaiy. the *Dīp*. प्रसारणं पूर्वम्। कथम् ? appears to be corrupt. As is clear from Kaiy's commentary, the question raised here is : if 1. 1. 45 : इग्यण: संप्रसारणम् is a purely injunctive rule, teaching substitution of *ik* in the place of every *yaṇ*, which would then serve as a *saṁjñā* rule ? Which rule of P would give the name of *saṁprasāraṇa* to *ik* which comes in the place of *yaṇ* by rules like P. 6. 1. 15 वचिस्वपियजादीनां किति ? In fact P. 6. 1. 15 would not be able to produce the change *yaṇ* > *ik*. For that *saṁjñā* should logically (by the Pari. अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा ...) apply to that *ik* only which is a product of P. 1. 1. 45. योगविभाग: क्रियते etc. is a reply to such a question. P. 1. 1. 45 will be split into two rules :

इग्यण: । '*ik* takes the place of *yaṇ*'

संप्रसारणम् । '(such an *ik* is termed) *samprasāraṇa*.

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[1] *ṇnigartham* would have been better. In *mider guṇaḥ* etc. the final is not *ik*.

The second rule is a general one now, not bound up with the preceding one. So now *any ik*, which comes into the place of *yaṇ*, is called *samprasāraṇa*.[1]

ननु च एतदप्य ... आदेशो वच्यादीनाम् — The defendant, on his part, makes an equally fanciful suggetion. On the basis of the maxim विधिनियमयोर्विधिर्बलवान्, if an injunctive character (as against a restrictive one suggested by the opponent in his statement विषयार्थं पुनर्वचनम् above) could be attributed to P. 6. 1. 15 etc., it would have to be preferred. Such a character can be attributed to it, it is suggested, if one interpretes P. 6. 1. 15 : वचिस्वपियजादीनां किति etc. as teaching the replacing of the roots *vac* etc. by the word *samprasāraṇa* itself ! The *Dīp* 'इग्यणः' इत्यत्राप्युपतिष्ठते is a reply. Since इग्यणः (' *ik* takes the place of *yaṇ* ') is present in P. 6. 1. 15, no such possibility will be realized.

उरण् रपरे च। कर्तृ हर्तृ — A similar case. Here a question arises : If *ur aṇ* is taken as an injunctive rule (teaching the replacement of every *ṛ* by *aṇ*), which of the three *aṇ* sounds, viz. *a i* and *u*, is to replace *ṛ* in *kartṛ* etc. ? Ordinarily, when a situation like this arises, the decision is taken on the basis of intimate relation (*āntaratamya*). That which is most intimate, in point of place of articulation, or in other properties, is preferred as the substitute. In the present case, however, all three, *a i* and *u*, are equally unrelated to the substituend *ṛ*. So which of the three is to be allowed to replace *ṛ* ? अत्रान्तरतमस्याणः अभावात् पर्यायेण प्राप्नुवन्ति is the reply. All three are to be allowed, one by one. — Bhar. adds that an example of nouns (कर्तृ हर्तृ) is deliberately taken by the author of the *Mbh*. In the case of verbs in *ṛ* this specific substitute is mentioned by Pāṇini himself as e. g. in rules P. 7. 1. 100 etc.

सिद्धं तु षष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात् — This is the Siddhānta Vārttika which points out the way to tide over the difficulty mentioned so far. The suggestion is to shift the rule P. 1. 1. 3 (and also P. 1. 1. 45) and to read it after P. 1. 1. 49 : *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā*. The result would be that *ṣaṣṭhī* could be brought down in (the present) P. 1. 1. 3 and 1. 1. 45 also. This would then mean that the operation like *ik* > *Guṇa* (or *yaṇ* > *ik*) would take place only there where a genitive of substituend is mentioned. Thus P. 1. 1. 3 will operate in conjunction with rules like 6. 4. 1 : *aṅgasya*, 7. 3. 82 *mider guṇaḥ* etc. It will not act independently. Similarly P. 1. 1. 45 : *ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam* will operate in conjunction with rules like P. 6. 1. 15 : *vacisvapiyajādīnāṁ kiti* etc. It will not act independently. In oher words, the alleged injunctive character is denied to these rules (P. 1. 1. 3 etc.), and meta-rule character is

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[1] It may be noted that Bhar. quotes the *vā* as संप्रसारणे च although in the *Mbh* the *Vār* reads as प्रसारणे च।

re-affirmed. — स्वनिमित्त = गुण-संप्रसारणनिमित्त, viz. स्थानषष्ठी like अङ्गस्य, वचिस्वपियजादीनां किति etc. The substantive 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इत्यादयः (the subject of निष्पादयन्ति) is to be understood for the adjectives °प्रयुक्ताः and अपेक्षमाणाः. अङ्गस्य etc. are in apposition with स्थानषष्ठीम् (and not the subject of निष्पादयन्ति!). Kaiy, as usual, brings out the point briefly and clearly : स्वातन्त्र्यमेषां निवर्तयति । यत्र षष्ठी तत्रैषामुपस्थानम्, 'अङ्गस्य' ... इत्यादौ। The *Chāyā* spells out the full significance thus : यत्र स्थानषष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्य उरण् विधीयते, तत्र रपर इत्युपतिष्ठते इति तस्यार्थः। एवं यत्र स्थानषष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्य गुणवृद्धी विधीयेते, तत्रेक इति षष्ठ्यन्तं पदमुपतिष्ठते। यत्र च स्थानषष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्य संप्रसारणं विधीयते, तत्रेग्यण इत्युपतिष्ठते इति चैषां वाक्यार्था बोध्याः ।

इमावपि योगौ ...... From here onwards up to the end of this *āhnika*, the *Mbh* points out three ways in which rules like P. 1. 1. 3 could be tied up with the jurisdiction of the स्थानषष्ठी. (1) The first one is the making use of the *svarita* accent (see *Dīp*. 4 etc. above) implied in इमावपि[1] योगौ (i. e. P. 1. 1. 3 and 45) षष्ठ्यधिकारमनुवर्तिष्येते. So Bhar. says : स्वर्यैते एतौ योगौ ... कार्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति. This is what is called *śāstrīya adhikāra*. (2) A *laukika adhikāra* is simply to connect two rules (even in the absence of a *svarita*), if syntactical construction is not complete without it. Such a connection is described as आकाङ्क्षामूलकः संबन्धः. Here the *modus operendi* is to divide P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा into two rules : (1) षष्ठी. Then (2) स्थानेयोगा. The reduced rule षष्ठी by itself makes no sense. It raises an expectation (*apekṣā*) : 'What about it (*ṣaṣṭhī*)?' Bhar. supplies the reply : यदेतदनुक्रान्तमेतद् यत्र षष्ठी तत्र संनिहितम् 'what is introduced before (viz. P. 1. 1. 3 and P. 1. 1. 45) should be known as present where there is a (substituend) genitive.' Here a doubt naturally arises : In this alternative we are not removing bodily rules P. 1. 1. 3 and 45 in the jurisdiction of P. 1. 1. 49 : *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā*. The former rules remain separated from the latter. What is there to prevent intervening rules also from getting connected with P. 1. 1. 49? The reply is : सामर्थ्यादेतावेव संबध्येते. Only P. 1. 1. 3 and 45 have syntactical and semantic affinity with P. 1, 1. 49 and so these two alone will be thus connected. Other rules lack this property and so there is no danger of their being thus entangled with P 1. 1. 49. (cf. Kaiy. : तत्र योग्यत्वादनयोरेवापेक्षा नान्येषाम् ।)

This alternative is contained in the *Mbh* passage : अथ वा षष्ठ्यधिकारे इमौ योगावपेक्षिष्यामहे.[2]

(3) The third way is expressed in the *Mbh* अथ वेदं तावदयं प्रष्टव्यः ... ... तदपेक्षिष्यामहे 'सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः' इति. Here neither the *svarita* nor the *laukika adhikāra* is resorted to, but a device called *pratibandi*. This is the argument ;

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1 The significance of *api* is that P. 1. 1. 51 : *ur aṇ raparaḥ* is already under the jurisdiction of *ṣaṣṭhī* ... (P. 1. 1. 49).

2 See the detailed note on *apekṣā* in *Dīp*. 10.

The opponent claims that P. 1. 1. 3 : *iko guṇavṛddhī* is a universal injunctive rule laying down replacement of all *ik* sounds by both Guṇa and Vṛddhi. He further claims that rules like P. 7. 3. 84 : *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* again teach Guṇa (*punarvacanam*) in their respective contexts which serves to ward off Vṛddhi, and rules like P. 7. 2. 115 *aco ñṇiti* again teach Vṛddhi in their respective contexts which serves to ward off Guṇa. Now here is a question for the opponent : How do you prevent Guṇa in cases like *yātā* where it is due by P. 7. 3. 84 ? He cannot say that P. 1. 1. 3 will prevent it (as there is no *ik* in *yātā*) for, P. 7. 3. 84 teaches Guṇa for *all* stems when the affixes mentioned follow and according to him P. 1. 1. 3 is not meant for specifying the substituend for Guṇa and Vṛddhi taught by rules likes P. 7. 3. 84 and P. 7. 2. 115 but for *enjoining* Guṇa and Vṛddhi for all *ik*-s. (And surely one cannot say that the opponent desires Guṇa in cases like *yātā*. For if he had wanted it, he would have said *vidhyarthaṁ punarvacanam* — and not *anyatarārthaṁ punarvacanam* — since even according to him P. 1. 1. 3 cannot sanction Guṇa in *yātā* etc.; also this would have been in consonance with the maxim : *vidhiniyamayor vidhir balavān*). The only way therefore left for him is to change his stand and connect P. 1. 1. 3 with rules like P. 7. 3. 84 (still maintaining the independent characters of both) which will ultimately result into Guṇa (taught by P. 7. 3. 84 etc. and also by P. 1. 1. 3) being restricted to *ik*. That is how Guṇa can be prevented in *yātā* etc. (एवं यातादयः शक्या निवर्तयितुम् — *Dīp.*). In other words he will have to say that P. 7. 3. 84 is not autonomous or complete in itself; and that it needs (*apekṣiṣyate*) P. 1. 1. 3. Pat. now says that it can equally be maintained that P. 1. 1. 3 is not autonomous and that it is operative only when it is combined with rules like P. 7. 3. 84 (which also can explain *yātā* etc.). Read : अथ वेदं तावदयं प्रष्टव्यः— सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोर्गुणो भवतीतीह कस्मान्न भवति, याता, वाता ? इदं तत्रापेक्षिष्यते इको गुणवृद्धी इति । यथैव तर्हि इदं तत्रापेक्षिष्यते, एवमिहापि तदपेक्षिष्यामहे सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोरिति । (*Mbh*). The *Dīp.* अवश्यं त्वयान्यतरार्थं up to the end is a commentary on this *Mbh.*

तत्रापेक्षायां सत्यां ... etc. makes a point which is not made expressly in the *Mbh.* Bhar. says that if neither P. 1. 1. 3 nor P. 7. 3. 84 etc. is complete in itself and requires (*apekṣā*) the other to complete it, what is the use of regarding them as two independent rules (*vākyabhedena*)? Let us better integrate them into a single rule (एकमेवाभिसंबद्धं वाक्यम्). Read Kaiy : 'अन्यतरार्थं पुनर्' इति वदतावश्यमेवं संबन्धः कर्तव्यो 'यत्र गुणवृद्धिशब्दोच्चारणेन गुणवृद्धी विधीयेते तत्रेक इति उपतिष्ठते' इति । अन्यथा याता वातेत्यादिषु विध्यर्थत्वे संभवति कथमन्यतरार्थं पुनर्वचनं स्यादित्युच्यते ? अवश्यकर्तव्यायां चापेक्षायामेकवाक्यतयैवापेक्षाऽस्तु । तेनैकरूप एवार्थौ, न तु वाक्यभेदेन स्वातन्त्र्यं पारतन्त्र्यं च ।

So P. 1. 1. 3 is not an independent injunctive rule.

Readings : (1) AL अथाप्येतदभ्युपगन्तव्यम् . Since *upagam-* also has the meaning 'to admit' etc., it is not necessary to alter the MS उपगन्तव्यम् into अभ्युप° . (2) Sw इकां will do equally well. (3) The MS परांगत्व is emended into पराङ्गवत् by AL and into परांगत्वे(न) by Sw. (4) Ed. प्रसारणे. (5) Ed. सर्वेषां यणाम्. (6) The context requires that the MS प्रसारणं पूर्वं कथं has to be emended into (सं)प्रसारणसंज्ञा कथम् . (7) AL इग् यणस्थानी अत्रानियत इति नियमार्थं वचनम् with a different punctuation and emendation. (8) Although the MS looks like नियमार्थं (and the older eds. follow it), the reading is centainly विषयार्थं as in the *Mbh.* (9) The corrupt मसु of the MS (reconstructed as एषु by AL) is correctly read as ननु by Sw. (10) MS इत्य × × पतिष्ठत (two letters indistinct); AL drop; Sw इत्यात्राकापतिष्ठते. Our text is simple and suits the context very well. (11) MS °नियमान्यत्र (or °त्र); AL °नियमोऽत्र; Sw °नियमा(द्)न्यत्र. (12) MS तश्र; Sw त(त)श्र. (13) The corrupt नाप्येशा of the MS (emended into चापेक्षां by AL) is correctly reconstructed as भाष्येण by Sw. (14) MS reads अपेक्ष्यते for the *Mbh.* (ed.) अपेक्षिष्यते.